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CHAPTER II

THE REGIME OF THE PRISONER OF WAR
A. INTRODUCTORY

In general, each of the successive conv'=lntions containing provisions
for the protection of prisoners of war, beginning with the unratified
1874 Declaration of Brussels and concluding, at the moment, with
the Third 1949 Geneva Convention, has been somewhat more sophisticated in its coverage of the day-to-day life of prisoners of war, the
protections afforded to them, and the obligations imposed upon them.
The purpose of this chapter will be to analyze generally those protections and obligations that now devolve upon prisoners of war "from
the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until tbeir final release and repatriation."! To the maximum extent possible, this analysis
will be presented on a completely functional basis, avoiding for the
most part the usual article-by-article discussion, thus bringing together
and correlating all of the numerous provisions throughout the Convention which deal with any particular facet of the regime of the
prisoner of war. :! We shall join the enemy soldiers at the moment of
their capture, accompany them on their evacuation to the rear,
view their life in the prisoner-of-war camp, and witness their ultimate
release and repatriation.:! We should then have a fairly good understanding of the treatment of these unfortunate individuals which was
probably contemplated by the great majority of the draftsmen of the
1949 Convention as well as, in some areas, the very different kind of
treatment which they probably will actually receive, at least from
some Detaining Powers. We will thus be alerted to the strengths and
the weaknesses of this great humanitarian international agreement
to which most of the members of the world community of nations
have subscribed.4
It is important to bear in mind that there are certain fundamental
protections which are accorded to prisoners of war by the 1949 Convention during the entire period of captivity. Therefore, these protections are applicable whether the individual is still in the hands of
Article 5.
See Preface, p. V.
a As a few of the subjects will require extremely extensive discussions, they will
merely be mentioned here and a whole chapter wiII thereafter be devoted to each
of them.
4 See Appendix B.
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the capturing unit, is in the process of evacuation to the rear, IS In
an interrogation center, is in a rear-area permanent prisoner-of-war
camp, is being transferred from one such camp to another, is in a
labor detachment, or is in process of repatriation. These protections
have, for the most part, been grouped together in the early part of
the 1949 Convention. They include what are now such basic propositions as that prisoners of war are in the hands of the Detaining
(enemy) Power, and not of the individuals who captured them, and
that the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment which they
receive [first paragraph of Article 12] ; that they must at all times
be humanely treated and must be protected, particularly against acts
of violence, intimidation, insults, and public curiosity [Article 13];
that they are entitled to respect for their persons and their honor
[first paragraph of Article 14] ;5 and that, subject to specific provisions relating to rank, sex, health, age, and professional qualifications,
they must all be treated alike, and without adverse distinctions based
on race, nationality, religious belief, or political opinions [Article 16].
The cited Articles also contain provisions which are specific, rather
than general, in their application. Many of the provisions of these
Articles, both general and specific, will be discussed at length at the
point where such a discussion is deemed to be most appropriate.
B. FROM BATTLEFIELD TO PRISONER-OF-WAR CAMP
1. Evacuation from the Battlefield
A surprise attack overruns an enemy position. An enemy unit is
,surrounded and forced to surrender. An enemy patrol is ambushed
and its members are captured. A patrol succeeds in its mission and
returns to its own lines with captured enemy personnel. These and
many other incidents of war will result in the abrupt transformation
from armed combatants to disarmed captives of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men, some of whom may be severely
wounded, some of whom are less severely wounded, and some of whom
are unhurt except for the mental shock which inevitably accompanies
capture. The first paragraph of Article 5 specifies that the Convention
5 The advent in World War II of large numbers of women as combatant (or noncombatant) members of the armed forces, and the reasonable likelihood that this
situation will also exist in future major international armed conflicts, necessitated
the inclusion in the 1949 Convention of a number of provisions specifically dealing
with this problem. Provisions of this nature are to be found in the second paragraph of Article 14, the last paragraph of Article 25, the second paragraph
of Article 29, etc. A discussion of the overall problem and of the relevant provisions of the Convention will be found at pp. 178-180 infra. It will not be mentioned
in the discussion of the various substantive problems which are applicable to all
prisoners of war, regardless of sex. Because of the nominal and pronominal inadequacies of the English language, the words "men," "he," "his," and "him"
should, where appropriate, be construed as including "women," "she," "her," etc.
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applies to them "from the time they fall into the power of the enemy."
This means that simultaneously with the transition from armed combatants to disarmed captives, there is a transition from armed combatants to prisoners of war and that, without any formal action or
decision, the individuals whose status has thus abruptly changed are
immediately entitled to the full protection and safeguards of the Convention. Thus, the 1949 Convention, like its predecessors, provides
[in the first paragraph of Article 19] that these individuals must be
removed from the dangers of the combat zone as soon as possible.
There is, in addition, a prohibition against the holding of captured personnel in combat areas as a shield against enemy action. 6
Certainly, no front-line combat unit would willingly permit itself
to remain encumbered with prisoners of war, so that there is every
incentive on the part of the capturing troops to secure their evacuation with the greatest possible dispatch, at least to the next higher
command which has responsibilities for prisoners of war. But the
evacuation of prisoners of war requires manpower for guards, and
perhaps for transportation-manpower which the combat unit most
probably will not be able to spare, at least until the battlefield area
has settled down to a comparatively quiet state. It can scarcely be
said that such a necessary delay in evacuating the newly captured
prisoners of war would be violative of the 1949 Convention. As a matter of fact, the third paragraph of Article 19 apparently contemplates
such a possibility, for it provides that "[p] risoners of war shall not
be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a
fighting zone." In other words, during the period which elapses before
it is physically possible for the capturing unit to effectuate the evacuation of the prisoners of war, every effort must be made to place
them at a location where they will be protected from the fighting so
far as such protection is possible. Evacuation to the rear must take
place as soon as it is within the capabilities of the capturing unit.
The requirement regarding prompt evacuation of new prisoners of
war is that they be evacuated "far enough from the combat zone for
them to be out of danger."7
But even then not all of the new prisoners of war will necessarily
be among those to be evacuated. The second paragraph of Article 19
authorizes the capturing unit to keep prisoners of war in the combat
zone where, due.to wounds or sickness, prompt evacuation would be
6 The first paragraph of Article 23 prohibits the capturing unit from detaining
prisoners of war where they may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, or in
the combat zone or elsewhere in order "to render certain points or areas immune
from military operations."
7 Article 19, first paragraph. As a practical matter, in modern armed conflict
there will be very few places where prisoners of war are completely out of danger.
The Convention provision refers to the dangers of the battlefield itself.
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more dangerous for their survival than retention in the combat zone. 8
Many modern armies have medical units which function very close to
the front lines, performing emergency operations on badly wounded
personnel where delay in rendering such assistance would probably
be fata1. 9 In many armies wounded enemy personnel will receive the
same type of emergency treatment as that side's own personnel and
will only be evacuated thereafter. 10 Unfortunately, this humanitarian
procedure is far from being universally followed.
Selected prisoners of war will undoubtedly be sent to higher echelon
interrogation centers. Normally, such centers will be sufficiently far
removed from the combat zone to constitute compliance with the provisions of the Convention with which we are here concerned. Prisoners
of war may not be held in the combat zone by front-line units solely
for purposes of interrogation. This is a prohibition which, however,
is not always obeyed. We shall shortly see that this is not the only
problem arising out of the tactical need for the prompt interrogation
of newly captured prisoners of war.l1
Assuming that the front-line unit is now in a position to evacuate
to the rear the prisoners of war whom it has captured, the Convention
contains provisions with regard to the manner in which such evacuation is to be performed, provisions with which, unfortunately, the
front-line unit is not always in a position to comply, and through no
fault of its own.
8 Article 14 of the First Convention (and Article 16 of the Second Convention)
provides that enemy personnel captured while wounded or sick are prisoners of
war and are entitled to the protections and safeguards of the Third Convention.
See pp. 70-71 supra.
9 In Korea, and even more so in Vietnam as more refined techniques evolved, the
helicopter was used as a quick method of evacuating the seriously wounded directly
from the battle field to medical installations. U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 38, provides that the evacuation of wounded prisoners of war from the combat zone is to
be through the same medical channels as those provided for wounded members of
the United States armed forces. (Agreement was reached comparatively early at
the Diplomatic Conference on the provisions of what is now the 1977 Protocol I
with respect to medical air evacuation, a subject covered by Articles 24-31 thereof,
and Articles 5-13 of Annex I thereof.)
10 Early in 1942 it was already apparent that the then Japanese Government did
not intend to comply with the humanitarian provisions of the law of war, including
the 1929 Prisoner-of-War Convention, despite its specific promise so to do. However, on at least one occasion, when units of the Japanese Army overran an American field hospital on Bataan and found wounded Japanese soldiers receiving the
same treatment as wounded Filipinos and Americans, they posted guards to protect
the hospital, its personnel, and its patients. Falk, Bataan 92-94. Such action is, of
course, required by the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 19 of the First
Convention. For a quite different attitude toward an American field hospital on
Bataan. see ibid., 94-101.
11 For a specific instance of violations of the Convention in connection with interrogations before and during evacuation, see Levie, Maltreatment in Vietnam
340-41.
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It will be recalled that Article 13 of the Convention requires that
prisoners of war must "at all times be humanely treated." This provision, of course, applies to the period of evacuation as well as generally. However, lest there by any doubt about this, the provision is
specifically repeated with regard to evacuation in the first paragraph
of Article 20 which states, in part, that "[t]he evacuation of prisoners
of war shall always be effected humanely...." But this latter Article
goes even further because, due to the unique problems frequently encountered during the course of the original evacuation of prisoners of
war from the front lines to the rear, it was felt necessary, and properly so, to establish certain specific minimum standards for general
guidance.
In the first place, Article 20 requires that the evacuation be effected
under conditions similar to those employed in changes of station for
forces of the Detaining Power. This provision is obviously unrealistic.
Front-line troops do not have available to them the physical facilities
which are available for the movement of troops on change of station.
The most that can be expected is that logistical vehicles which bring
supplies forward may be available to move prisoners of war to the
rear. If, as may frequently occur, the battlefield conditions are such
that motor vehicle turnabout areas are located at a considerable distance to the rear, then prisoners of war are necessarily going to be
required to march on foot at least to those areas; and upon their arrival there, they are going to be required to continue their march to
the rear on foot if no vehicles are available at that point. Moreover,
many armies are not adequately mechanized for the movement of
supplies to forward areas. 12 Certainly, in line with what has already
been discussed, it is to the advantage of the new prisoner of war to
get away from the combat zone, and as far to the rear as possible, and
as soon as possible, even if he must travel on foot-except, perhaps,
insofar as the possibility of escape diminishes as he moves to the rear.
In the second place, the middle paragraph of Article 20 requires
the Detaining Power to furnish an adequate amount of food, potable
water, clothing, and medical attention during the course of the evacuation. There is no question but that humanitarian considerations of
the highest order dictate that the prisoner of war should be adequately
cared for in these material respects during the process of evacua-

12 Only a comparatively few of the armies of today are what might be considered
to be "adequately" mechanized. In Korea a million "volunteers" of the so-called
Chinese People's Volunteers were supported logistically by a number of vehicles
which the commander of a Western European army would probably consider insufficient for a single infantry division.
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tionP This can be a crucial period insofar as the ultimate survival
of a prisoner of war is concerned. While most prisoners of war will
survive an evacuation which is accomplished in a few hours or, perhaps, a day, evacuations which are performed completely by marches
and which last a number of days or weeks take a disproportionately
high toll-and usually unnecessarily SO.14
In the third place, like its predecessors, the second paragraph of
Article 20 requires the captors to "establish as soon as possible a
list of the prisoners of war who are evacuated." The dual purpose of
this provision-like a number of other provisions relating to identifications, notifications, and communications with the exterior (the
homeland of the prisoner of war)-is (1) to establish the accountability of the Detaining Power for the prisoners of war whom it has
taken; and (2) to permit families to receive definite information
concerning the fate of their loved ones. Perhaps in order to avoid accountability, perhaps in the expectation that uncertainty with regard
to the fate of husbands, sons, and fathers will adversely affect the
morale and the wiII to continue the war of the enemy civilian population, some countries have either intentionally disregarded this provision or, having perhaps complied with it for their own use, have
refused or neglected to comply with the later provisions of the Convention15 which make the present provision meaningful by providing

13 In the preliminary discussions of this Article by Committee II (Prisoners of
War) of the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference, the representative of the ICRC
(Wilhelm) referred to "the distressing experiences of the last war" which had
occurred during the evacuation of prisoners of war. 2A Final Record 252. He was
undoubtedly referring primarily to such well-publicized incidents as the "Death
March" which followed the fall of Bataan. I.M.T.F.E. 1043-45; ibid., Pal Dissent
1171-72. Less wellpublicized atrocities of this nature were the subject of charges
in a number of other war-crimes cases such as the Trial of il'Iasao; Trial of Heering and Trial of Mackensen. According to one commentator, 35-40 percent of the
Germans captured at Stalingrad died while being evacuated. Reiners, Soviet Indoctrination 18.
14 Experiences during the hostilities in Korea indicate that the treatment of
prisoners of war by the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists during the
period of evacuation (as well as during the rest of the period of captivity) reached
a new level in inhumanity. With regard to the prisoner-of-war evacuations by the
Communists, one American investigating body had this to say: "The first ordeal
the prisoner [of war] had to suffer-and often the worst-was the march to one
of these camps .... So the journeys to the prison camps were 'death marches' ....
On one of these marches, 700 men were headed north. Before the camp was reached.
500 men had perished." U.S., POW 8. See also U.S., Communist Interrogation 1617. The Viet Minh followed the identical procedure with the French prisoners of
war captured at Dien Bien Phu-and with equally fatal results. Fall, Indochina
7-9.
15 Articles 122, 123, and 124. For a fuller discussion of this problem, see pp. 153158 infra.

103
for the furnishing of the information contained in such lists of evacuees through neutral channels to the Power upon which the prisoners
of war depend.10 While it is true that front-line troops are rarely
equipped to do administrative work, even a rifleman or truck driver
or military policeman could perform the simple function of listing the
prisoners of war whose evacuation he is supervising.17 Moreover, this
act of listing the prisoners of war being evacuated is actually of value
and an advantage to the Capturing Power, as it is then in a much
better position to account for prisoners of war who die or escape during the evacuation and thus to avoid charges of enslavement which
have-and not without justification-been leveled against the countries which have failed to account for individuals who presumably
were once prisoners of war in their hands.
Where the evacuation process takes place over a period of time, and
intermediate stops are necessary, the last paragraph of Article 20
contemplates that such stops will be made at "transit camps" and directs that prisoners of war be held in such camps for as brief a period
as possible. Experience has shown that these transit camps were frequently nothing but rude barbed-wire enclosures offering none of the
required amenities such as protection from the elements, sanitary
10 These were among the many provisions of the 1949 Convention which the
North Korean and Chinese Communists refused to implement during the Korean
hostilities, despite an early promise by the North Koreans to comply with the Convention. In August and September 1950 the North Koreans furnished two token
lists containing the names of 110 Americans taken prisoners of war early in the
fighting. 1 ICRC, Conflit de Coree, Nos. 176 & 178. However, they thereafter refused all requests for further information of this kind, and the Chinese Communists never furnished any lists. During the armistice negotiations the United Nations Command demanded a list of all prisoners of war held by the Communists
before it would embark on any discussion of the prisoner-of-war problem. It then
developed that the Communists were completely unable to account for many thousands of members of the armed forces of the nations composing the United Nations
Command and of the Republic of Korea, who were missing in action and many of
whom had presumably been captured. It is probable that a majority of these missing individuals-for whom the Communists were never able to account-were
among those who died on the evacuations marches, no lists of such evacuees having
ever been made.
17 It must be admitted that even a crude list may be well-nigh impossible of preparation at this level if the capturing troops and the prisoners of war use different
alphabets, or if one uses an alphabet and the other uses ideographs. However, even
this difficulty can be easily overcome by the use of the duplicate identity cards provided for in the third paragraph of Article 17. Thus, one of the members of the
United States Delegation to the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference has said:
"This provision [for duplicate identity cards] offers an easy solution to the problem of hasty evacuation. The duplicates of each identity card may be collected prior
to evacuation and they constitute a basis for a nominal roll. The provision that the
identity card "may in no case be taken away from him" does not preclude the taking of the duplicate. The intent of the provision is that the prisoner of war shall at
no time be without means of identification." Dillon, Genesis 50.

104

facilities, etc. Article 24 provides that where transit camps are used
on a regular basis they must meet all of the conditions required of
permanent prisoner-of-war camps and evacuees must receive the same
treatment there as the 1949 Convention entitles them to in such permanent prisoner-of-war camps.18 Unfortunately, there is little likelihood of general compliance with these provisions. Actually, in many
areas of the world intermediate stops made during the course of evacuation will usually be made at what are merely convenient stopping
points in that particular march, where no facilities whatsoever are
available, and compared to which even a rough transit camp would
offer considerable comfort.19
Finally, it must be pointed out that in at least one respect this particular facet of the 1949 Convention inexplicably contains less protection for the prisoner of war than did the 1929 Convention. The last
paragraph of Article 7 of the latter Convention limited daily foot
marches during the evacuation to 20 kilometers (about 12 miles) a day
except in certain specified situations. No comparable provision is to
be found in the 1949 Convention. 20 If this deletion was made because
it was thought that future evacuations would be accomplished entirely
by mechanical means, events have already disclosed the incorrectness
of such an assumption. 21 While the distance fixed in the 1929 Convention as a maximum might have been considered as somewhat low
(perhaps it was intentionally set low because of the number of walking wounded who will normally be among those evacuated on foot),
there is little doubt but that some reasonable maximum should have
been included, if for no other reason than to furnish the commander
of the capturing troops with an international standard as a guideline
for his own protection against subsequent charges of maltreatment
of prisoners of war.
2. Transfer of Prisoners of War between Detaining Powers
One problem which may arise as early as the evacuation is that
18 The 1929 Convention had no provision establishing minimum requirements for
transit camps. Those maintained by both sides in EUrope during World War II
were found to be grossly inadequate. 1 JCRC Report 245. The JCRC takes the position that a distinction must be made between the type of transit camp referred to
in the last paragraph of Article 20, used for evacuations, and the more permanent
type of transit camp referred to in Article 24, used for intercamp transfers. Pictet,
Commentary 175-76.
19 Of course, if the transit camp is located in the hinterland, remote from the
combat zone, and is used primarily in connection with transfers between permanent
prisoner-of-war camps, the applicability of Article 24 can scarcely be questioned.
20 Its deletion was recommended by the 1947 Conference of Government Experts
(1947 GE Report 128) on the theory that this type of protection would be covered
by the broad principles that were to be included in the proposed new first paragraph of the article. The propriety of the action was not challenged at the 1949
Diplomatic Conference.
21 The numerous deaths which occurred during prisoner-of-war evacuations by
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relating to the transfer of prisoners of war from the custody of one
Detaining Power (the Capturing Power) to another Detaining Power,
an ally. Suppose, for example, that a small Belgian tactical unit, such
as a battalion, is operating under attachment to a French division
which is furnishing it complete logistical support. The Belgians capture a number of prisoners of war. They have no facilities for the
evacuation of, nor prisoner-of-war camps to which to evacuate, these
prisoners of war. In accordance with their overall logistical reliance
on the French, the Belgians turn the prisoners of war over to the
French for evacuation and custody. Which Power is thereafter responsible for ensuring that these particular prisoners of war receive the
full protection accorded them by the 1949 Convention, the Belgians or
the French 122 The solution to this problem was sharply disputed at
the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference.23 The Stockholm Draft which
had resulted from the prior efforts of the ICRC provided for the joint
responsibility of the Capturing Power and the actual Detaining Power.24 The United Kingdom and the Netherlands had each submitted a
memorandum prior to the convening of the Conference opposing joint
responsibility and recommending that responsibility be placed solely
on the actual Detaining Power,25 basically because of the difficulty of
enforcing joint responsibility, but also because of the likelihood of its
causing friction between allies. The provision which was finally adopted, and which appears in the second and third paragraphs of Article
12, was a United Kingdom compromise proposal placing primary responsibility for the proper care and treatment of the transferred
prisoners of war on the Power which accepts them, and which thereby
becomes their Detaining Power (France, in our example), but prothe Communists in Korea (see note 14 supra) were indubitably directly related to
the daily marches of 50 and 60 kilometers which the prisoners of war were required to make, frequently in subzero weather and always with inadequate clothing, food, and water, and with no medical attention for the wounded and sick.
22 The situation could, in fact, be far more complex than outlined above. See
Baxter, Constitutional Forms 325. And, of course, the Power to whom custody is
transferred must be a Party to the Convention.
23 2A Final Record 248-50; Dillon, Genesis 48; Pilloud, Reservations, R.I.G.R.
Supp. 195-96.
24 See Article 11, Revised Draft Conventions 56. The United States and the Soviet
Union both supported this proposal. 2A Final Record 328. Although the 1929 Convention contained no provision concerning the transfer of prisoners of war from
one Detaining Power to another, during World War II the United States had accepted the view that it continued to be ultimately responsible for the welfare of the
prisoners of war captured by it whom it had turned over to the custody of its allies.
Feilchenfeld, Prisoners of War 87; 1 [GRG Report 242, 336 & 544-45; Lewis &
Mewha 240.
21i Diplomatic Conference Documents: Memorandum by the Government of the
United Kingdom, Document No.6, at 5-6; Proposition by the Netherlands Government, Document No.8, at 6.
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viding that if the Protecting Power advises the Capturing Power (Belgium) that the transferred prisoners of war are not being treated as
required by the 1949 Convention in some material respect, the burden
is then on the Capturing Power either to see that the deficiency is corrected or to request the return of the transferred prisoners of war.2G
There is thus created the normal absolute responsibility of the actual
Detaining Power and a type of contingent responsibility on the Capturing Power.27 All of the Communist countries have followed the
lead of the Soviet Union and have filed reservations to this provision
of the 1949 Convention. 28 The Soviet reservation, which is typical,
states that it does not "consider as valid the freeing of a Detaining
Power, which has transferred prisoners of war to another Power, from
responsibility for the application of the Convention to such prisoners
of war while the latter are in the custody of the Power accepting
them."29

3. Interrogation of Prisoners of War
From the moment of capture there also arises the problem of the
extent to which the Detaining Power may seek or extract information
from the new prisoner of war.30 In Article 17 the 1949 Convention
has attempted, to a rather limited extent, to remedy the deplorable
situation in this regard which existed during World War II. However,
this Article merely elaborates somewhat on its predecessor, Article 5
of the 1929 Convention; and like so many of the other provisions of
the new Convention, the ultimate efficacy of the redrafted provisions
will depend almost entirely upon the extent to which the belligerents
direct and require compliance with these provisions of the 1949 Convention by their troops despite the not abnormal military expediency
to the contrary.
26 This was, generally speaking, the manner in which the United States had acted
during World War II (1 ICRC Report, 544-45) and it apparently voted in favor of
the United Kingdom compromise proposal which was adopted. The Soviet Union
did not. 2A Final Record 330-31.
27 Yingling & Ginnane 407. The second paragraph of Article 12 requires that
before making the transfer the Capturing Power must have "satisfied itself of the
willingness and ability" of the proposed Detaining Power to apply the Convention.
:!8 Shindler & Toman 483ff. For a discussion of the Soviet position, see Brockhaus, The U.S.S.R. 291.
29 Shindler & Toman 505. One ICRC legal expert has stated with respect to the
reservations to Article 12 that "this reservation cannot be considered as binding
on States which have not maGe it. As it is not intended to limit or modify the
obligations of the States which did make it, it constitutes in reality a unilateral
declaration by those States, indicating the attitude which they will adopt if the
situation arises. They are not entitled, however, to rely on the Convention itself to
require that other States adopt the same attitude." Pilloud, Reservations, 11
R.I.C.R. Supp. 195-96.
30 See generally Glod & Smith, Interrogation.
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Prohibitions on the use of force to compel prisoners of war to
divulge information to the enemy are not a recent development. They
were already well established in 1863 when Lieber included in his Code
a provision which stated that "the modern law of war permits no
longer the use of any violence against prisoners in order to extort
the desired information or to punish them for having given false information."31 Oddly enough, Article 9 of the Regulations annexed to
the Second Hague Convention of 1899 and to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, w'hich were identical, each merely required the prisoner of war to give his "true name and rank" and provided for loss
of privileges if he refused to do so-thus imposing obligations in this
area on the prisoner of war, but none whatsoever on the Detaining
Power. This defect of the Hague Conventions was soon recognized,
and the special prisoner-of-war agreements negotiated by the belligerents during the course of World War I frequently remedied the omission with rather detailed restrictive provisions. 3:! The 1929 Convention
rectified the omissions of 1899 and 1907 but, unfortunately, its provisions were all too frequently disregarded; and, as has already been
stated, the 1949 Convention does little more than to elaborate on some
of the relevant provisions.
In order to ensure the correct identification of every prisoner of war
the first paragraph of Article 17 of the 1949 Convention requires each
of them to answer questions regarding his full name, rank, serial number, and date of birth.33 Moreover, if the prisoner of war refuses to
furnish these items of information to his interrogators, he may have
restrictions placed on the privileges to which his rank or status34 might
otherwise entitle him,35 unless his failure to respond is due to his
31 Lieber Code, Article 80. Article 130 of the 1949 Convention makes "torture or
inhuman treatment" a "grave breach" of the Convention. For a discussion of this
grave breach and its relationship to the interrogation of prisoners of war, see
pp. 357-358 infra.
3:! See, e.g., Article XXIX of the 1918 Agreement between the British and Germ-an Governments concerning Combatant Prisoners of War and Civilians.
33 For a problem created by the disparity between the requirements of the first
paragraph of Article 17 and those of the fourth paragraph of Article 122, see
note 216 infra.
34 The word "status" in the second paragraph of Article 17 refers to the categories of persons covered by Article 4A (4), such as war correspondents, who,
while not actually members of the armed forces, are normally granted the status
of officers if they are captured. Pictet, CommentaT1J 159.
:lu For a list of these privileges, see ibid., 159-60. The statement is also there
made (at 159) that "[u]nder the Convention, a prisoner who wilfully makes an
inaccurate statement or who refuses to give the particulars specified in the first
paragraph [of Article 17] may be liable to 'a restriction of the privileges accorded
to his rank of status". It is assumed that the "inaccurate statement" refers to one
concerning identification. There is certainly nothing in Article 17, or anywhere
else in the 1949 Convention, that makes it improper for a prisoner of war to give
incorrect information on any subject other than identification.
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physical or mental condition.36 This, however, is the outer limit of the
pressure which may be applied upon a prisoner of war incident to his
interrogation. 37
It must be borne in mind that nowhere does the 1949 Convention
prohibit the interrogation of prisoners of war which goes beyond the
items listed above. 3s Moreover, there is no prohibition against obtaining information from a prisoner of war by trickery.39 What the fourth
paragraph of Article 17 of the 1949 Convention does prohibit is the
use of physical or mental torture, or any other form of coercion, to
compel a prisoner of war to answer questions propounded to him; and
it further provides that a prisoner of war who refuses to answer such
questions may not be "threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant
or disadvantageous treatment of any kind" because of his refusal. 40
36 The penultimate paragraph of Article 17 specifies that if a prisoner of war
is unable to provide the identifying material because of his physical or mental
condition, he is to be handed over to the medical service and other means are to
be used to establish his identity. Presumably this would include recourse to the
identification card, identification tags, interrogation of other prisoners of war
captured at the same time and place, etc. And the last paragraph of Article 17
requires that interrogations be conducted in a language understood by the prisoner of war being interrogated.
37 In Korea a situation arose which had not been foreseen by the draftsmen
of the Convention-prisoners of war who did not desire to be identified and who
would give false names, switch identities, etc. Meyers & Bradbury, Political Behavior 221; U.S., MP Board, Korea, I, at 101.
3S U.S. DA Pam 27-161-2, at 99. The laws or military regulations of the Power
of Origin may provide sanctions against members of its armed forces who, as
prisoners of war, respond to such interrogation; sanctions which, of course, will
only be imposable subsequent to repatriation. Khadduri, War and Peace 129; Secs.
IV and V, Code of Conduct; Sec. 29, U.S.S.R. Law of 25 December 1958. (While
the Soviet law does not specifically refer to giving information to the enemy, a
Soviet commentator on this section is quoted as stating that it requires the Soviet
soldier who is taken prisoner of war to "sacredly protect military and state
secrets." Ramundo, Soviet Criminal Legislation 81.) After the repatriation of prisoners of war from North Korea (1953), several American servicemen were courtmartialed for informing against fellow prisoners of war. See, e.g., United States
v. Batchelor; United States v. Floyd; United States v. Dickenson.
39 In the notes on the Trial of Killinger, 3 LRTWC at 68, the following appears:
"During his closing address one of the Defense Counsel made three submissions
regarding the scope of the [1929] Convention. The first was that under the Geneva Convention interrogation was not unlawful. The second was that to obtain information by a trick was not unlawful, under the same Convention. The third
point was that to interrogate a wounded prisoner was not in itself unlawful unless
it could be proved that that interrogation amounted to what could be described as
physical or mental ill-treatment. The Court expressed its agreement with these
three principles." And in Pictet, Commentary 163-64, this statement is made: "Be
this as it may, a State which has captured prisoners of war will always try to
obtain military information from them. Such attempts are not forbidden; ..." See
also Flory, Prisoners of War 94; Spaight, Air Power 386; U.S. POW 58-61.
40 After World War II there were a number of war crimes trials arising out of
illegal interrogations of prisoners of war. See, e.g., Trial of Killinger.
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The front-line unit which captures a prisoner of war will frequently,
and understandably, attempt to exploit that event by seeking to obtain
information from him concerning tactical positions and plans and order of battle before evacuating him to the rear. Psychologically, this
is probably the most fruitful time to interrogate a prisoner of war
because of the state of shock from which he will be suffering, and his
fear of the unknown, including how he will be treated by the enemy
in whose complete power he now so suddenly finds himself.41 The capturing unit may seek such information without in any way violating
the provisions of the 1949 Convention, provided that it does not use
any form of coercion and provided that it evacuates the prisoner of
war from the combat zone as soon as practicable. 42
Certain prisoners of war (airmen, submariners, missilemen, nuclear
specialists, etc.) may be considered as having important and unique
intelligence value, and they will probably be evacuated through special
evacuation channels and to special interrogation centers. It is this special type of prisoner of war, in particular, who was the victim of maltreatment of the most vicious nature during World War II, both in
Germany and in Japan. 43
41 It has been found that a prisoner of war is most amenable to answering
questions when he is still suffering from the shock of capture. Toppe, German Methods 23. As long ago as 1936 the Soviet Army prepared a lengthy questionaire which
was to be completed by the capturing troops so that it would be available during
subsequent interrogations. Olson, Soviet Policy 110.
42 In U.N. Human Rights, A/8052, para. 118, the statement is made that "one
of the important rights of prisoners of war was that they should not be interrogated until they have been medically attended and were in a fit condition for
interrogation." Without in any way condoning interrogation by withholding medical treatment from those who are in immediate need of it, or by brutal methods,
no such "right" exists. See note 39 supra. Paragraph 119 of the United Nations
report is even more unrealistic. It states, in part: "Other basic right of prisoners
of war under interrogation would include the right, when possible, to some independent advice before interrogation; ... He should have the right not to be interrogated incessantly or for unduly long periods of time, and should have the
right to food and rest during periods of questioning." The interrogation of a prisoner of war in a search for tactical information of immediate urgency cannot be
equated to the interrogation of an individual arrested for questioning in connection with the possible commission of a crime, as the United Nations report attempts to do.
43 It will be a long time before any interrogators are able to match the cruelties
inflicted upon captured American naval personnel at the Ofuna Naval Interrogation Center in Japan during World War II. See the Schacht Statement. The Nazis
maintained a special interrogation center for all captured airmen (except Russians) at Auswerstelle West, Oberursel, Germany, but wile, rather than torture,
was normally employed there. American Prisoners of War 3; U.S., POW 58-61;
Glod & Smith, Interrogation 148. An opinion of the Judge Advocate General of
the United States Army states that "truth serum" may not be used in interrogating prisoners of war. JAGW 1961/1157,21 June 1961.
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4. Property in the Possession of the Prisoner of War
Our discussion has so far dealt exclusively with the safety and wellbeing of the new prisoner of war-and this is certainly an area which
the 1949 Convention emphasizes, and rightly so. By the fact of his
capture the prisoner of war has lost his liberty for the duration of
hostilities; but the Powers which drafted the Convention, and those
which have since become Parties to it, have, presumably, by their
ratification or adherence thereto, indicated that they entertain the humane belief that there is no reason why he should also be deprived
of his health or his life. Indeed, they have gone a step further, taking
the position that his loss should be limited to the temporary deprivation of his liberty and that even his property (and, as we shall see,
his civil rights) should be protected. Here, too, the protection accorded to the prisoner of war begins at the moment of capture and continues throughout the period of captivity.
While it is only natural to expect that the prisoner of war will be
thoroughly searched immediately upon his capture, both to ensure
that he has no hidden weapons or other articles which might facilitate
escape, and to ascertain whether he has in his possession any documents or other items of intelligence value, the Convention preserves
to him his own personal property as well as certain types of equipment of military issue.
Once again we find that the provisions dealing with this subject in
the 1949 Convention are basically mere elaborations of the cognate
provisions of the 1929 Convention. It will therefore be useful to ascertain what defects, if any, were found to exist in this area during World
War II and to see how these defects have been remedied, if at all.
Article 6 of the 1929 Convention protected the prisoner of war in
the continued possession of "effects and objects of personal use," helmets and gas masks, identification documents, insignia of rank, decorations and objects of value. 44 Because it is impossible to foresee
H The United States practice with respect to such matters during World War
II is summarized as follows: "Each prisoner was searched and disarmed immediately upon capture and contraband articles were taken from him, including all
equipment issued to him by his government, except clothing. He was permitted
to retain his helmet and gas mask in combat zones. Contraband included cameras,
binoculars, signalling devices, compasses, and such other articles as might be
useful to him in an escape. All military papers, documents, maps, and diaries were
retained for intelligence examination." Rich, Brief History 492. This statement was
concerned with the implementation of POW Circular No.1, para. 35 of which
established four categories for personal property found in the possession of a
prisoner of war at the time of his capture:
35. '" Property found in the possession of a prisoner [of war] may be in one
of four classes:
a. Personal effects which he may be allowed to retain.
b. Personal effects taken from him temporarily but returned as soon as practicable.
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what weapons will be used in a future war, the Greek Government
suggested that the provision for the retention of the helmet and gas
mask be enlarged to include other protective devices. 45 This was accomplished by adding the words "and like articles issued for personal
protection" to the former provision when it was redrafted into the
first paragraph of Article 18 of the 1949 Convention. This added clause
will cover such items as bulletproof vests, antiradiation garments,
radiation badges, etc. 46
It has already been noted that the 1929 Convention provided for the
retention by the prisoner of war of any identification documents which
he possessed. The third paragraph of Article 17 of the 1949 Convention now provides for the issuance by the Power of Origin of identity
cards 47 in duplicate48 containing all of the information as to identification that a prisoner of war is required to furnish his captors, and,
if desired, the individual's signature and fingerprints 49 and any other
information the particular belligerent may wish to include thereon;
and also contains a specific prohibition against taking identity cards
away from prisoners of war, a practice which had caused numerous
problems during World War IVw The second paragraph of Article 18
contains the further provision that where a prisoner of war has no
c. Personal effects which he is not permitted to retain while interned, including money and any article which may be used to facilitate escape.
d. Articles which he is not permitted to retain at any time and which will be
confiscated.
For another type of classification, see Pictet, Commentary, 166 n.2.
41; Diplomatic Conference Documents: Memorandum by the Greek Government,
Document No. 11, at 8. The language actually adopted was suggested by a Canadian representative. 2A Final Record 251.
46 During W orId War II none of the belligerents construed the provision concerning the retention of helmets and gas masks as applying once the prisoner of
war had reached a permanent prisoner-of-war camp. See note 44 supra, and
SPJGW 1944/6900, 5 July 1944. Whether this will continue to be a reasonable
interpretation of the new provisions is doubtful, given the developments of modern
warfare.
47 However, entitlement to the status of prisoner of war does not depend upon
the possession of an identity card. Nordic Experts 167-68. See also p. 62 supra.
48 The provision of the 1949 Convention which calls for the individual to be
supplied ,vith two identity cards, rather than one, was proposed by a member of
the United States Delegation to the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference (Parker).
2A Final Record 251. He gave no reason for his proposal, which was adopted
without discussion. Ibid., 351. For a possible reason, see note 17 supra.
49 For a discussion of fingerprinting, see pp. 118-119 infra.
tiO During World War II the ICRC found that some 26,000 German noncommissioned officers (NCOs) had had their identity papers taken from them in
England, before being shipped to prisoner-of-war camps in the United States, with
the result that they were denied NCO status and were required to work. 1 ICRC
Report 339. GCI'man Regulations, No. 13, para. 54 ,specifically directed the confiscation of all identification papers "[i]n order to render escapes of prisoners of war
more difficult!' The United States Army considered this and other similar direc-

112

identity card, the Detaining Power shall supply him with such a document. 51 Thus three separate efforts have been made to prevent a recurrence of the situation which so frequently arose during World War
II when prisoners of war were unable to establish their actual grade
because their identification documents had been taken from them.52
During World War II a rather unusual situation arose with respect
to the right of a prisoner of war to retain his uniform. There was no
specific reference in the 1929 Convention to the right of a prisoner
of war to retain his uniform or other items of clothing. However, this
was apparently a generally accepted proposition. Nevertheless, German guards at prisoner-of-war camps were taking from prisoners of
war certain uniforms which, with minimum changes, could be made
to resemble items of clothing used by the civilian population and thus
could facilitate escape, substituting other uniforms of the same belligerent which were less easy to convert. In July 1943 the German military command issued a directive prohibiting this practice.!i3 Despite
this directive, the practice seemingly continued because six months later
it was called to the attention of the American military authorities, who
expressed the opinion that the German guards were not acting improperly inasmuch as even personal and other specifically exempted
property may be taken from a prisoner of war and impounded when

tives to be contrary to the provisions of the 1929 Convention and to be without
support in international law. SPJGW 1945/2868, 17 March 1945. Today such action would be a direct violation of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the 1949
Convention; and the second paragraph of Article 18 of the Convention would require the Detaining Power to replace the identity card which had been improperly
taken.
51 The United States Army has implemented this requirement with U.S. Army
Regs. 633-50, para. 19, which directs that if a prisoner of war does not have an
identity card, one will be issued to him.
52 The United States Army apparently continues to take the position that prisoners of war who do not possess identification documents should be treated as
privates (other ranks), although provision is now made for them to submit requests to their own governments for proof of their true grades. U.S. Army Regs.
633-50, para. 30.
53 German Regulations, No. 27, para. 410, read as follows:
The uniforms of prisoner of war officers, particularly French light infantry officers, French and British naval officers, and British aviation officers,
have been frequently confiscated for reasons of security and replaced by
others less objectionable as to cut and color. Such procedure is not permissible. The prisoner of war officer has a right to his uniform. It must be left
in his possession even if it should make a stricter surveillance of the prisoner
of war necessary.
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it is of a character to facilitate escape. 5~ The specific authorization for
prisoners of war to retain "articles used for their clothing and feeding" even if they are of military issue, now included in the first paragraph of Article 18 does not appear to have changed the situation; and
it is probable that this unwritten limitation on the protection of prisoner of war property rights continues to exist. 55 Thus, a prisoner of
war might have an antique pocket watch with a compass in the stem.
Even though such a watch falls within the category of "articles of
personal use" [Article 18, first paragraph] or of "articles having
above all a personal or sentimental value" [Article 18, third paragraph], which prisoners of war may normally retain, no Detaining
Power could be censured for taking the watch and placing it in safekeeping until the owner is repatriated. 5R
Money in the possession of the prisoner of war at the time of his
capture is placed in a category by itself. Article 6 of the 1929 Convention merely provided that money could only be taken from a prisoner
of war by order of an officer, that a receipt had to be given, and that
the amount taken had to be credited to the individual's prisoner-of-war
account. These provisions were found to be inadequate to provide
answers to the numerous problems which arose during World War II
with regard to money so taken and it is doubtful that they have been
resolved by the provisions of the 1949 Convention, despite the fact that
the draftsmen were undoubtedly aware of these problems and did
elaborate to some extent on the former provisions.
If the prisoner of war has in his possession at the time of capture
a reasonable amount of the currency of the nation in whose armed
forces he was serving at the time of his capture (the Power of Origin), no real problem arises. But what if he has an extraordinarily
large amount of such currency? Or if he has currency of the Detaining Power? Or of third Powers, belligerent or otherwise? Or so-called
invasion or occupation money, currency issued by his military authorities solely for use in a particular area? Each of these questions arose
;;4 In SPJGW 1944/2037, 11 February 1944, the view was expressed that "the
German position [of confiscating leather flying suits and work coveralls on the
ground that they would facilitate escape] is correct. There is an established principle in international law allowing the detention of articles useful in aiding espionage, or escape, even though they fall within the class of property that a
prisoner of war may ordinarily retain. It is believed that that principle is properly applied in this case to the clothes in question which might well be taken for
civilian clothes."
GG U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, No. 24 (a), permits the retention of their mess equipment by prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of Article 18, but, nevertheless, specifically excludes knives and forks, items which could be used as weapons
or tools.
GG Ibid., para. 24 (b). This could in any event probably be justified under the
fifth paragraph of Article 18, which permits the withdrawal of articles of value
from prisoners of war "for reasons of security."

114

during World War II. None of them is really answered directly by
the 1949 Convention.
As in the 1929 Convention, the fourth paragraph of Article 18 of
the 1949 Convention provides that money may be taken from a prisoner of war only by order of an officer,57 that a receipt must be given,
and that the amount taken must be credited to the prisoner-of-war
account which Article 64 of the 1949 Convention requires to be established for each individual prisoner of war. It has two additional features intended as protective devices: a requirement that the receipt
be itemized and that it be "legibly inscribed with the name, rank, and
unit of the person issuing the receipt"; and a provision for a "special
register" in which the transaction is to be recorded at the time it takes
place, with particulars as to the amount of money taken and the identity of the prisoner of war from whom it was taken. Unfortunately,
no convention provisions of this kind can possibly be effective with
the numerous rapacious individuals to be found in every armed force
in time of war and who may happen to be the captors; and it is extremely doubtful if any newly captured prisoner of war, even one fully
familiar with these provisions of the 1949 Convention, is going to be
sufficiently assertive and courageous to question the act of his captor
in taking his money and either not giving him a receipt, or giving
him one which is completely indecipherable.
But let us suppose that the captor and searcher is one of the more
honest individuals who probably constitute the great mass of the
members of most armed forces. He finds that the prisoner of war has
only a nominal amount of money on his person and that all of such
money was issued by the Power of Origin. The appropriate receipt
would be issued, the appropriate entry would be made in the special
register, and subsequently, if so requested by the prisoner of war, the
amount would be credited to his prisoner-of-war account; if no such
request is made, the currency will be kept with other obj ects taken
from the prisoner of war for safekeeping and will be returned to him
at the time of his repatriation. No problems are encountered and the
provisions of the 1949 Convention are fully adequate to cover the
transaction.
Now let us suppose that this same captor finds that the prisoner of
war has in his possession a sum of money in the currency of the Power
of Origin many times in excess of that which he could normally be
expected to have. There is much to be said for the position adopted
by some Powers during WorId War II of requiring the prisoner of
57 In Pictet, Commentary 169, the suggestion is made that the officer need not
actually be present, that he may instruct a clerk to carry out the operation, but
that the officer remains responsible. As a practical matter, this is probably how
the search for, and the removal of, money will be accomplished in the great majority of cases.
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war to justify his possession of an inordinately large sum of money. 58
Article 18 is concerned with protecting the personal property of the
prisoner of war and the portion of paragraph 4 thereof which is concerned with the giving of the receipt for money taken from a prisoner
of war refers to the "owner." Under these circumstances, it is believed that the Detaining Power is warranted in requiring the prisoner
of war to justify his possession of unusually large sums of money.59
A somewhat similar problem arises when the newly captured prisoner of war is found to be in possession of currency issued by the
Detaining Power or its allies. There is rarely, if ever, any valid justification for a member of the armed forces of one belligerent having in
his possession currency of an enemy belligerent. When he does, it
usually indicates one of three things: that he has taken it illegally
from members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power captured
and searched by him before his own capture ;60 that he has looted the
SPJGW 1944/11874, 3 November 1944, stated:
4. A prisoner of war is not entitled, under the quoted provisions of Article
6 of the [1929] Convention, to have all money found upon his person credited
to his account. It is only money belonging to the prisoner of war that is to be
so credited, and where a reasonable doubt arises as to ownership, the prisoner
of war may be called upon for proof thereof....
5. The possession by a prisoner of war of a large sum of cash likewise indicates the probability that such money is not his property. The practice of
diffusing public funds among individuals when capture or military occupation impends is almost as old as war itself....
To the same effect, see Downey, Captured Enemy Property 491-92. Substantially
the same result was reached in German Regulations, No. 27, para. 395. The United
Kingdom and the United States have both taken this same position in their postWorld War II military manuals. See British Manual para. 141 nn.1 & 2; and U.s.
Manual para. 94c. [The frequent similarities which may have been noted in these
two manuals is no mere coincidence. See Baxter, The Cambridge Conference on
the Revision of the Law of War, 47 A.J.I.L. 702.]
59 At the beginning of the German offensive which later became known as the
"Battle of the Bulge," an American division was overrun while its finance officers were in possession of several hundred thousand dollars in cash which had
just been issued to them for payroll purposes. Most of these officers elected to burn
or bury the cash in their possession before their capture. Had they decided to retain it on their persons, or to distribute it to a few trustworthy soldiers, it would
still have been governmental, and not personal, funds. There would, therefore,
have been no basis for not considering it to be "war booty," public property of
one belligerent captured by another. Downey, Captured Enemy Property 491-92.
60 Of course, it is possible that he has lawfully taken the money from prisoners
of war in accordance with the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 18,
given them the required receipt, and entered the transaction in the special register; and that he was himself captured before he had an opportunity to turn the
money over to the appropriate authorities of his armed force. However, if such
is the case, once again the fund belongs to his Power of Origin, not to the prisoner of war in whose possession it is found; and it is properly seized by the Detaining Power as war booty. (This does not affect the right of the original owner
to a credit on his prisoner-of-war account; provided that the two belligerents concerned are able to overcome the administrative problems involved.)
fiB
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bodies of the dead and wounded of the Detaining Power ;61 or that it
has been given to him by his military authorities for subversive or
other similar purposes. It is therefore somewhat surprising, to say
the least, to find the the fourth paragraph of Article 18 provides that
"[s]ums in the currency of the Detaining Power ... shall be placed
to the credit of the prisoner's account."6!l Just as there is no valid
justification for his possession of enemy currency, so there is no valid
justification for permitting him to profit from a possession which in
all probability originally came about through illegal acts. Perhaps it
will be possible to circumvent this undesirable result by requiring that
here,too, the prisoner of war establish that he is, in fact, the "owner"
of the currency involved.
The possession by a prisoner of war of the currency of a neutral
Power is not immediately suspect as it is possible for him to be legitimately in the possession of this currency. However, the circumstances
here are likewise such as to warrant an investigation. If it develops
that the currency actually is the property of the Power of Origin, the
Detaining Power may treat it as war booty and confiscate it. 63 If the
prisoner of war establishes ownership, he may, pursuant to the last
paragraph of Article 18, ask to have it converted into the currency
In SPJGW 1945/2240, 19 February 1945, the following statement appears:
Since enemy governments do not pay their soldiers in United States money
or issue it to them, the presumption is justified, in the absence of satisfactory
evidence to the contrary, that United States money found in the possession
of a 'prisoner of war at the time of initial search upon capture was unlawfully taken from an American soldier, living or dead. When United States
money is found upon a prisoner of war at such time, an informal investigation
will be made by an officer of the legality of his possession of it. As this is not
a criminal but an administrative investigation, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not required in order'to decide the question either way. If the investigating officer concludes that the statement of the prisoner and other evidence
(if any) presented by him outweighs the prima facie presumption above mentioned, the officer will give the prisoner a receipt for the money and deposit
it to his credit in a trust fund account. Otherwise the money will be confiscated ...•
See also German Regulations, No.4, para. 13; and Rundell, Paying the POW 122.
62 Similarly, Article 59 provides that "[c]ash which was taken from prisoners
of war.•. at the time of their capture, and which is in the currency of the Detaining Power, shall be placed to their separate accounts"; and the first paragraph of Article 64 provides that the account of a prisoner of war shall be credited with "the sums in the currency of the Detaining Power which were taken
from him." In this regard, see note 222 infra.
63 During W orld War II aircraft crews were frequently furnished with "escape kits" containing currency of the countries over which they might fly, or
which they might be able to reach if they were shot down. Obviously, they were
not the owners of such currency and were not, ~md w,:,uld n-t be, entitled to have
it credited t9 their prisoner-of-war :?ccounts. German Regul.,tions, No. 39, par,~.
737. This would also be true as to the g:>ld coins which were furnished t-:> aircraft
crews operating in certain parts of the world.
61
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of the Detaining Power and credited to his account; otherwise it will
be placed in safekeeping for ultimate return to the prisoner of war
upon his repatriation.
Finally, there arises the question of the action to be taken by the
Detaining Power with respect to "invasion" or "occupation" money,
currency printed by the Power of Origin for use in a specific area and
during a specific period, and which has no actual value. It is probably
possible to dispose of this problem by considering such currency as
falling within the ambit of the phrase "currency other than that of
the Detaining Power" contained in the last paragraph of Article 18. 64
The Detaining Power would then unquestionably be justified in refusing any request for the conversion of such currency for credit to the
prisoner-of-war account, and would maintain in safekeeping the very
bills taken from the prisoner of war, just as it would do with any
nonmoney "articles of value," returning them to the prisoner of war
"in their original state" upon the termination of his captivity. This
was the procedure followed by the Germans during World War II65
and no objection was made to it, nor can any be perceived. While this
currency may, at the later date, be completely worthless, this is a
problem· to be resolved between the individual and his Power of
Origin, the nation which originally issued it.
From the foregoing, it is fairly apparent that while the 1949 Convention has added a few provisions intended to ensure that the new
prisoner of war will be safeguarded in the possession of his moneythe effectiveness of which will, as heretofore and necessarily, depend
in large part upon the controls maintained by the Detaining Power
upon its personnel-it has made no perceptible attempt to solve some
of the technical problems which have previously arisen in this area
and which will undoubtedly arise once again in any future major conflict. However, these are basically problems of administration which
can probably be solved by a commonsense approach and by reciprocity.66
One other problem which has arisen with respect to the personal
property of the prisoner of war is worthy of mention-his right to
sell such property and the right of military personnel of the Detaining
Power to buy it from him. Neither the 1929 nor the 1949 Convention
has any provision relating to this problem.
64 If the "invasion" or "occupation" money was issued by the Detaining Power,
the problem is the same as if it were actual currency of that Power.
65 German Regulations, No. 43, para. 802.
66 The provisions of the 1949 Convention just discussed are, of course, concerned
solely with the problem of the disposition of cash found in the possession of a
prisoner of war at the time of his capture. The more general problem of the finances of individual prisoners of war is discussed at pp. 194-212 infra..
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In August 1944 The United States Army issued a circular which
authorized its personnel to purchase articles from prisoners of war.67
The British, on the other hand, took the view that because of the unequal bargaining positions of the two parties, to permit such purchases
might be to open the way to abuse. Accordingly, British military personnel were subject to disciplinary proceedings if they trafficked with
prisoners of war by way of the purchase or barter of the latter's personal property.68 The United States has now accepted the British position and its post-World War II manual, like that of the United
Kingdom, prohibits such transactions. 69 Presumably, this will not prevent military agencies, such as post exchanges, from buying and offering for sale items produced by the prisoners of war as a pastime,
such as art work, handmade jewelry, novelties,70 etc. Nor is there
actually any basis for asserting a legal, conventional prohibition
against the basic practice, potentially pernicious though it may be.

5. Fingerprinting Prisoners of War
Although the use of fingerprinting as a means of identification dates
back to the late nineteenth century, the matter of fingerprinting prisoners of war did not arise until World War 1. During that conflict the
German Government protested against the United States practice of
photographing and fingerprinting prisoners of war in its custody. The
United States Government replied that it did not consider fingerprinting for the purposes of identification to be inhumane, humiliating, or
disrespectful, and that it would welcome similar action by the Germans with respect to American prisoners of war held by them.71 The
67 U.S. War Department Circular No. 353, 31 August 1944. It is reproduced
substantially in extenso in Downey, Captured Enemy Property 500-02. The circular was based upon an opinion contained in SPJGW 1944/6900, 5 July 1944,
which stated:
There is nothing unlawful in a soldier of our Army picking up and retaining small objects found on the battlefield, or buying articles from prisoners
of war, of the sort which, under the articles quoted, it is unlawful for him to
take from a prisoner, the wounded, or the dead.
68 Lauterpacht, Problem 380 n.1. One ICRC expert believed that while the
practice could be dangerous, and that it would be preferable to prohibit it, the
United States War Department circular was, on the whole, a satisfactory implementation of the relevant provisions of the 1929 Convention, particularly because
it authorized each commander to take any measures he considered necessary to
prevent violations of either the letter or the spirit of the Convention. Pilloud,
Captured Enemy Property, 32 R.I.C.R. at 83l.
69 U.S. Manual para. 94b; British Manual para. 140 n.3.
70 A visit which the author paid late in 1951 to the prisoner-of-war camps maintained by the United Nations Command at Koje-do in Korea revealed that the
main occupation of many prisoners of war was the production for sale of a multitude of novelty items made from used tin cans. See Hermes, Truce Tent 236.
71 [1918] For. Rel. U.S., Supp. 2, at 35-38 (1933); 6 Hackworth, Digest 280.
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1929 Convention again made no mention of fingerprinting. Nevertheless, during World War II both sides photographed and fingerprinted prisoners of war.72
When the Government Experts met in 1947 the question of fingerprinting arose, but only in connection with what became the penultimate paragraph of Article 17, concerning prisoners of war who, because of their physical or mental condition, were unable -to furnish
the required identifying information. 73 Even this limited reference
to fingerprinting by the Detaining Powers was eliminated at the Diplomatic Conference without anything in the record to explain the
reason for, or the meaning of, the action. 74 Presumably, it was felt that
the phrase, "[t]he identity of such prisoners [of war] shall be established by all possible means" (emphasis added) was sufficiently
broad to include the use of fingerprinting if the Detaining Power desired to employ this method of identification. Certainly, there is no
indication that the draftsmen considered fingerprinting to be "inhumane, humiliating, or disrespectful." In fact, the indications are quite
to the contrary, as the third paragraph of Article 17 provides that the
identity card which a State is required to provide to its own personnel
who may become prisoners of war may include fingerprints; and
Annex 4A to the Convention,75 the model identity card, provides space
for both fingerprints and a photograph.76
There appears to be no question but that the United States construes the Convention as permitting both the fingerprinting and the
photographing of prisoners of war. After the identification fiasco early
in the Korean confiict,77 prisoners of war were both photographed and
fingerprinted. 78 The same procedure was followed in Vietnam. 79 Current regulations of the United States Army provide for the issuance
of identity cards with photographs and fingerp.rints to prisoners of
72 Concerning the German practice during W orId War II, see Maughan,
Tobruk 773; concerning the practice of the United States in Korea, see U.S., MP
Board, Korea, I, at 10l.
73 1947 GE Report 124. The fifth paragraph of Article 17, as approved at Stockholm, contained a final sentence which stated: "The identity of such prisoners
[of war] shall be established by all possible means, particularly by the taking of
fingerprints." (Emphasis added.) Revised Draft Conventions 58.
H See 2A Final Record 350-51; 2B Final Record 173.
76 See Annex 4A to Appendix A hereof.
76 For some unknown reason, the draftsmen elected to refer Annex 4A of the
Convention solely to Article 4 thereof (see Article 4A(4) and pp. 60-62 supra)
which, of course, provides for the issuance of identity cards to "[p]ersons who
accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof." However,
this is undoubtedly the identity card which would also be issued in compliance with
the requirement of the third paragraph of Article 17.
77 See note 37 supra.
78 See note 72 supra.
79 The subject was covered by a number of directives of both the Military Assistance Command Vietnam and the United States Army Vietnam.
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war who lack such documents ;80 and the fingerprinting of all prisoners of war. 81 It is extremely doubtful that this procedure will engender any protests from enemy Powers of Origin. More probably, they
will follow the same path if they have the technical competence to
do so.
C. LIFE IN THE PRISONER-OF-WAR CAMP
We have seen our prisoners of war captured, searched, interrogated,
and evacuated to the rear, perhaps through a transit camp. Now, what
of their subsequent life as prisoners of war? The Detaining Power
is, of course, specifically authorized to subject them to internment
(Article 21) ; and, as a corollary to that right, it has the duty to
provide them with maintenance and medical care without charge
(Article 15). This combined right and duty relates to many of the
usual problems of life: a roof over one's head and a place to sleep,
food to eat, clothes to wear, protection against illness, care when sick,
a way to pass the time when well,82 etc., etc. And, wisely, the draftsmen of the 1949 Convention attempted to lay down specific minimum
requirements on the Detaining Power in many of these areas, as well
as in other areas which affect the day-to-day life of the prisoner of
war. For our purposes, it will be necessary not only to analyze these
various minimum requirements, but also to attempt to determine their
probable adequacy in actual practice and the extent to which Detaining Powers may be expected to comply with them.
1. Establishment of Prisoner-of-War Camps
During the wars of the twentieth century it has been generally
customary to intern prisoners of war in camps established for that
specific purpose. The preliminary question as to where such prisonerof-war camps may be located is itself of major importance. As we have
already seen, the prisoners of war must be expeditiously removed
from the dangers of the combat zone (Articles 19 and 23) ;83 but this
80 U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para 19b and Figure 1 (at 86).
til Ibid., para. 20 and Figure 2 (at 87). The NATO directive on this subject
provides for both photograph and fingerprints. STANAG No. 2044, Annex A.
82 This latter item is more important than it might seem. Boredom and idle
hands have frequently been the cause of the lack of discipline in, and many of
the attempted escapes from, prisoner-of-war camps. Lewis & Mewha 57. Much
of the disorder in the prisoner-of-war camps maintained by the United Nations
Command at Koje-do unquestionably stemmed from the fact that the prisoners
of war were not kept busy, a situation upon which Communist techniques battened. See note 70 supra.
83 The problem of transfers from one prisoner-of-war camp to another is discussed at pp. 187-194 infra. However, it should be noted at this point that the
second paragraph of Article 47 covers a situation which, depending upon the
amount of territory available to a Detaining Power, may frequently arise in a
war of movement-the approach of the combat zone to an established prisoner-of-
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is not the only limitation on the Detaining Power's right to locate a
prisoner-of-war camp where this can be most easily accomplished, or
where it will be most usefully located as a ready source of labor. Article 22 of the 1949 Convention sets forth the general requirements
and prohibitions governing the selection of prisoner-of-war camp sites.
They must be located on land ;S4 they must afford every' guarantee of
hygiene and healthfulness; they must not, except in unusual circumstances, be located in a penitentiary;85 and they must not be in unhealthful areas, "or where the climate is injurious for them." If this
latter contingency occurs, perhaps because the prisoners of war are
originally interned in the region of the place of capture, they "shall
be removed as soon as possible to a more favorable climate."
The problem of the climate of the place of internment has long been
a source of difficulty.s6 During the Boer War (1899-1902), the actions
of the British Government in transporting Boer prisoners of war to
India, St. Helena, and Ceylon for internment were protested (by
members of the British Parliament, by the Boer Government. and by
the United States in its capacity as Protecting Power) because of the
allegedly unhealthful climate in each of those places. 87 During World
War I, the German Government protested against the French transfer of prisoners of war captured jn Europe to Algeria and Morocco,
again on the basis of allegedly unhealthful climates. 88 Article 9 of the
1929 Convention attempted to remedy the situation by providing that
persons "captured in unhealthful regions or where the climate is injurious for persons coming from temperate regions, shall be transwar camp. The cited article sets forth two alternative requirements, one of which
must exist in order to justify the transfer of the prisoners of war from the threatened camp to another: that their transfer can be carried out "in adequate conditions of safety"; or that remaining where they are will expose them to even
greater risks than will the transfer.
8! This was formerly of more importance than it is now. During the Napoleonic
Wars, for example, ship hulks were the usual place of internment for prisoners
of war. Lewis, Napoleon 58-60. Nevertheless, the problem did arise again during
World War II. 1 !CRC Report 248.
85 Article 22 authorizes this where it is "justified by the interests of the prisoners themselves." During World War II the ICRC found at least one instance
where the use of a penitentiary as a place of internment was considered to be
to the advantage of the prisoners of war. Ibid.
86 The United States exhibited concern in this regard and included provisions
intended to alleviate the problem if it should occur as long ago as in its Treaties
of Amity and Commerce with Prussia of 10 September 1785 (Article 24), and of
11 July 1799 (Article XXIV) ; and in Article XXII, paragraph II, of the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo ,vith Mexico of 2 February 1848. One pre-World War II
author credits the provision of the 1785 Treaty with being the progenitor of the
cognate article of .the 1929 Convention. Meitani, Regime 26 & 29.
Si Flory, Prisoners of War 46-47. In no case was the protest based upon the
distance from the place of capture to the place of internment.
e~ Ibid., 47.
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ported, as soon as possible, to a more favorable climate." Obviously,
this provision did not meet, and was not even directed at, the
actions specifically protested in the previous conflicts, which involved
transfers {rom the place of capture to an unhealthful region. On the
other hand, in attempting to solve the problem to which it was related,
it probably went too far. Problems of this nature were minimal during
World War II, despite the fact that fighting was going on all over
the globe,89 and the changes made in drafting Article 22 of the 1949
Convention, which were not even the subject of floor debate, were
probably not intended as changes in t!::.e substance of the provisions
of the 1929 Convention.
The provisions of the 1949 Convention have been interpreted literally and as imposing upon the Detaining Power the obligation to
transport prisoners of war from internment in a place where the
climate is unfavorable for any reason,IJO even though it may have been
the place of capture. When, for example, soldiers of a country located
in a temperate climate are transported by their Government to fight
against the armed forces of an equatorial nation and some are captured,
can the Detaining Power be required to remove them from that area,
its national territory, in order to intern them in a "more favorable"
climate (which, normally, will be a climate more closely resembling
that to which they are accustomed) ? A literal interpretation of the
second paragraph of Article 22 would require that this question be
answered in the affirmative. 91 Or, if the troops from the temperate
climate capture soldiers of the equatorial Power, would lack of adequate territory under their control, or problems of logistical support,
justify transporting the prisoners of war to the national territory of
the Detaining Power, even though this might mean interning them
in a "less favorable" climate (less favorable in the sense that it will
be one to which they are not accustomed) ? A literal interpretation
of that second paragraph of Article 22 would require that this question be answered in the negative.fJ 2 It remains to be seen, but it ap89 1 ICRC Report 248.
Pictet, COl1t1nentary 183.
During World War II most of the Germans and Italians captured in Africa
were ultimately transported to and interned in England, Canada, and the United
States. Undoubtedly, this removal was, in the majority of cases, to a "more favorable climate" as far as those prisoners of war were concerned. However, it is
equally without doubt that their removal was accomplished for the convenience of
the Detaining Powers; that it was completely unrelated to the provisions of
Article 9 of the 1929 Convention; and that it would have been made even had the
result been otherwise.
92 Of course, under these circumstances the requirements concerning climate
might well run head-on into the requirement of Articles 19 and 23 concerning the
removal of prisoners of war from the dangers of the combat zone and the numerous requirements relating to their maintenance. It would seem to the author
that the requirement concerning climate is probably of lesser importance than the
others, at least in the vast majority of cases.
90
91
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pears extremely doubtful, whether, apart from exceptional cases, Detaining Powers of the future will so construe this provision.93
'Ihis problem of the location of prisoner-of-war camps raises a
collateral, but related, question-should the enemy be advised of the
location of camps in which captured members of its armed forces are
interned, or should this information be withheld for military reasons?
Two measures included in Article 23 of the 1949 Convention were
intended to require that this information be divulged in order to afford
protection to prisoner-of-war camps against unwitting attack by the
armed forces of the Powers of Origin of the prisoners of war interned
therein. The third paragraph of Article 23 requires that the Detaining
Powers provide "the Powers concerned" (the Power of Origin of the
prisoners of war and its allies) information as to the geographical
location of prisoner-of-war camps; and the last paragraph of Article
23 provides that prisoner-of-war camps (and only prisoner-of-war
camps) shall, "whenever military considerations permit," be marked
with the letters "PW" (prisoners of war) or "PG" (prisonniers de
guerre) so as to be visible from the air.94 No such provisions were
contained in the 1929 Convention, and prisoner-of-war camps were
sometimes attacked by aircraft of the Power of Origin of the prisoners
of war, or of its allies, unaware of the actual nature of the installation being attacked. While, at the urgent behest of the Protecting
Powers and the ICRC, some belligerents permitted the furnishing of
information as to the location of prisoner-of-war camps maintained by
them to their enemies, others did not. 95 The substance of the provi93 In considering the question of climate, the draftsmen of both the 1929 and
the 1949 Conventions appear to have had in mind primarily persons from temperate European countries or their equivalents, and only such widespread conflicts
as World War I and World War II, where prisoner-of-war camps could be located
in many areas of the globe; and to have given little, if any, consideration to nationals of other types of countries and to conflicts of a more limited territorial
extent.
94 One military pilot who was an Australian representative at the :\.949 Diplomatic Conference stated that such markings would afford no protection whatsoever because of the height at which modern bombers fly and the speed at which
low-flying aircraft traveI. 2A Final Record 354. If this was true in 1949, and
there is no reason to doubt the statement, it has become even more true in the
light of subsequent technological developments. However, this alone should not
be the basis for denying the prisoner-of-war camps this type of protection if it
might possibly be effective in even a few rare instances.
95 1 ICRC Report 305-19. The British were particularly opposed to the required exchange of such information and at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference they
adhered to their World War II opposition, pointing out that marking prisoner-ofwar camps in a country with a relatively small geographical area had the effect
of pinpointing military objectives. 2A Final Record 254, 347, & 354. It is rather
difficult to understand why this opposition, which resulted in the inclusion of the
clause "whenever military considerations permit" in the fourth paragraph of Article 23 did not extend to the preceding paragraph of that Article which requires
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sions now included in the 1949 Convention were originally proposed
by the IeRC. With the methods of electronic navigation and target
finding developed after World War II, it is probable that if information as to the geographical location (longitude and latitude) of a
prisoner-of-war camp is furnished pursuant to the third paragraph
of Article 23, the need for marking in order to be able to identify such
a camp from the air will be greatly reduced. If this is so, the "military
considerations" limitation with respect to marking will not be too
important.
2. Quarters
The physical requirements for prisoner-of-war camps are set forth
in the first paragraph of Article 25 of the 1949 Convention which,
basically, specifies that "prisoners of war shall be quartered under
conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power
who are billeted in the same area."96 This obviously establishes each
Detaining Power's national standard as its minimum international
standard, the one which must be met by it under any and all circumstances. However, it is possible that the conditions under which the
forces of the Detaining Power are normally billeted in an area are
such that they would be detrimental to the health of prisoners of war
accustomed to quite another sbmdard. To meet this situation, the
first paragraph of Article 25 continues with two added requirements:
that the conditions according to which the prisoners of war are billeted
must take into consideration their "habits and customs"; and that
in no case shall those conditions be such as to be prejudicial to their
health. While the desirability of these two additions to the Detaining
Power's national standard can probably not be denied, it is extremely
difficult to envision a situation wherein a Detaining Power would
provide prisoners of war held by it with quarters superior to those
provided for its own troops in the same area. 97
The basic general requirements are enumerated in the first paragraph
of Article 25, and the specifics are set forth in the second paragraph
thereof. The requirement of conditions as favorable as those furnished
the Detaining Power's own troops in the same areas means that dormitories for prisoners of war must have at least the same total surface
and minimum cubic space, the same general installations (presumably
the giving of "all useful information regarding the geographical location of prisoner of war camps." The ICRC construes this latter provision to encompass adequate information in order "to enable the camp to be pin-pointed on a map." Pictet, Commentary 190.
96 This is referred to as the "principle of assimilation." Ibid., 192 n.2.
97 We will find that in other areas, also, the Convention establishes a better
than national standard as the standard of treatment of prisoners of war. See, e.g.,
note III-94 infra. Idealistic as its policies naturally are, the ICRC has, to some
extent, also recognized this pro,blem, Pictet, Commentary 194.
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the same proportion of sanitary facilities such as washbasins,
showers, toilets, washtubs, etc.), the same bedding, and the same
number of blankets. Further, the third paragraph of Article 25 requires that the quarters furnished prisoners of war must be protected
from dampness, must be adequately lighted and heated (particularly
between dusk and lights-out, which is usually "free" time for the
prisoners of war), and must have adequate precautions taken against
the dangers of fire. 98
Assuming complete compliance with the foregoing requirements,
let it not be thought that the prisoner of war will be living in pampered comfort and luxury. Far from it! A Detaining Power can follow
the provisions of Article 25 of the 1949 Convention to the letter and
for many prisoners of war their quarters will still be barely more
than marginal. Nevertheless, they will unquestionably afford comfort
and luxury compared to those furnished where the 1949 Convention is
not applicable, or where applicable not honored by a belligerent. 99
It is appropriate to note that in addition to the requirements of
the 1949 Convention aimed at physical comfort, there is also a very
important provision aimed at physical protection. This is the second
paragraph of Article 23, which imposes upon the Detaining Power
the obligation of providing the prisoners of war with shelters against
air bombardment and other hazards of war equal to those which are
provided for its civilian population.10o The same rule is applied to any
other types of protection which are furnished to the civilian population. 101 Moreover, the prisoners of war must be permitted to avail
themselves of the use of such shelters upon the sounding of the alarm,
the only exceptions being those prisoners of war assigned to specific
protective duties related to their quarters, presumably such as fire
wardens, etc.
.

98 The second and third paragraphs of Article 25 of the 1949 Convention are
little more than redrafts of Article 10 of the 1929 Convention. It has been stated
on behalf of Switzerland, which acted as Protecting Power for some 34 countries
during World War II, that there was general compliance with Article 10 during
that conflict, except in the Far East and to some extent in Germany. Janner,
Puissance protectrice 53-54. For statements of United States practice during
World War II, see McKnight, POW Employment 50; Rich, Brief History 395.
Of) As a practical matter, only rarely will a new prisoner-of-war camp meet all
of the physical requirements of Articles 25, 29, 30, 34, 38, etc., at the time of the
internment there of the first prisoners of war. 1 ICRC Report, 248-49. However,
the Detaining Power would be expected to exert itself to meet these requirements
as soon as possible.
100 Here, again, we have the national standard applied to prisoners of war-but
the civilian standard, not the military, and with no provision which would require, under some circumstances, a better than national standard.
101 Conceivably, this could include antiradiation garments, protective masks, decontamination chemicals and equipment, etc.
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3. Food
Naturally, food is an extremely important part of the "maintenance"
which the Detaining Power is required by Article 15 of the 1949
Convention to provide free of charge to prisoners of war.
Article 7 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provided that in the absence
of a special agreement with respect to "board," prisoners of war should
be "on the same footing as the troops of the Government who captured them." During World War I most of the belligerents found it
necessary to negotiate special agreements covering, among numerous
other subjects, that of food for prisoners of war. One such agreement
provided that "the daily food ration which the prisoner of war receives
ought not to be less than that of the civilian population [of the Detaining Power]"; but with the caveat that such ration would necessarily
depend upon the availability of food in the country in which the
prisoner of war was interned.102 Other agreements adopted the formula of specifying the minimum daily caloric intake for prisoners of
war, who were placed in three categories: nonworkers (2,000 calories); ordinary workers (2,500 calories); and workers performing
strenuous labor (2,850 calories) .103
When the 1929 Convention was drafted, a modification of the provision contained in the 1907 Hague Regulations was adopted. While
retaining the ration of the troops of the Detaining Power as the
standard for prisoners of war, it was specified in Article 11 that the
"troops" referred to were those "at base camps" ("troupes de depot").
Experience during World War II disclosed numerous objections to
this provision. Some belligerents had no "base" or "depot" troops to
furnish the required standard.104 Rations for the base troops of the
different belligerents varied widely, so that it was possible for a
Detaining Power to comply with the obligation imposed upon it in
this respect and still have great suffering among the prisoners of
war.105 National diets also varied widely, so that the adequacy of the
ration furnished when judged on a caloric standard did not always
102

Final Act of the Conf(Jrence of Copenhagen, Title IV, Chapter III, :,\rticle I.

103 Article 26 of the 1918 Agreement between France and Germany concerning
Prisoners of War. (Article 27 of that Agreement provided that prisoners of war
were to receive the same meat ration as the civilian population.) Article XLVI
of the 1918 Agreement between the British and German Governments concerning
Combatant and Civilian Prisoners of War contained a similar approach to the
problem, with an additional specific provision with respect to the daily ration of
bread.
104 1 lCRC Report 254.
105 Thus a survey made after World War II disclosed that "during good times
the Japanese base troops received approximately 1500 calories per day, the German
base troops approximately 2500 calories per day, Italian base troops approximately
2300 calories per day, but American base troops receive approximately 3300 calories per day." Feilchenfeld, Prisoners of War 36.
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ensure the maintenance of health.l06 Of course, the major problem in
this area is that when war conditions and a blockade reduce a country's
food supply to a bare subsistence level, or even lower, how can that
country possibly be expected to meet the obligation which it has undertaken with respect to prisoners of war ?101
The draftsmen of the 1949 Convention were fully aware of these
many difficulties and attempted to meet them insofar as possible. The
use of the "depot troop" ration as a standard was eliminated and the
use of either a caloric or a national standard as a substitute was rejected. Instead of an absolute standard, the continued health of the
individual prisoner of war was adopted as the standard. Thus, the
first paragraph of Article 26 of the 1949 Convention provides that
"the basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and
variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of
weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies." Moreover, it
also contains a requirement that the Detaining Power take into consideration the "habitual diet" of the particular prisoner of war. While
the overall effect of the first paragraph of Article 26, with its relative,
rather than absolute or national, standard, will very probably turn
out to be an improvement over that of its predecessor, it would be
extremely naive to believe that even loss of health or weight, or the
development of nutritional deficiencies, will cause the Detaining Power
to increase and improve the diet furnished prisoners of war at a time
when its own civilian population (and perhaps its armed forces) is
subsisting on a substandard diet.
It has been suggested that the problem is' not without solution and
that there are, in fact, two remedial courses of action available to the
loa The experience in the United States during WOJ;'ld War II was that there was
actually a waste of food when the national dietary habits of the prisoners of war
were ignored. Tollefson, Enemy Prisoners of War 57. The United States included
such dietary habits in its regulations governing the furnishing of rations for prisoners of war. POW Circular No.1, para. 59; Mason, German Prisoners of War
207. So did the Germans. German Regulations, No. 11, para. 21. The American
prisoners of war in Japanese hands were not so fortunate (see Kunz, Treatment
102) despite a proposal made by the United States on 13 February 1942 [10 Dept.
State Bull. 146 (1942)] and a promise made by Japanese Foreign Minister Togo
shortly thereafter. I.M.T.F.E. 1100-0l.
101 Feilchenfeld, Prisoners of War 13 & 39. Relief packages from the Power of
Origin, allied States, neutral States, and international relief organizations (see
Articles 72 and 73 and Annex III to the Convention, discussed at PP. 158-163
infra) can, of course, be extremely helpful in this regard. However, even these will
not fully remedy the situation if the Detaining Power does as Germany did during
World War II-consider that the receipt of food 'Packages reduces pro tanto the
obligation to furnish prisoners of war with even the substandard ration which it
had previously been furnishing. 1 ICRC Report, 255. Maughan, Tobruk 796. The
second paragraph of Article 72 of the 1949 Convention now specifically prohibits
such action by the Detaining Power.
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Detaining Power under these circumstances: (1) the transfer of the
prisoners of war to another Party to the 1949 Convention pursuant
to Article 12 of the Convention; or (2) repatriation pursuant to
Article 109 thereof.los As any ally of the Detaining Power would
probably also have less than the food supply required for its existing
needs (otherwise it would already be furnishing direct assistance to
the Detaining Power), the only possible transfer of the custody of
prisoners of war which would avoid repatriation but would remedy
the situation would be to a neutral nation. This could be accomplished
under Articles 6, 109, and 111 of the Convention. l09 The prisoners of
war would then, of course, be lost to the former Detaining Power
and its allies, as a labor force but would be interned in a neutral
country and would be equally unavailable to the Power of Origin. On
the other hand, while a special agreement for repatriation pursuant
to which the repatriated prisoners of war would be excluded either
wholly or in part from further military service during the then current war could be negotiated under Articles 6, 109, and 117 of the
Convention,110 such an agreement would probably be difficult to reach
inasmuch as it would at least add the repatriated prisoners of war to
the labor force of their Power of Origin and, to that extent, would
increase its war-making potentia1.111
While the internationally accepted obligation to provide prisoners
of war with an adequate ration to maintain health is, of course, the
major problem in this area of protection afforded to prisoners of war
by the 1949 Convention, there are several related problems. It is
obvious that to maintain the health of a prisoner of war performing
heavy labor will require more food than to maintain the health of a
prisoner of war who is performing work of a sedentary nature, or
no work at all. Even though this will automatically increase the requirement on the Detaining Power under the relative standard already
lOS Dillon, Genesis 45. A third possible course of action (relief shipments) is discussed at pp. 158-163 infra.
109 The first paragraph of Article 6 provides for special agreements between the
belligerents provided that such agreements do not "adversely affect" the prisoners
of war concerned, "nor restrict the rights" conferred upon them by the Convention;
the second paragraph of Article 109 provides for special agreements between belligerents for internment of longtime prisoners of war in a neutral country; and
Article 111 provides for tripartite agreements between the Detaining Power, the
Power of Origin, and a mutually acceptable neutral Power for the internment of
prisoners of war in neutral territory. Concerning such internment, see pp. 413-416
infra. For a discussion of agreements between the opposing belligerents, see pp.

84-86 supra.

110 Concerning Articles 6 and 109 see the preceding note. Article 117 provides
that no repatriated prisoner of war "may be employed on active military service."
See note VII-92, infra.
111 It would undoubtedly also improve morale and the wiII to fight in the country
to which the prisoner of war had been repatriated.
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discussed, it was, nevertheless, made the subject of special provision.
The second paragraph of Article 26 again adopts a relative standard
to meet this situation, requiring the Detaining Power to provide
prisoners of war who work "with such additional rations as are necessary for the labor on which they are employed." However, the first
paragraph of Article 51 appears to adopt the national standard for
civilian workers in similar work as the minimum standard.112
An adequate supply of drinking water can, at times, be even more
important than food.l13 For this reason, the third paragraph of Article
26 contains the flat requirement that "sufficient drinking water shall
be supplied to prisoners of war."lH
The preparation and distribution of the food issued to prisoners
of war is another aspect of the problem which it was felt necessary
to cover with particularity in the 1949 Convention. Thus the fourth
paragraph of Article 26 authorizes and requires the Detaining Power
to use prisoners of war in connection with the preparation of their
food (including both the food supplied by the Detaining Power and
any other food in their possession, such as that received in relief
packages, that purchased at canteens, etc.). The fifth paragraph of
Article 26 requires the Detaining Power to provide adequate messing
facilities; the third paragraph of Article 44 requires the Detaining
Power ~o facilitate the supervision of officers' messes by the officer
prisoners of war; and the second paragraph of Article 45 contains a
similar provision with respect to the supervision by enlisted prisoners
of war (noncommissioned officers and other ranks) of their messes.
Finally, there is one further very important provision of the 1949
Convention concerning food. The third paragraph of Article 87 prohibits collective punishments generally. Nevertheless, because of the
112 The first paragraph of Article 51 provides that working conditions, including
food, "shall not be inferior to those enjoyed by nationals of the Detaining Power
employed in similar work." This, of course, establishes a national standard. Presumably, the Detaining Power would be expected to furnish the working prisoner
of war with the higher of the two standards, relative under the second paragraph
of Article 26, or national under the first paragraph of Article 51. Concerning the
diet of prisoner-of-war patients, see note 129.
113 In the French version of the 1949 Convention, Articles 20, 26 and 46 all use
the term "eau potable." In the English version, the second paragraph of Article 20
refers to "potable water," but the third paragraphs of Articles 26 and 46 refer to
"drinking water." It appears that this was merely careless draftsmanship. See 2A
Final Record 347.
114 During the "Death March" in the Philippines in April 1942, in semitropical
heat, a great many deaths resulted from the lack of water--or from frantic attempts by the marching prisoners of war to obtain water. I.M.T.F.E. 1043-45. The
requirement that the Detaining Power provide an adequate supply of water (and
food) during such an evacuation is now specifically covered by the second paragraph of Article 20 of the 1949 Convention. See pp. 101-102 supra. The third paragraph of Article 46 contains a similar provision with respect to transfers between
prisoner-of-war camps.
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alacrity with which many Detaining Powers have had recourse to the
reduction of food allowances as a method of punishing groups of
prisoners of war for the alleged misconduct of some few of them, it
was felt necessary to specifically prohibit collective measures with
respect to food and the last paragraph of Article 26 so provides.1l5
4. Clothing
The first paragraph of Article 18 provides that captured prisoners
of war may retain "articles used for their clothing." Article 27 elaborates upon the requirements imposed upon the Detaining Power with
respect to the supplying of prisoners of war with clothing. This Article
places upon the Detaining Power the requirement that it supply
prisoners of war with "sufficient quantities" of clothing, allowance
being made for "the climate of the region where the prisoners are
detained." It further authorizes the issuance to prisoners of war of
captured uniforms of the forces to which they belonged, if such
captured uniforms are suitable for the climate in which they are to
be used. Moreover, the requirement that clothing in sufficient quantities be supplied to prisoners of war is a continuing one, the second
paragraph of Article 27 requiring that "regular replacement and repair" of clothing shall be assured by the Detaining Power. Finally, this
Article makes provision for the issuance to prisoners of war by the
Detaining Power of clothing appropriate to the work to which they
are assigned,l16
The provisions of Article 27 are substantially those contained in
Article 12 of the 1929 Convention. Few problems arose during the
course of World War II with regard to the issuance of clothing to
prisoners of war. The main difficulty which did arise was that a point
was reached in the war at which a number of countries found it im115 The last sentence of Article 26 of the 1949 Convention is actually a verbatim
reproduction of the last sentence of Article 11 of the 1929 Convention; and the
third paragraph of Article 87 of the 1949 Convention (prohibiting collective punishments generally) is an amplification of the prOVisions of the last sentence of
Article 46 of the 1929 Convention. A violation of the provisions of the last sentence
of Article 26 by a belligerent would, in most cases, constitute a violation of the
relatively more important provisions of the first paragraph of Article 26. [During
the rioting at Koje-do in Korea in 1952 (see note V-8 infra), in order to move recalcitrant Communist prisoners of war to smaller, more manageable, prisoner-ofwar compounds where control by the Detaining Power could be reestablished, the
military authorities of the United Nations Command made food available in the
new, small compounds and refused to make it available in the old, large compounds.
If the prisoner of war wanted to eat, he had to move to the new compound. The
ICRC Delegate took the position that this was collective punishment involving
food. The United Nations Command took the position that as food was available
in the new compounds, to which the prisoners of war were free to move, there was
no denial of food to them. Harvey, Control 142-43; Vetter, Mutiny 177.]
116 This requirement is, in effect, reiterated in the first paragraph of Article 51.
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possible to comply with the requirement for the issuance of adequate
clothing. When this occurred, the Powers to which the prisoners of
war belonged remedied the situation by sending uniforms through
relief channels to the enemy prisoner-of-war camps. These shipments
were made with the understanding that they were not to be considered
as in any way releasing the Detaining Power from the obligations
imposed upon it by the provision of the 1929 Convention and that the
uniforms so furnished were to be regarded as a supplement to, and
not as a replacement for, those which the Detaining Power was required to furnish. With the exception of Germany, the Detaining
Powers concerned accepted and applied this principle. 117
5. Hygiene and Medical Care
The maintenance of the health of prisoners of war is perhaps the
major problem with which these Conventions are concerned.ll8 The
provisions of the 1949 Convention relating to this problem are numerous and detailed, and full compliance with them would unquestionably
mean the survival of many prisoners of war who, under less favorable
conditions, would succumb to the illnesses and diseases which are
endemic in crowded prisoner-of-war camps. Unfortunately, however,
here once again we find that, despite the broad coverage of the subject
in the 1949 Convention, there are actually only a few instances where
its provisions go beyond the limits of the predecessor 1929 Convention.
Perhaps the draftsmen at Geneva felt that the provisions of the 1929
Convention in this area were adequate if complied with and only
required minimum clarification in order to accomplish the desired
purposes.
The basic provision concerning medical care is Article 15, which
binds the Detaining Power to provide prisoners of war with "the
medical attention required by their state of health." This provision
is, of course, merely a general requirement containing no standardsbut it sets the stage for what is to come. The detailed provisions with
respect to the hygienic conditions which the Detaining Power is required to maintain and the medical attention which it is bound to
provide to the prisoners of war are contained in Articles 29, 30, and
1171 ICRC Report 258. This limitation would appear to be rather meaningless.
If a Power of Origin feels the imperative need to furnish clothing for its military
personnel held as prisoners of war by the enemy because the enemy Detaining
Power is itself completely unable to furnish that clothing, it accomplishes very
little to assert that the Detaining Power is not relieved of its basic responsibility
in this regard-a responsibility which it concededly is not in a position to meet.
The problem here is quite different from that with respect to food. See note 107

supra.
118 Obviously, the provisions of the Convention which are concerned with shelter,
:food, clothing, etc., are all of major importance in maintaining the health of the
prisoner of war.
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31.119 It is primarily with the provisions of these Articles that we
will be concerned.
Article 29 is substantially the same as Article 13 of the 1929 Convention.120 It places upon the Detaining Power, in a number of specified areas, the duty to take all measures necessary to maintain a
standard of sanitation which will "ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and ... prevent epidemics."121 Specifically, the Detaining Power must provide prisoners of war with clean and hygienic
toilet facilities, accessible 24 hours a day;122 bath and shower facilities
and the time to use them; and, finally, water and soap in sufficient
quantities both for their personal cleanliness and for washing laundry.
Actually, the only substantive changes from the 1929 Convention are
that the requirement that prisoners of war be provided with a suffi119 The health of the prisoner of war is also frequently referred to in the context
of other problems, several of which have already been discussed and others of
which will be discussed below. Thus, wounded and sick prisoners of war need not
be evacuated from the battlefield immediately after capture [Article 19, discussed
at pp. 99-100 supra] ; health limitations are placed on the locating of prisoner-ofwar camps [the first two paragraphs of Article 22, discussed at pp. 120-123 supra];
the quarters provided for prisoners of war must not be such as to be "prejudicial to
their health" [Article 25, discussed at pp. 124-125 supra]; the food with which
they are provided must be such as to keep them "in good health" [Article 26, discussed at p. 127 supra] ; wounded and sick prisoners of war may not be transferred
between prisoner-of-war camps [Article 47, discussed at p. 191 infra]; etc.
See also, the provisions of the 1949 Convention setting the standards of medical
care required for a prisoner of war who is the victim of an industrial accident or
who contracts an industrial disease [Article 54, discussed at pp. 250-l!51 infra];
and outlawing acts which would '·seriously endanger the health of a prisoner of
war" and providing sanctions for so doing or for subjecting a prisoner of war to
"physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments" or to "biological experiments" [Articles 13 and 130, discussed at pp. 358-360 infra].
120 The fourth paragraph of Article 13 of the 1929 Convention is now found, in
substance, in the second paragraph of Article 38 of the 1949 Convention.
121 Article 29, first paragraph. During World War II the United States apparently discovered that the problem of general sanitation and personal cleanliness
existed in both directions as it found itself obliged to issue a directive requiring
prisoners of war to "observe all sanitary measures necessary to assure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics. Insanitary habits will
not be tolerated." POW Circular No.1, para. 68. Such a directive is unquestionably
authorized by virtue of the Detaining Power's duty to ensure cleanliness. Pictet,
Commentary 208.
122 Article 29, second paragraph. In the discussion of this Article contained in
Pictet, Commentary 207, the authors refer to the finding of the ICRC that during
World War II toilet facilities ("conveniences") were frequently not accessible during the night, and then state that "the new Convention makes an express stipulation In this regard." As the provisions relating to this matter contained in the
official French versions of the 1929 and 1949 Conventions are absolutely identical
("jour et nuit") , it is difficult to see how the implications of the Commentary statement can be justified. If a Detaining Power does not meet its obligations in this
respect, it will be in violation of the provision of the 1949 Convention just as other
Detaining Powers were in violation of the same provision of the 1929 Convention.
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cient quantity of water for bodily cleanliness is increased to require
the Detaining Power to provide both sufficient water and soap, not
only for bodily cleanliness but also for washing personal laundry;
and the further requirement that installations, facilities, and time
also be provided to the prisoners of war for these purposes.123
The duty to take all measures necessary to prevent epidemics contained in Article 29 must not be overlooked. It is this duty which
both obligates and authorizes the Detaining Power to provide prisoners
of war with the inoculations and vaccinations needed to immunize
them from the outbreak and spread of the numerous diseases such as
typhus, typhoid, paratyphoid, cholera, smallpox, plague, etc., which
have historically appeared where men were closely confined over long
periods of time. 124
The medical care and attention to which the prisoners of war are
entitled and which the Detaining Power is obligated to give them is
set forth in Articles 30 and 31. Basically, there is a dual coverage
with respect to the problem of the ascertainment of the need of any
individual prisoner of war for medical treatment. At least once a
month every prisoner of war must receive "medical inspections."
This "inspection" includes weighing and weight recording, determination of general health condition, technological tests to detect the
presence of contagious diseases, etc. 125 The purpose of this procedure
is obviously to permit the identification of ailments before the appearance of subjective symptoms, particularly those ailments which could
123 Article 29, third paragraph. The 1929 Convention stated that camps "shall be
as well provided as possible" with baths and showers. The 1949 Convention contains the flat admonition that the camps "shall be furnished" with these facilities.
This change would seem to have closed the loophole of self-excuse under which the
Detaining Power might previously have attempted to justify failure to comply
with the requirements of the Convention in this respect.
124 The term "authorizes" is used intentionally. If a Detaining Power considers
it essential to give all prisoners of war held by it, or all prisoners of war in a particular camp, a generally recognized and medically accepted immunization, even by
force if necessary, such a procedure is entirely within its authority in the execution of its obligation to prevent epidemics among the prisoners of war in its custody. Of course, should the medication used not be one recognized and accepted by
the medical profession generally, or should it be a known defective medication, the
individuals involved on the part of the Detaining Power would lay themselves open
to the charge that the prisoners of war were being used as human guinea pigs, in
direct violation of the first paragraph of Article 13, and they would be subject to
the sanctions of Articles 129 and 130. See the discussion of this subject at pp. 358360 infra.
125 Article 31. The United States contemplates a medical "examination" of every
prisoner of war upon arrival at the prisoner-of-war camp and a monthly "inspection" by a medical officer which will include the recording of the weight of the
prisoner of war. POW Circular No.1, para. 66 and Figure 3. For a further discussion of the monthly "medical inspection" required by Article 31 and the monthly
"medical examination" required by Article 55 in connection with the working prisoner of war, see pp. 219-221 infra.
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be transmitted to other prisoners of war and which can exist and
even enter the contagious or infectious stage without the ailing person being aware of his condition.126 The other side of the coin, and the
second aspect of the determination of the existence of a need for
medical treatment, consists of the right granted to a prisoner of war
by the Convention to seek medical examination on his own initiative.l21
The prisoner of war who believes that he has a condition warranting
medical attention must be permitted to obtain such attention so that
a determination may be made by qualified medical personnel as to
the actual existence of an ailment, its identity if it does exist, and the
treatment required. The addition of this provision in the 1949 Convention undoubtedly resulted from the problems in this area encountered by the ICRC during World War II.I28
A second basic requirement in the medical field is that there must
be an "adequate" infirmary in every prisoner-of-war camp. The size
and capabilities of the infirmary will necessarily depend upon the
manner in which medical care is organized by the particular Detaining Power-provided, always, that whatever the organization, it must
be such as to provide the medical care required by the prisoner of
war.129 Thus, one Detaining Power might organize the camp infirmaries so as to provide only day-to-day medical care, with the sick or
injured prisoner of war being transferred to a more elaborate medical
installation outside the prisoner-of-war camp when his illness or
injury requires more sophisticated treatment than is available at
the local infirmary.13o Under these circumstances, the Convention
126 This is similar to the efforts of voluntary civilian organizations during peacetime to have everyone submit himself regularly to the various technical checks for
tuberculosis, diabetes, heart disease, etc.
127 Article 30, fourth paragraph. This right is established negatively-by prohibiting the Detaining Power from preventing a prisoner of war from applying
for medical treatment. There are certain merits in establishing prisoner-of-war
rights through the medium of prohibitions on the actions of the Detaining Power
where such a procedure is appropriate. The potential dangers inherent in this particular provision, whether stated affirmatively or negatively, and which were apparently overlooked or disregarded by the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, are discussed in connection with Article 55, at p. 220 infra.
128 1 ICRC Report 265. Even more reprehensible was the deliberate withholding
by the Chinese in Korea of badly needed medical attention from prisoners of war
who refused to accept the Communist ideological thesis-the so-called "reactionaries." U.K.,Treatment 22.
129 Article 30, first paragraph. The infirmary must also be capable of providing
an "appropriate diet" for the condition for which the prisoner of war is receiving
treatment.
130 During Wcorld War II the United States pursued the following method of providing medical care at all levels: "The camp dispensary, under the supervision of
the camp surge'ln. held the usual daily sick call and gave the same infirmary treatment as afforded by any unit surgeon. Those in need of hospital care were sent to
the station [camp] hospital. If need of specialized treatment or prolonged hospital-
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specifically provides that the prisoner of war needing special treatment
must be admitted to any medical installation, military or civilian,
where the necessary treatment is available. l3l Other Detaining Powers
might organize their camp infirmaries in such a manner that each of
them would be completely competent to provide any conceivable medical care which could be required by a prisoner of war-from first aid
for a cut finger to heart or brain surgery.132
In addition to the foregoing basic requirements, there are a number
of other provisions relating to medical care which, while not of general
application, are certainly of major importance in the circumstances
under which they are applicable. Thus, there are requirements that,
if necessary, isolation wards must be established for the treatment
of cases of contagious and mental diseases ;133 that a prisoner of war
whose condition is such as to require 'special medical treatment or a
special operation must be given such care even if his repatriation is
imminent ;134 that special facilities must be established for the care
and rehabilitation of the disabled (presumably amputees and those
who have suffered some similar disabling condition), and particularly
of the blind ;135 that the Detaining Power must, if requested by a
prisoner of war, furnish to him an official certificate, and forward a
duplicate thereof to the Central Prisoners of War Agency,1a6 containing information with regard to the nature of the illness or injury for
which he was treated, and the duration and kind of treatment received;
and that the costs of medical treatment, including the costs of any
necessary "apparatus" must be borne by the Detaining Power.131
ization was indicated, prisoners [of war] were transferred to a general hospital."
Rich, Brief History 409. The author was informed that in the Indian prisoner-ofwar camps for Pakistani prisoners of war (1972-74), the retained Pakistani medical officers were permitted to perform only minor first aid treatment, more serious
cases being sent, when space became available, to an Indian military hospital.
131 Article 30, second paragraph.
13!! This is probably a more utilitarian method of operation for a very large concentration of prisoners of war, as it obviates the need for prisoner-of-war transfers
from camp to outside hospital, for prisoner-of-war wards in hosiptals ill equipped
for such an arrangement, etc. Moreover, there will frequently be sufficient prisonerof-war or retained medical personnel (see discussion at pp. 70-73 supra) available
to man a camp medical installation competent to provide complete medical services.
133 Article 30, first paragraph.
134 Article 30, second paragraph.
135 Ibid. The emphasis with reference to the blind resulted from the experiences
of World War II and the belief that the sooner their rehabilitation began, the
better their overall condition would be. 2A Final Record 259.
13& Concerning this agency, see 1>p. 154-158 infra. Similar provisions with respect
to industrial illnesses and injurjes are discussed at PP. 249-252 infra.
137 The second paragraph of Article 14 of the 1929 Convention provided merely
that the Detaining Power would bear the costs of "temporary prosthetic equipment." The last paragraph of Article 30 of the 1949 Convention attempts to elaborate in this regard, specifying that the Detaining Power must provide "dentures
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The third paragraph of Article 30, provides that prisoners of war
shall, preferably, receive medical attention from the medical personnel
of the power on which they depend (the Power of Origin) "and, if
possible, of their nationality."138 This provision, which has no real
counterpart in the 1929 Convention, must be read in conjunction with
Articles 32 and 33,139 which specify the functions to be performed by
captured medical personnel of various categories, some of whom have
a basic right to be repatriated and may be retained by the Detaining
Power only insofar as the needs of tlie prisoners of war may require.14.O
There is one other aspect of the problem of maintaining the health
of prisoners of war which, although receiving comparatively little
attention in the Convention, is of major importance. This concerns
the availability of time and space for outdoor physical activities, such
as calisthenics and sports. The first paragraph of Article 38 admonishes the Detaining Power to "encourage" the participation of prisoners of war in sports and games,141 and obligates it to provide them
with "adequate premises and necessary equipment." The second paraand other artificial appliances, and spectacles." While the intention of the draftsmen was undoubtedly to liberalize the provision by making specific references to
dentures and spectacles, which had not always been provided by Detaining Powers
during World War II (1 ICRC Report 266), the use of the phrase "dentures and
other artificial appliances, and spectacles" to amplify the previous reference in the
provision to "apparatus" may, in other respects, be found to be retrogressive. Does
its use in place of "temporary prosthetic equipment" affect the obligation of the
Detaining Power to provide artificial limbs for amputees'! It is certainly to be
hoped that no Detaining Power will so construe it-but Detaining Powers are not
noted for the liberal construction of international conventions establishing their
obligations to prisoners of war. It would have been much better had the term
"prosthetic equipment" been retained in the enumeration in the provision of the
Convention.
138 This paragraph was the occasion for some discussion at the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference. The representative of the United States emphasized the need for a
prisoner of war to be able to communicate with the medical personnel who were
treating him, while the representative of the United Kingdom believed that the
prisoner of war should be treated by medical personnel from the armed forces in
which he was serving when captured. 2A Final Record 472. The decision was
reached to include both suggestions. Ibid., 476 & 382.
139 And also with Article 28 of the First Convention.
140 For a discussion of "retained personnel," see pp. 70-74 supra.
141 Article 38 opens with the words "[w]hile respecting the individual preferences of every prisoner, the Detaining Power shall encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, sports and games. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The italicized words were intended to constitute a prohibition on
enforced attendance by prisoners of war at propaganda lectures, etc. See pp. 139142 infra. Unfortunately, to be consistent, this means that the Detaining Power
must also respect the individual preferences of prisoners of war who do not desire
to exercise even though this can be only of benefit to their health. However, it is
assumed that the Detaining Power would at least have the right to require attendance at morning calisthenics in the execution of its obligation to maintain the
health of the prisoners of war.
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graph of Article 38 provides that the prisoners of war shall have
opportunities for these purposes and for being out-of-doors; and that
sufficient open spaces shall be provided by the Detaining Power for
this purpose in all prisoner-of-war camps.
It will thus be seen that the Detaining Power is obligated to provide
the prisoners of war with (1) opportunities for physical exercise,
including sports and games; (2) the equipment necessary for these
purposes; (3) the open spaces likewise necessary for these purposes;
and (4) opportunities to be out of doors.142 During World War II it
was found that when the Detaining Power made such opportunities
available to the prisoners of war, it improved not only their health,
but also their morale.143 Unfortunately, there are times when it is
simply beyond the ability of the Detaining Power to provide adequate
and sufficient space for the purposes of exercise.144 When this occurs,
or when the Detaining Power fails to furnish the necessary space for
its own reasons, the result will frequently be "barbed-wire psychosis,"
a mental condition which can be a greater drain on the resources of
the Detaining Power than liberal compliance with the foregoing provisions of the Convention.145
6. Morale
The preceding discussion has been directed primarily toward the
provisions of the Convention aimed at ensuring the physical wellbeing of the prisoner of war. Now let us direct our attention to a
number of other areas which are also of vital importance in the
maintenance of individual esprit and the will to live.
The importance of keeping a prisoner of war fully occupied, without time hanging on his hands, cannot be overestimated, both from
the point of view of the Detaining Power and from the point of view
142 The comparable articles of the 1929 Convention (Articles 13, fourth paragraph, and 17) were lacking in detail and were nonmandatory. The provisions of
the 1949 Convention in this area are a considerable improvement. (For a further
discussion of some of the problems connected with physical exercise and organized
sports, see note 141 supra.)
143 1 ICRC Report 264.
144 It should be comparatively rare that the Detaining Power could not even
provide an area sufficient for walking or jogging.
145 For an example of complete noncompliance with most of the foregoing provisions of the Convention concerning life in a prisoner-of-war camp, see Bean, A
Guest at the Hanoi Hilton, The Retired Officer, July 1973, at 28. Colonel Bean, a
prisoner of war in North Vietnam for five years and two months, spent the first
half of that period alone in a cell 7 by 8 feet in size, with no ventilation and very
little light; was fed "a small loaf of bread and watery soup" twice a day; received
only 2% coffee-size cups of water a day; was provided with a "convenience" consisting of a bucket in his cell; and during 25 months was allowed out to "exercise"
on only 37 occasions (an average of once every 20 days), each time for a period of
3-5 minutes. See also notes VI-35 and VII-94 infra.
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of the prisoner of war himself. Keeping the prisoner of war fully
occupied solves many disciplinary problems for the Detaining Power
and, in many cases, it is all that makes life in a prisoner-of-war camp
supportable for the prisoner of war. The Detaining Power may,
within the limitations of the Convention, require prisoners of war
to perform certain types of labor,146 but this alone is not the full story.
There are many hours in the day other than those during which the
prisoner of war will be performing the labor required by the Detaining Power. Some of these will be occupied in sleeping, eating, bathing,
doing personal chores, etc. The Convention indirectly attempts to
make specific provisions for the remaining hours. It is with this subject that we will now be concerned.
a. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES
Like Article 16 of the 1929 Convention, the first paragraph of
Article 34 of the 1949 Convention provides for complete liberty in
the exercise of religious duties, subject only to the requirement of
compliance with the disciplinary routine of the Detaining Power. 147
New in this area is the absolute requirement of the second paragraph
of Article 34 that "[a] dequate premises shall be provided where
religious services may be held."148
As in the case of medical personnel, provision is made for the
retention of chaplains for the purpose of ministering to the prisoners
of war.149 While so retained, they have the same status as retained
medical personneJ.150 With respect to ministers of religion who were
not engaged in their religious capacity while serving in their armed
forces, special provision is now made in Article 36, permitting them
to function as chaplains while in the custody of the Detaining Power
and providing that they shall receive the same treatment as retained
chaplains and that they shall not be required to perform any other
146 See

pp. 225-240 infra.

147 Certainly, no one would contend that religious services could be scheduled so
as to conflict with morning roll call or to interrupt the workday.
148 The enumeration in the first paragraph of Article 72 of the items which prisoner of war are allowed to receive through the post includes "articles of a religious, educational or recreational character which may meet their needs, ..." This
matter will be discussed at more length in connection with the overall problems
relating to relief packages. See p. 160 infra.
149 See the discussion of Articles 4C and 33, at pp. 70-74 supra. See also the
restrictive provision of the last paragraph of Article 33.
150 Various special agreements entered into during World War II authorized the
retention of anywhere from one chaplain per thousand prisoners of war (United
States-Germany) to four chaplains per thousand prisoners of war (GermanySouth Africa). 1 rCRC Report 202. Article 2(a) of the Model Agreement on this
subject, drafted by the rCRC pursuant to Resolution 3 of the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference (1 Final Record 361), calls for the retention of one chaplain per two
thousand prisoners of war. rCRC, Model Agreement.
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work.1:i1 Finally, as a third source of spiritual advisers, when neither
retained nor prisoner-of-war ministers are available, provision is
made (in Article 37) for the designation-subject to the approval of
the prisoners of war constituting the religious community, the Detaining Power, and, where appropriate, the local religious authorities of
the religion concerned-of a local minister or, where permitted by the
religion, a qualified layman, to perform the necessary religious functions for the prisoners of war of that religion. The minister or layman
so designated is specifically required to comply with all of the regulations of the Detaining Power with respect to discipline and military
security.
Details with regard to the functions to be performed by chaplains
are contained in Article 35 which, generally, permits them to minister
to prisoners of war "and to exercise freely their ministry among prisoners of war of the same religion." Special privileges available to
them include the use of necessary transport for visiting prisoners of
war outside the camp where the chaplain is himself confined, presumably where a group of prisoners of war have no other source of
spiritual guidance;lG2 and freedom to correspond, beyond the personal
quota but subject to normal censorship, with the ecclesiastical authorities of the Detaining Power and with international religious organizations, on matters relating to his religious duties. Iu3

b. INTELLECTUAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND RECREATIONAL PURSUITS
Provision having been made for the spiritual needs of the prisoners
of war, the draftsmen of the 1949 Convention directed their attention
to other types of activity: the intellectual, educational, and recreational.
Article 17 of the 1929 Convention merely provided that "so far as
possible" the Detaining Power "shall encourage intellectual diversions
... organized by prisoners of war." It is readily apparent that the
foregoing provision did not impose any measurable obligation on the
151 There was no comparable provision in the 1929 Convention. During World
War II many ministers and priests were found serving in the ranks as ordinary
soldiers. The United States used them in their religious capacities, but, in most
respects, continued to consider them to be prisoners of war. Lewis & Mewha 159,
160; Rich, Brief History 411.
152 During World War II the allocation of chaplains to the various prisoner-ofwar installations apparently caused some problems. 1 JCRC Report 274; Mason,
German Prisoners of War 201. One method adopted in the 1949 Convention for reducing this problem for the future was to state specifically in Article 35 that they
were to be "allocated among the various camps and labor detachments." (Emphasis added.)
153 This privilege should be read in conjunction with the first paragraph of
Article 125, which authorizes the representatives of religious organizations, among
others, to visit the prisoners of war and to distribute relief supplies.
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Detaining Power. Moreover, it did not specifically preclude the Detaining Power from subjecting the prisoners of war to political propaganda and from attempting to convert them to its own ideology.
During World War II a few Detaining Powers did construe the Convention provision as prohibiting such action on their part, at least to
the extent that political propaganda, such as lectures on ideology,
could not be forced on the prisoners of war through the medium of
compulsory classes, although they considered that classes could be
conducted on the basis of voluntary attendance.1G4 However, this interpretation of the Convention provision, which was unquestionably extremely liberal, was not uniformly made. 155 Where it ,vas applied, the
system usually adopted was to permit the prisoners of war to organize
their own intellectual activities, such as formal study courses, the
publication of camp newspapers, the establishment and operation of
camp libraries and reading rooms, etc. ;156 and to install radio loudspeakers, variously located, upon which would be broadcast programs
selected by the camp authorities. In this latter instance, in order to
maintain the policy of voluntariness, provision would be made whereby
prisoners of war who did not desire to hear the broadcast material
could turn it Off.157
The Commission of Experts established by the ICRC to draft proposed revisions to the provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to
the spiritual and intellectual needs of prisoners of war appreciated
the necessity to be more specific in regard to the encouragement of
intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits by prisoners of
war and attempted to redraft the Article to attain this objective.
Conceding that some political propaganda on the part of the Detaining
Power was inevitable, the Commission approved an ICRC suggestion
for the inclusion of an additional provision covering the problem of
154 Thus, as early as March 1943, the decision was made by the United States
that while there would be no legal objection to making information on American
history and government, and the workings of democracy, available in prisoner-ofwar camps, attendance at any lectures, classes, motion pictures, etc., on these subjects would have to be completely voluntary and that it would be unlawful to compel such attendance. SPJGW 1943/4248, 29 March 1943; Rich, Brief History, 544;
Tollefson, Enemy Prisoners of War 67.
155 The ICRC intervened to induce certain Detaining Powers to refrain from
carrying on political propaganda among prisoners of war. This was deemed to be
necessary in the case of the German authorities with Allied prisoners of war and
in the case of the British authorities with Italian prisoners of war in India. 1
ICRC Report 251.
156 POW Circular No.1, para. 96; Lewis & Mewha 147, 160. By 1944 the pro·
gram in the United States had grown to such an extent that prisoners of war were
taking correspondence courses given by American colleges and universities and
also courses specially prepared for members of the United States armed forces.
Rich, Brief History 443.
157 1947 SAIN 13.
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forced versus voluntary attendance at propaganda meetings.158 Although the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference did not completely
agree with the terminology proposed, it did adopt substantially the
proposal approved by the Commission. While once again stating the
obligation of the Detaining Power to "encourage" the practice of
inteJ1ectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, the draftsmen at
the Conference agreed, without any controversy, that the first paragraph of Article 38-which has now become the relevant Article, and
which again calls upon the Detaining Power to "encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits"-should
open with the words "[w]hile respecting the individual preferences of
every prisoner. . . ." Obviously, this clause was added in order to
place it beyond dispute that a Detaining Power may not use compulsion on prisoners of war in this area. 11l9
At the conclusion of World War II, when prisoner-of-war problems
were being studied in depth, one commentator, while agreeing that
prisoners of war should not be involuntarily subjected to political
propaganda favoring the Detaining Power and detrimental to their
own country, even had reservations with respect to permitting this
type of activity on a voluntary basis. He pointed out that while the
system would work where prisoners of war were receiving a sufficient
quantity of food, to permit it where inadequate supplies of food were
available might in effect result in a "no study, no eat" policy, the food
allowances thus being used as a bribe to encourage, or even compel,
attendance at propaganda classes and lectures.160 The validity of his
argument was fully demonstrated by what transpired in the prisonerof-war camps maintained by the Communists in Korea during the
1950-53 hostilities in that country. While attendance at political indoctrination sessions in these camps were originally compulsory/ol in
time it became voluntary, with the so-called "progressives"-who attended such sessions regularly-receiving a substantially increased
food allowance, and the so-called "reactionaries"-those who had
proven immune to Communist blandishments-frequently receiving
a food allowance which was far below the minimum subsistence
leveJ.162 Nevertheless, it is believed that the policy contained in the
1949 Convention is a proper one and that the flagrant disregard
thereof by the Communists in Korea, and elsewhere, does not warrant
Ibid., 12.
2A Final Record 263.
160 Feilchenfeld, Prisoners of War 45.
101 Flory, Nouvelle conception 60; U.K.: Treatment 4-10; U.S., POW 10-14.
Nevertheless, the Communists complained bitterly of the 'lJoluntary system established in the prisoner-of-war camps by the United States Command. Hermes, Truce
Tent 237. The fact that they did complain is indicative of the success that the voluntary program was having.
10::! See U.S., POW 10; U.K., Treatment 21-22.
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denigration of the provision, but merely indicates that this is another
area where, in the application of the provisions of the Convention, it
is frequently necessary to rely largely on the good will and inherent
desire to be law-abiding of the respective belligerents-even where
some of them do not have a very good record of compliance with their
voluntarily assumed international obligations.
In addition to their duty to "encourage" the prisoners of war to
engage in intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, the
Detaining Power also has an obligation under the first paragraph of
Article 38 to "take the measures necessary to ensure the exercise
thereof by providing them [the prisoners of war] with adequate
premises and necessary equipment."163 Obviously, more than time is
required if prisoners of war are to be enabled to read, to study, to
participate in sedentary games, to engage in musical activities, to
produce entertainment, etc. They need places not subject to the
vagaries of the weather in which to pursue these activities, and they
need the items of equipment which are indispensable for many of
them. The Convention places the basic responsibility for providing
both premises and equipment directly on the Detaining Power. It
places upon the Detaining Power a far more specific and measurable
obligation than that which was contained in the parallel provision of
the 1929 Convention which, as we have seen, merely obligated the
Detaining Power to "encourage" these activites "as much as possible."
Here, once more, the problem arises as to whether the Detaining
Power may consider the receipt of equipment in these categories (intellectual, educational, and recreational) in relief parcels or collective
shipments as relieving it pro tanto from the international obligation
which it has assumed. 164 There will obviously be considerably less
excuse for such action by the Detaining Power in these areas than in
the case of food. In any event, the prohibition against such a practice
contained in the second paragraph of Article 72 is there stated to be
applicable to all of the obligations of this nature assumed by the
Detaining Power as a Party to the Convention.
c. PHYSICAL EXERCISE AND SPORTS
A third type of activity which contributes tremendously to the
morale and well-being of the prisoner of war, and in many instances
will so contribute to the exclusion of intellectual, and perhaps even
spiritual, pursuits, is the opportunity for physical activities and organized sports and games. Both paragraphs of Article 38 impose new
obligations on the Detaining Power in this area. As already noted in
connection with intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, the
163 See note 148 supra. Article 80 likewise gives responsibilities in this area to
the prisoners' representative, See p. 305 infra.
164 See note 107 supra.
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Detaining Power must now provide adequate premises and the necessary equipment. This obligation is equally applicable to physical activities. And the second paragraph of the Ariele imposes upon the Detaining Power the affirmative requirements of providing the prisoners of
war with opportunities for taking physical exercise and for being outof-doors, and of providing sufficient open space in every camp for these
purposes. Once again, it is no longer left to the Detaining Power itself
to determine its capabilities in this regard and what it considers to be
"possible" on its part. All discretion is removed and the definite obligation is placed upon the Detaining Power to provide the prisoners
of war with time and space for being out-of-doors, for physical exercise, and for sports and games. Actually, this will frequently contribute so much to the health of the prisoners of war as to substantially
reduce the requirement for medical attention. 165
d. CANTEENS

There is one further subject which contributes materially to the
morale of the prisoner of war although it does not exactly fall within
the general category of matters which we have just been discussing.
This is the camp canteen, the store where the prisoner of war is allowed to purchase such ordinary items as may be available on the local
economy, especially tobacco. 166 The existence of the canteen and the
availability for sale of canteen-type articles has an affirmative effect
on morale the extent of which is incalculable.
Provisions for the establishment of canteens in each prisoner-of-war
camp are contained in Article 28 of the 1949 Geneva Convention. This
Article represents a considerable elaboration of the predecessor provision, Article 12 of the 1929 Convention. For example, while Article
12 referred only to "food products and ordinary objects," the new
provision includes "food stuffs, soap and tobacco and ordinary articles
in daily use." Again, while Article 12 provided that prisoners of war
would be able to obtain the named items "at the local market price,"
the new Article 28, in the first paragraph, affirmatively states that
Uthe tariff [price list] shall never be in excess of local market
165 This is true only provided that the prisoners of war are receiving a sufficient
food allowance to enable them to participate in physical exercise and sports. Inadequate diet reduces both the will and the power to indulge in activities which
necessitate physical exertion; and the resulting reduced activity, while perhaps
somewhat reducing the need for food, also reduces the ability of the body to fight
infection.
106 See note 172 infra. The canteens may typically also stock such other items as
toilet articles; candy, crackers, soft drinks, fruit, and other food items; and, in
some cases, even light beer (or wine), McKnight, POW Employment 52; Mason,
German Prisoners of War 208. The inventory will, as noted below, depend entirely
upon the state of the local economy.
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prices."167 And, while Article 12 provided that profits from the canteen "shall be used for the benefit of prisoners," the second paragraph
of Article 28 not only so provides, but further specifies that "a special
fund shall be created for this purpose,"lG8 and that the prisoners'
representative169 shall have a right to collaborate in the management
of this fund (as well as in the management of the canteen itself) ; and
the last paragraph of Article 28 states that when a camp is closed,
the balance of any such fund shall be turned over to an international
welfare organization (presumably one such as the ICRC, and not a
national Red Cross Society) to be used for the benefit of other prisoners of war of the same nationality as those whose purchases have
created the fund. l7O
Of course, the stock available at prisoner-of-war canteens will depend largely upon the availability of canteen-type items in the territory of the Detaining Power. If there is, for example, a shortage of
tobacco or soap or candy in the territory of the Detaining Power, there
will likewise be a shortage of this item in the prisoner-of-war canteens. As in the case of food shortages, to expect any Detaining Power
to maintain prisoners of war at a higher standard than that of its
own civilian population is an excess of naivete. Unfortunately, the
Convention does not contain any provision covering this situation. Presumably, if any such item is rationed to the civilian population, prisoners of war should, by analogy to other Convention provisions, receive
a comparable ration. The unfortunate omission of such a provision in
167 The author was told by a number of Pakistanis who had been held as prisoners of war in India that the Indian Government had given concessions to Indian
entrepreneurs to operate the canteens on a profit-making basis and that the canteen prices were frequently four or five times that of the local economy.
168 During World War II the German Government stated that "prisoner of war
canteens are establishments of the Reich and that their operations (resourc·es)
represent economic income and expense of the Reich." German Regulations, No. 41,
para. 769. While the exact meaning of this statement is somewhat obscure, the section heading is quite specific. "Tax on turnover of prisoner of war canteens." The
United States, on the other hand, determined that as Federal instrumentalities,
prisoner-of-war canteens were not subject to State taxes, such as sales taxes, and
that their profits were to be used for the benefit of the prisoners of war. SPJGT
1943/10442,12 July 1943; Rich, Brief History 415.
169 Concerning the prisoners' representative, see pp. 293-307 infra. Under the
third paragraph of Article 62 the pay of the prisoners' representative, and of his
assistants, is chargeable against canteen profits.
170 The United States went even further and provided that in general when prisoners of war were transferred from one camp to another, "a proportionate share
of the value of canteen stock and the Prisoner of War Fund will be transferred"
with them. POW Circular No.1, para. 75. For details of the directive concerning
the administration of the camp canteens by the United States during World War
II, see ibid., para. 71 et seq.; and Rich, Brief History 413. The last paragraph of
Article 28 further provides that in the event of a "general repatriation" (cessation
of hostilities?), accumulated canteen profits will be kept by the Detaining Power
unless the Powers concerned otherwise agree.
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the Convention is one which, it is to be feared, will offer an escape
hatch to the Detaining Power so inclined.l7l To some prisoners of war,
the failure of the Detaining Power to make tobacco available through
the canteens will be as serious an omission as its failure to provide an
adequate food allowance.172
7. Correspondence
The privilege of communicating with, and receiving communications
from, his family is probably the greatest single factor in the maintenance of prisoner-of-war morale. l73 The recognition of its importance
is illustrated by the fact that no less than 11 articles of the Convention
are in some way concerned with this problem. 174
171 This problem was discussed briefly by Committee II (Prisoners of War) at
the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. The suggestion was there made that the present
Article 28 should include a provision for special agreements under which the Power
of Origin might supply the canteens if the Detaining Power was unable to do so.
This suggestion was not favorably considered for two reasons: first, that the first
paragraph of Article 6 already provided generally for special agreements between
belligerents; and, second, that such a provision would encourage some Detaining
Powers to refrain from stocking canteens. 2A Final Record 258-59. The first reason
did not prevent the draftsmen from including in the same Article a provision which
contemplates the possibility of a special agreement concerning the ultimate disposition of canteen profits. While there is considerable merit to the second reason,
if shortages occur-as they inevitably will-there should be some established
method, other than relief packages, for remedying the situation.
172 The importance of tobacco to the prisoner of war is illustrated by its inclusion in the few items specifically listed in the first paragraph of Article 28, as well
as by the provision in the third paragraph of Article 26 requiring the Detaining
Power to permit the use of tobacco by prisoners of war. Speaking of the British
and Australian prisoners of war in Singapore early in 1942, one author says that
"after food, tobacco was the prisoners' main preoccupation." Caffrey, Out in the
Midday Sun 226-27.
173 During World War II the Central Prisoners of War Agency (concerning this
Agency, see pp. 154-158 infra) received and forwarded almost 20 million communications from and to prisoners of war and civilian internees; and it estimated
that this was only a very small proportion of the total of such mail. 2 ICRC
Report 57.
114 Articles 48, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 98, and 108. Annexes IVB and IVC'
are also relevant, as are Articles 72 and 73. One well-informed writer has said:
"One of the most bitter features of captivity is the ignorance of the prisoners [of
war] of conditions and news in general of home." Dillon, Genesis 55. The reverse
of this situation, the lack of the receipt of news of the prisoner of war by his family, is an equally bitter feature of captivity. During the hostilities in Vietnam the
North Vietnamese took advantage of the prisoner-of-war hunger for news from
home, and the family hunger for news of and from the prisoner of war, to use
correspondence as a method of obtaining favorable propaganda. After a long period
during which only a sporadic and extremely limited correspondence was permitted
(8ee note 183 infra), arrangements were made for an antiwar group in the United
States to act as North Vietnam's postal agent with respect to prisoner-of-war mail.
1971 Hearings 237-38; Sullivan, Prisoners of War in Indochina 305-06.
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Pursuing the subject chronologically, Article 70 provides that as
soon as possible and, in any case, not later than one week after arrival
at a transit or prisoner-of-war camp, every newly captured individual
must be given the opportunity to send a "capture card" to his family in
which he may inform them of the fact of his capture, his address, and
his state of health. At the same time he may send a somewhat similar
card to the Central Prisoners of War Agency,175 thus making doubly
sure that the information reaches his famiIy.176 The Detaining Power
is specifically admonished to expedite the forwarding of these capture
cards and is prohibited from delaying their transmission. Provision is
also made for the sending of this type of card whenever the prisoner
of war has a change of address because he is hospitalized or transferred to another prisoner-of-war camp.177 The first paragraph of
Article 48 specifies that in this latter event the Detaining Power has
an obligation to advise the prisoner of war of his new postal address
in time for him to send the card to his next of kin.178
While the dispatch of the capture card is of extreme importance
both to the prisoner of war and to his family, of at least equal importance to them is the right to communicate with some degree of
regularity over the period during which the prisoner-of-war status
175 A capture card "similar, if possible" to Annex IVB to the Convention is to be
provided by the Detaining Power for use by the prisoner of war in notifying the
Central Prisoners of War Agency of his capture. As no form is provided by the
Convention for use by the prisoner of war in notifying his family of his new status,
the suggestion has been made that the capture card sent to the family could consist of the back (message side) of Annex IVB and the front (address side) of
Annex IVC 1 (the Correspondence Card). Pictet, Commentary 342 n.1. However,
this would involve unnecessary duplication of information. All that is really needed
is a card identical to Annex IVB with a blank address side on which the prisoner
of war could write the name and address of the member of his family to whom the
information is to be sent.
176 The second paragraph of Article 36 of the 1929 Convention contained a very
similar provision with respect to the notification of the f~mily. Although it contained no provision for a capture card to be sent to the Central Prisoners of War
Agency, during World War II the ICRC succeeded in persuading a number of
belligerents to adopt such a procedure, particularly because the capture cards
usually reached the Central Agency in Geneva long before the lists officially submitted by the Detaining Power pursuant to what is now Article 122. 1946 Preliminary Conference 78-79. This procedure also made the information centrally
available when a displaced family failed to receive the card addressed to it by the
prisoner of war.
177 Article 70 also provides for the dispatch of such a card "in cases of sickness."
The meaning of this provision is unclear. Certainly, there was no intention to
authorize the sending of such a card every time that a prisoner of war was on sick
call because of a cold or some other equally routine ailment. Pictet, Commentary
341.
178 The third paragraph of Article 48 imposes upon the Detaining Power the correlative obligation of promptly forwarding to the prisoner of war at his new camp
all mail and parcels received at the former camp after his departure therefrom.
See p. 193 infra.
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extends, which may be a matter of years. The subject is covered, at
considerable length, in Article 71 of the Convention which opens with
the fiat statement that "[p]risoners of war shall be allowed to send
and receive letters and cards." This is the blanket provision and it is
followed by a number of specific provisions, some of which restrict
the authority of the Detaining Power, and some of which provide the
Detaining Power with a limited leeway to impose some restrictions in
this area.
The tenor of the Convention is that the Detaining Power will permit
prisoners of war to write and send an unlimited number of letters and
cards. However, it is appreciated that the transportation of a massive
bulk of mail and the censorship of correspondence which will probably
be written in a language foreign to that of the Detaining Power may
create problems requiring the imposition of some numerical limitations. The Detaining Power is therefore authorized, when it is deemed
necessary, to limit each prisoner of war to not less than two letters
and four cards per month.179 While Article 71 authorizes the monthly
minimum, in exceptional cases, to be reduced below the foregoing
figures, this may only be done when the Protecting Power (not the
Detaining Power) concludes that it would be in the overall general
interests of the prisoners of war to impose such a reduction because
of the delay caused by the Detaining Power's inability to provide a
sufficient number of translators to accomplish the necessary censorship without inordinate delay.lso
One additional authorization for interference by the belligerent Powers with prisoner-of-war mail is contained in the third paragraph of
Article 76, which permits a complete ban to be imposed, "either for
military or political reasons," but with the admonition that such ban
"shall be only temporary and its duration shall be as short as possible."
Unfortunately, neither the drafting history of this provision (nor of
its counterpart, the second paragraph of Article 40 of the 1929 Con17[1 The first paragraph of Article 36 of the 1929 Convention permitted Detaining
Powers to establish numerical limits but did not provide for any specific monthly
minimum. During World War II the United States at first permitted each prisoner
of war to write and mail four letters and four cards per month. As the number of
prisoners of war increased, the burgeoning censorship problem necessitated the
reduction of this allowance to two letters and four cards per month. Tollefson,
Enemy Prisoners of War 66-67. These same numbers were adopted by most of the
belligerents. 1 ICRC Report 349. They have now been incorporated into the first
paragraph of Article 71 of the Convention. (It should be noted that under the
third paragraph of Article 78, letters of complaint addressed to the Detaining
Power, the prisoners' representative, or the Protecting Power, are excluded from
the count.)
180 The sentence of the first paragraph of Article 71 which immediately follows
the provision referred to in the text concerns the other aspects of the problemmail to the prisoners of war. Here the limitations may be imposed only by the
Power of Origin, "possibly at the request of the Detaining Power."
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vention), nor any other provision of the Convention, discloses the intent and purpose of this authorization. It may be that it was included
in order to enable the Detaining Power to put a blanket prohibition on
prisoner-of-war correspondence prior to a major military operation
which might otherwise be compromised by the many small bits of
information which could be gleaned from such correspondence to form
an overall recognizable pattern. However, the fact of the ban itself
would probably be equally, or even more, revealing to the enemy intelligence service. So-called "disinformation" would probably be more
effective than the total ban. And no justifiable "political reasons" can
be envisaged for such a ban.1S1 All in all, this provision appears to be
an unwarranted and unnecessary one which can be used by an unscrupulo,us Detaining Power, at least for limited periods of time, to
justify legally what is really a premeditated violation of major provisions of the Convention.
Detaining Powers have, on more than one occasion, used the denial
of mail privileges for disciplinary purposes: either to punish for
alleged misconduct, or to compel or reward certain desired conduct. 182
In the 1949 Convention every effort has been made to remove the mail
completely from the disciplinary area. Thus: (a) the last clause of
the first paragraph of Article 71 states that letters and cards "may
not be delayed or retained for disciplinary reasons"; (b) the third
paragraph of Article 87 prohibits collective punishment for the acts
of individuals ;183 (c) the second paragraph of Article 89 provides that
181 Unlike the limitations on mail contained in the first paragraph of Article 71,
which require the concurrence of the Protecting Power or of the Power of Origin
before they may be imposed, the emergency limitations authorized by the third
paragraph of Article 76 may apparently be imposed unilaterally by the Detaining
Power.
182I.M.T.F.E. 1135; U.K., Treatment 21; Miller, The Law of War 245. Writing
of the procedures with respect to mail followed by the Chinese in Korea, a psychiatrist said: "Loyalties to home and country were undermined by the systematic
manipulation of mail. Usually only mail which carried bad news was delivered to
a man. If he received no mail at all, it was pointed out to him that his loved ones
must have abandoned him." Schein, Patterns, 257-58.
183 Maughan, Tobruk 796. While it denied the applicabliity of the 1949 Convention to the American prisoners of war shot down over its territory (see note 1-68
supra), North Vietnam made the following statement in a letter to the ICRC dated
31 August 1965.
Authorization has been granted [to the captured American airmen] to correspond with their families. However, the regulations concerning mail with the
exterior having been recently infringed, the competent authorities of the
Democratic RepUblic of Vietnam have decided temporarily to suspend this correspondence. In future, if those concerned demonstrate their willingness to
observe the regulations in force in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the
competent authorities could reconsider the question with a view to finding an
appropriate solution.
3 I.R.R.C. 528 (1965). Information concerning the nature of the "regulations" and
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disciplinary punishment may include the discontinuance of only those
privileges which have been granted by the Detaining Power "over and
above" the minimum requirements stipulated in the Convention; (d)
the first paragraph of Article 98 reserves to prisoners of war underging disciplinary punishment all of the benefits of the Convention;
(e) the last paragraph of Article 98 specifies that prisoners of war
undergoing disciplinary punishment shall have permission "to send and
receive letters"; and (f) the third paragraph of Article 108 provides
that prisoners of war serving sentences imposed after trial "shall be
entitled to receive and dispatch correspondence."ls4
A problem with respect to correspondence may arise by reason of
the fact that the languages of prisoners of war usually differ from
that of the Detaining Power. The third paragraph of Article 71 of
the Convention, like Article 36 of its 1929 predecessor, provides that,
as a general rule, prisoners of war shall use their "native language"
in their correspondence but that the Detaining Power may allow them
to use other languages. ISS The italicized clause was undoubtedly included for the protection of the prisoners of war, as a ban on any
attempt to compel them to correspond in a language other than their
own. lS6 Unfortunately, it has apparently also been construed as meaning that, while generally the Detaining Power will permit correspondence to be conducted in the native language of the prisoner of war, it
may, in exceptional cases, dictate otherwise. Thus, during World War
II, certain prisoners of war held by the Germans were required to
conduct their correspondence in German, a language with which they
were totally unfamiliar as were, presumably, their correspondents at
home.187 Of course, this was the same as prohibiting them from sending any mail. While such action on the part of the Detaining Power
may not always be totally unwarranted, as it may. have available for
how and by whom they had been violated was not disclosed. Unless it was found
that every prisoner of war had violated the "regulations," the North Vietnamese
action was vicarious punishment in violation of the prohibition on collective punishment contained in the third paragraph of Article 87.
IS4 It should also be noted that the first paragraph of Article 87 prohibits the
imposition upon prisoners of war of any punishment not imposed upon members of
the armed forces of the Detaining Power who have committed the same act. Most
armed forces permit their military prisoners to send and receive mail.
18G Presumably, the language of the Power of Origin will be the "native language" of the prisoner of war. However, this it not always true; and the privilege
of using a different language will sometimes be sought because of unusual circumstances such as, for example, the fact that the prisoner of war was serving in the
armed forces of a country other than his own (see note 204 infra), or the fact that
the parents of the prisoner of war did not accompany him when he immigrated, or
that while they have immigrated to the Power of Origin of their prisoner-of-war
son, they are still not literate in the language of their adopted land.
186 This is the position taken by the ICRC which does not appear to accept the
possibility of an alternative interpretation. Pictet, Commentary 350.
187 Tchirkovitch, Nouvelles conventions 105.
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censorship purposes practically no personnel familiar with a particular
language which is in limited use, neverthless, the result can obviously
be morale-shattering to the prisoners of war affected by such a ruling.
It is to be regretted that despite the known existence of this problem
under the provisions of the 1929 Convention, no effort was made to
solve it in the 1949 Convention, which is identical except for minor
drafting changes. ISS
It will have become obvious that differences in language, with the
consequent difficulties encountered in censoring, constitute one of the
major problems with respect to prisoner-of-war correspondence. As a
further limitation on the Detaining Power in this area, the first paragraph of Article 76 requires that censorship be accomplished as rapidly as possible,189 be done only by the dispatching and the receiving
States,I9° and only once by each.
As one means of solving the problem of censorship of prisoner-o:fwar mail during World War II, the belligerents. as we have seen, found
it necessary to place a numerical ceiling on the number of items a
prisoner of war would be permitted to dispatch each month, a ceiling
which has been included as a floor in the 1949 Convention. A number
of belligerents in World War II went a step further and only permitted
the use of letter forms with a limited number of words, or even with
stereotyped messages. l9l This procedure is indirectly prohibited by
the first paragraph of Article 71, which requires that the cards and
letters furnished to prisoners of war for their use conform "as closely
as possible" to the forms annexed to the Convention. 192 These forms
provide a blank space for the message and carry the remark that the
space "can contain about 250 words which the prisoner is free to
write."193
18S It should be noted that the German military authorities did attempt to solve
this problem by issuing an order under which letters written in a number of languages little known in Germany (Urdu, Kurdish, Georgian, etc.) could be sent to
Berlin for censoring. German Regulations, No. 25, para. 341. At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the Indian delegation did make a proposal in this connection but
it was not pressed. 2A Final Record 288.
189 Obviously, this is a provision which lends itself to subjective interpretation.
190 This would appear to be intended to preclude censorship by another belligerent should the prisoner-of-war mail pass through its territory while en route to its
ultimate destination.
191 1 ICRC Report 348.
192 See Annexes IVC 1 and 2, respectively.
193 In the discussion of this matter in Pictet, Commentary 346, the statement is
made, with respect to the model cards and letters, that it is "to be hoped that the
Detaining Powers will adopt them, as recommended by the present provision." This
is one of the few instances in which the present author's interpretation of a provision of the 1949 Convention is more liberal than that of the ICRC. "[C]onforming as closely as possible to the models annexed to the present Convention," the
language of the first paragraph of Article 71, does not appear to be a simple recommendation. It is a requirement which can only be the subject of variation if the
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Several other aspects of the prisoner-of-war mail problem are deserving of mention. Thus, prisoner-of-war mail has long been exempt
from postage requirements and continues so to be. 194 This provision
for the postage-free carriage of prisoner-of-war mail applies not only
to the country where the mail originates (the Detaining Power) and
for which it is destined (usually, but not necessarily, the Power of
Origin), but also to all intermediate countries (which may be belligerents or neutrals) .195
Second, in respect of the anguish caused by lack of news, the provisions of the 1949 Convention amplify the cognate provisions of the
1929 Convention concerning the use of telegrams.196 The second paragraph of Article 71 specifies that prisoners of war (a) "who have
been without news for a long period";197 or (b) who are unable to
receive or send news by ordinary postal routes; or (c) who are at a
great distance from their homes, may send telegrams, the cost thereof
to be met by the prisoner of war concerned either by payment in cash
Detaining Power is able to show good cause for its action. Both the language and
the intent of this provision differ markedly from the "similar, if possible," phraseology of Article 70. (See note 175 supra.)
HH The first paragraph of Article 16, 1907 Hague Regulations; the first paragraph of Article 38, 1929 Geneva Convention; the second paragraph of Article 74,
1949 Geneva Convention. The current provision on free postage is implemented by
Article 16 (1) of the Rules applicable in common throughout the international
postal service, Part I of the 1974 Universal Postal Convention.
195 In view of the free-postage provision of Article 16 (1) of the Rules applicable
throughout the international postal service attached to the 1974 Universal Postal
Convention, it appears that States which are Parties to that Convention, but not
to the 1949 Geneva Convention, would still have a treaty obligation to permit the
free passage of prisoner-of-war mail from, through, or to, their national territory.
Moreover, the provisions of the Universal Postal Convention 'Common Rules are
specifically extended to include prisoners of war interned in a neutral country.
19a International Telecommunications Convention and Article 4 of the Annex to
the Telegraph Regulations are concerned with prisoner of war telegrams. Para. 4
of Recommendation F.1 of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative
Committee Greenbook provides for a 75 percent reduction in the charge to prisoners of war for telegraphic services. Despite the wide use of wireless telegraphy
for the transmission of messages prior to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the
word "telegrams" was retained in the Convention. It is assumed that, nevertheless,
if ,vireless telegraphy facilities are available, the Detaining Power will permit
their use, under appropriate safeguards, in meeting its obligations under the
second paragraph of Article 71. It has even been suggested that when neutral
representatives are permanently stationed in a prisoner-of-war camp, they might
be delegated the function of transmitting these messages (perhaps with their own
transmitting set). Feilchenfeld, Prisoners of War 32.
197 There is no attempt to define the term "a long period." During World War
II three months was usually the period required. Hoole, And Still We Conquer 51.
Another method made available for the use of those without news for three months
was the so-called "Express Messages," really a short airmail message sent via the
Central Agency. 2 ICRC Report 62-63; POW Circular No.1, para. 145.
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or by being charged to his prisoner-of-war account. 198 Because this
cost was often found to be beyond the resources of prisoners of war
during World War II, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference adopted a
Resolution in which it requested the ICRC to prepare a series of specimen messages covering certain appropriate subjects ("personal health,
health of relatives at home, schooling, finance, etc.") .199 The ICRC has
complied with the operative provision of the Resolution, a report with
respect thereto having been submitted to the 1969 International Conference of the Red Cross.200 A series of specimen messages is therefore
available to any Detaining Powers which may agree to permit their use
by prisoners of war. Furtherm"ore, the concluding paragraph of Article 74 calls upon all Parties to the Convention to reduce the charge
for telegrams sent by or to prisoners of war.
Third, while a prisoner of war is denied his freedom for military
reasons, it is not a dishonorable state and there is no military need
to deny him the opportunity to transmit to his family documents, such
as wills, powers of attorney, etc., of which they may have need. 201 This
was allowed during World War 11,202 and the first paragraph of Article
77 of the 1949 Convention continues the practice in somewhat more
specific language than was contained in the first paragraph of Article
41 of the 1929 Convention. 203
Fourth, while there is a tendency to consider the problem of prisoner-of-war mail as one involving solely the transmittal of mail both
ways between the prisoner-of-war camp and the territory of the Power
of Origin, this is not necessarily so. For example, the family of the
prisoner of war with whom he wishes to correspond may live in a third
country;204 or he may have close relatives in another prisoner-of-war

198 There is a further provision in the second paragraph of Article 71 making
the use of telegrams available "in cases of urgency." This was likewise the practice
of some belligerents during World War II. Ibid., para. 142.
199 Resolution 9, 1 Final Record 362.
:lOO ICRC, Proposed System of Standard Telegram Messages to and from Prisoners of War.
201 The third paragraph of Article 14 guarantees the retention of "full civil
capacity." See the discussion of this subject at pp. 180-187 infra.
202 See 2 ICRC Report 75-76.
203 The first paragraph of Article 120 contains a special provision for the transmittal of a will to the Protecting Power, with a certified copy going to the Central
Agency.
204 There has scarcely been a war fought during this century in which citizens
of neutral States did not volunteer for service in the armed forces of at least one
of the belligerents. Americans fought in the British and French armed forces during the 1914-17 period of World War I; Swedes fought in the Finnish armed forces
during the 1939 Finnish-Russian war; Americans fought in the British and Canadian armed forces during the 1939-41 period of World War It; etc., etc.
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camp.205 If a third country-neutral or belligerent-which is a Party
to the Convention is involved, it is obligated to take the steps necessary
to effectuate the relevant provisions with respect to prisoner-of-war
correspondence discussed above.
There are a number of more general provisions of the Convention
dealing with the mail which also require at least a passing mention.
Thus, as soon as a belligerent becomes a Detaining Power (by virtue
of having taken members of the enemy armed forces into custody as
prisoners of war), it has a duty to inform the prisoners of war and
their Power of Origin, through the Protecting Power, of the procedures which it has adopted in order to implement the various provisions of the Convention which are concerned with prisoner-of-war
mail (Article 69). Sacks containing prison-of-war mail must be securely sealed, labeled as such, and properly addressed (Article 71, fourth
paragraph) , and they must be shipped by the most expeditious method
available to the Detaining Power (Article 71, first paragraph). And
in the event that conditions prevent a belligerent from fulfilling its
obligations to provide the necessary transport for prisoner-of-war
mail, provision is made for this function to be performed by a neutral
agency such as the Protecting Power, the lCRC, or some other organization approved by the belligerents (Article 75).
The many individuals who participated in the drafting of what
eventually became the 1949 Convention were well advised to give the
amount of attention which they did to the all-important subject of
prisoner-of-war mail. Unfortunately, the policies adopted by the Japanese during World War II, by the North Koreans and the Chinese
during the hostilities in Korea, and by the North Vietnamese during
the hostilities in Vietnam were a far cry from the policies in this
regard expressed in the provisions of the 1929 and 1949 Conventions.
And when belligerents use this significant prisoner-pf-war right to
send and receive mail as a means of propaganda, as a means of coercing prisoners of war-as occurred in the latter two conflicts-much
of the fabric of the Convention disintegrates.
8. Official Information concerning Prisoners of War
We have seen some of the efforts which were expended in order to
ensure that the prisoner of war would be able to advise the members
of his family of the fact of his capture, to keep them informed of his
condition, and to receive news of them. But the efforts in this direction did not stop there. Based upon experiences of history, a number
of other institutions were included among the provisions of the 1949
Convention and a number of other obligations were imposed upon
Parties to an international armed conflict.
205 This apparently occurred frequently enough during World War II to cause
the German military authorities to issue a regulation specifically authorizing correspondence in such cases. German Regulations, No.5, para. 10.
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Article 14 of the 1899 Hague Regulations had provided for the
establishment of a Bureau of Information relative to prisoners of war
in each of the belligerent States (and in any neutral State in the territory of which there were members of the armed forces of a belligerent) •
Each such Bureau was intended to provide what would now be called
a "central data bank" for all information concerning prisoners of war
held by that Detaining Power, so that any inquiry concerning an individual prisoner of war could be quickly answered. Such Bureaux were
established during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) .206 Also, during
that conflict, France, the Protecting Power for Russia, requested the
Japanese Government to provide it, on a regular basis, with lists of
Russian prisoners of war. This was done on a reciprocity basis so that,
for the first time, official lists of prisoners of war were exchanged liy
the opposing belligerents through the medium of the Protecting Power. 207 Then, during the Balkan War (1912-13) the ICRC tried out the
idea, which was really only fully implemented during World War I,
of a central bureau in neutral territory which would receive and disseminate information on prisoners of war from all belligerents.208 This
bureau was subsequently institutionalized in Article 79 of the 1929
Convention and then in Article 123 of the 1949 Convention.
Thus, through a process of evolution, there had come into being a
"Central Prisoners of War Information Agency" ;209 national "Prisoners of War Information Bureaux" ;210 and an obligation on each
belligerent to furnish its adversary promptly with certain specified
detailed information concerning every prisoner of war taken into custody by it. With some exceptions,2l1 these institutions had functioned
fairly suceessfully during World War II, with the result that the
changes made with respect to them in the 1949 Convention were minimal and, for the most part, were concerned with amplification rather
than with substance.
Once again national Information Bureaux are to be established in the
territory of each belligerent State (and of each neutral or nonbelligerTakahashi, Russo-Japanese War 115.
Franklin, Protection 77-78. Despite the adoption of this obviously humanitarian device, Article 14 of the 1907 Hague Regulations merely added the requirement that the data collected by the national Bureaux would be sent to the Power
of Origin "after the conclusion of peace."
208 Charpentier, 1929 Convention 146; 2 ICRC Report 5-6. The latter publication indicates that as early as the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) the ICRC had
opened an unofficial prisoner-of-war information bureau at Basle.
209 It is generally known simply as the "Central Agency." For a review of the
activities of the World War II Central Agency, see 2 ICRC Report, passim.
210 They are generally known simply as "Information Bureaux." The United
States has elected to call its Information Bureau the "United States Prisoner of
WaIi Information Center" (USPWIC). U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 5.
211 Concerning the Soviet Union's negative attitude in this regard, see ICRC
Report 253-55.
206
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ent State which is involved with prisoners of war) immediately upon
the outbreak of hostilities ;212 and each such State is specifically required to provide its Bureau with adequate space, equipment, and
staff.213 Moreover, it is incumbent upon each State to furnish to its
Information Bureau "within the shortest possible period" all of the
specified identification material concerning every individual in its
custody whose status brings him within one of the various categories
listed in Article 4 of the Convention.214 However, this creates a problem. The first paragraph of Article 17, the 1949 Convention's version
of the old "name, rank, and serial number," has added only the date
of birth to the information which a prisoner of war is bound to give
the Detaining Power.215 The fourth paragraph of Article 122 requires
the Detaining Power, "[s]ubject to the provisions of Article 17," to
furnish its Information Bureau not only the foregoing data, but also
with the "place ... of birth, ... first name of the father and maiden
name of the mother, name and address of persons to be informed...."
Just how the Detaining Power is to obtain this information is not
explained-and certainly no Detaining Power could be held to be in
default if a prisoner of war, exercising his rights under the first paragraph of Article 17 refused to furnish these items of personal identifification 216 and the Detaining Power was therefore unable to provide
all of the information required by the fourth paragraph of Article
122 to its Information Bureau.
212 The first paragraph of Article 122, which provides for the establishment of
the Information Bureaux upon the outbreak of hostilities, as did Article 77 of the
1929 Convention, now also requires their establishment "in all cases of occupation."
213 The first paragraph of Article 122 also provides that prisoners of war may
be employed in the Bureaux, subject to the provisions regarding the employment
of prisoners of war contained in Articles 49-57, inalusive, of the Convention. (See
note III-55 infra).
214 Article 122, second paragraph. For a discussion of the categories listed in
Article 4, see pp. 34-84 supra.
2l1i The Identity Card referred to in Article 4A (4), the model for which is reproduced in Annex IVA of the Convention, includes information as to the place
of birth and religion. The Capture Card (Annex IVB to the Convention) and
the Correspondence Card and Letter (Annex IVC 1 and 2 to the Convention) also
call for identifying information beyond that required to be given by the first paragraph of Article 17.
216 In its Information Note No.4, at 15, the ICRC stated that while the prisoner
of war could refuse to furnish any information beyond that required by the first
paragraph of Article 17, "it will be to his advantage to give the officials of the
detaining Power who question him all the information provided for in Article 122."
(Trans!. mine.) Sec. V of the U.S. Code of Conduct forbids members of its armed
forces to give any information beyond that required by the first paragraph of
Article 17. This, like several other provisions of that Code of Conduct, is completely
unrealistic. Technically, every captured member ,of the armed forces of the United
States will violate this section of the Code of Conduct when he completes a Capture
Card or writes a Correspondence Card. See the preceding note.
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With the information now in its possession, the Information Bureau
should, in any event, have adequate identification for every prisoner of
war. The requirement is then imposed upon the appropriate other
agencies of the Detaining Power to furnish to its Information Bureau
any and all data with respect to subsequent developments concerning
each prisoner of war such as "transfers [between prisoner-of-war
camps], releases, repatriations, escapes, admissions to hospital, and
deaths";217 and, with respect to a seriously ill or seriously wounded
prisoner of war, the obligation is imposed of furnishing the Information Bureau with information regarding his state of health "regularly,
every week if possible."218
Having thus accumulated complete and reasonably up-to-date personal information with respect to each and every prisoner of war in
the custody of the Detaining Power,219 the Information Bureau is
required, using "the most rapid means" available, to forward this
information to the Protecting Power representing the Power of Origin
of the prisoner of war and to the Central Agency.220 It is through this
procedure that the basic list of captured personnel should reach the
Power of Origin within a comparatively short period of time. It is the
compilation made from these lists that establishes the overall accountability of the Detaining Power for enemy personnel at one point in time
admittedly in its custody.2!!1
217 Article 122, fifth paragraph.
218 Article 122, sixth paragraph. The Finnish representative at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference suggested the deletion of the clause "every week if possible" as
being too burdensome a requirement. His suggestion was rejected. 2A Final Record
378.
219 The records containing this information with respect to each prisoner of war
must be maintained even for prisoners of war who have died in that status as,
under the seventh paragraph of Article 122, the Information Bureau must be in a
position to answer inquiries concerning deceased prisoners of war. See Roxburgh,
The Prisoner of War Information Bureau 25.
220 Article 122, third paragraph. The next paragraph of Article 122 states that
the receipt of the information by the Information Bureau "shall make it possible
to advise the next of kin ~oncerned"; and the seventh paragraph of Article 122
makes the Information Bureau responsible for answering inquiries concerning
prisoners of war. However, these provisions do not mean that anyone may send an
inquiry to, and expect an answer from, the Information Bureau. While the Final
Record is silent on the question, it appears that the Information Bureau will probably transmit information to, and answer inquiries from, official sources (the Protecting Power and the Central Agency) only. (This refers to inquiries concerning
enemy prisoners of war. Of course, there is nothing to prevent a belligerent Power
from using its Information Bureau as the center of information concerning its own
personnel in enemy hands and, if it does so, the answering of inquiries concerning
them would be subject to any ground rules that the Power desired to impose.)
221 The Communist countries have, when the occasion arose, uniformly refused
to implement this provision. Concerning the Soviet failure in this regard during
World War II, see note 211 supra; concerning the North Korean and Chinese failure in this regard during the Korean hostilities, see Hermes, Truce Tent 14-141;
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The Information Bureau has one other function in addition to that
of being a central data bank of prisoner-of-war personal information
-it is the agency given the responsibility by the IMt paragraph of
Article 122 for collecting and forwarding the "personal valuables"222
of prisoners of war who are no longer in the custody of the Detaining
Power.223 The disposition of personal effects other than valuables is
subj ect to arrangements to be agreed upon by the Detaining Power
and the Power of Origin.224
A Central Prisoners of War Information Agency (Central Agency)
is to be established on neutral territory.225 The ICRC has defined the
basic duties of the Central Agency as follows:
(1) To centralize all information on PW ... (announcement of
capture, deaths, transfers, etc.)
(2) To act as intermediary between the belligerent Powers for
the transmission of this information.
(3) To serve as an information bureau and on the basis of the
data assembled in its card-indexes or of researches made, to answer enquiries from public or private organizations and private
persons. 226
This statement is somewhat broader than is specified in the second
paragraph of Article 123, but there can certainly be no objection to
that as long as the added activities are not contrary to the national
and concerning the Chinese failure in this regard during the Sino-Indian border
hostilities (1962) (while insisting that India furnish that very information with
respect to civilian internees), see Cohen & Leng, Sino-Indian Dispute 296-97. As
the North Vietnamese refused to apply the 1949 Geneva Convention in its entirety
(see note 1-68 supra), they did not furnish lists of prisoners of war as required
by Article 122, even though they were furnished lists by the Republic of Vietnam
authorities covering all prisoners of war in the custody of that Power, no matter
by whom captured. See, e.g., ICRC Annual Report 1968, at 30.
222 "Personal valuables" are specifically stated to include "sums in currency
other than that of the Detaining Power and documents of importance to the next
of kin." (Emphasis added.) See note 62 supra.
223 They will have been interned in a neutral country, or repatriated, or released,
or have escaped, or died.
224 See the last sentence of Article 122 and note 480 infra. See also pp. 84-86
supra.
225 Article 123, first paragraph. Since the first such Central Agency was established informally by the ICRe during the Balkan War (1912-13) [or during the
Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), note 208 supra], such Agency has always been
established in Switzerland and pursuant to a proposal advanced by the ICRC.
226 2 ICRC Report 12. This volume of the ICRC's report on its humanitarian
activities during World War II is devoted exclusively to the operations of the Central Agency. Preparations having wisely been commenced long before the actual
outbreak of hostilities, the ICRC was able to advise the belligerents on 14 September 1939 that a Central Agency had been established and was in operation in
Geneva. (That Central Agency extended its operations beyond those stated in the
text, providing information, for example, which permitted the reuniting of dispersed families, tracing lost indivduals, etc.)
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interests of a belligerent, which they certainly are not. If, for example, the Central Agency is willing to take upon itself the arduous task
of answering i:itquiries from private organizations and private individuals, this cannot possibly have an adverse effect on a belligerent
and it can only make the Central Agency more effective in accomplishing the objective for which it was created: the prompt delivery of
complete and correct information concerning all prisoners of war held
by all Detaining Powers.
Of course, the Central Agency wiII, for the most part, be only as
effective as the cooperation which it receives from the belligerent
Powers allows it to be. While it wiII have other sources of information
to supplement that received from the Detaining Powers,227 the great
mass of its information must come from them. If they do not supply
it to the Central Agency, the latter wiII not be able to pass it on to the
Powers of Origin. If the belligerent Powers do not provide it with
the facilities to transmit the information which it has received, that
information wiII be of little value. As has been noted immediately
above, the third paragraph of Article 122 requires the national Information Bureaux to furnish the required information to the Central
Agency and to do this without delay and by the most rapid means
available. The second paragraph of Article 123 makes it the responsibility of the Central Agency to collect this information, and that obtained through private channels, and to transmit it to the Power of
Origin as rapidly as possible; and obligates the belligerent Powers to
assist it in so transmitting the information.228 Only with this type
of all-around cooperation will the letter and the spirit of these provisions of the Convention be fulfilled. 229
9. Relief Shipments
Few Detaining Powers wiII be in a position to comply fully with
their obligations under the Convention as to food and clothing, particularly if the armed conflict in which they are engaged continues
over a considerable pe~iod of time. As has been seen, if the civilian
population, and perhaps the armed forces, of the Detaining Power
!!!!7 Of course, it will have one other major source of information-the Capture
Cards which the prisoners of war are entitled to send directly to the Central
Agency under the provisions of Article 70. See note 175 supra.
228 The third -paragraph of Article 123 requests all Parties to the Convention,
and particularly the belligerent Powers, to provide the Central Agency with financial assistance; and Article 124 gives the Central Agency (and the national Information Bureau) the benefits of the free-postage provision which Article 74
gives to prisoners of war (see notes 194 and 195 supra) and either free use of the
telegraph facilities or greatly reduced rates (see note 196 supra).
229 Some idea of the vastness of the operations of the Central Agency can be
gathered from the fact that by June 1947 the World War II Central Agency had
accumulated almost 36 million index cards (as compared to 7 million after World
War 1).2 ICRC Report 9 & 316.
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are on a limited and possibly inadequate food ration, it is highly unlikely that prisoners of war wiII receive a sufficient ration to keep
them in good health and to prevent loss of weight. 230 While there are
other possible courses of action which the "law-abiding" Detaining
Power can pursue in order to solve the problem,231 the one which has
been employed in past armed conflicts-and which wiII undoubtedly
be employed again in the future-involves relief packages. A discussion
of the extent to which the law relating to relief packages has evolved
wiII be helpful in understanding the overall problem.
Article 15 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provided for the distribution of relief to prisoners of war by societies constituted for that purpose. The first paragraph of Article 16 of those Regulations provided
for free postage on "parcels by post, intended for prisoners of war."
This latter was the only reference in the Regulations with respect to
individual relief packages, if such it was. Because of the stabilized
fronts which characterized World War I, the belligerents were themselves able to transport and distribute both general relief shipmentEl
for prisoners of war and individually addressed parcels.232 Nevertheless, the two provisions contained in the 1907 Hague Regulations were
repeated in almost identical form in the 1929 Convention ;233 but, in
addition, Article 37 thereof contained a completely new provision
allowing prisoners of war "to receive individually postal parcels containing foodstuffs and other articles intended for consumption or clothing ;"234 and the third paragraph of Article 43 of that Convention
charged the prisoners' representatives 235 with the responsibility for
"the reception and distribution of collective consignments."236
The 1946 Preliminary Conference made a number of suggestions
concerning relief supplies: that the principles of both individual and
collective relief should be continued; that Detaining Powers should be
prohibited from unilaterally forbidding or limiting individual relief
parcels; that if any such limitations should be necessary, they should
See p 127 supra.
See pp. 127-128 supra.
232 See 3 ICRC Report 5-6. This volume of the ICRC's report on its humanitarian activities during World War II is devoted exclusively to relief activities.
233 See Article 78 and the first paragraph of Arti«le 38, respectively.
234 (This unofficial English translation of the official French text is taken from
118 L.N.T.S. at 371. It is a considerably better translation than the one used officially by the United States, which appears in 47 Stat. at 2043.) More than 44
million individually addressed parcels were sent from Switzerland and through the
ICRC during the period 1940-45, inclusive. 3 ICRC Report 11.
:l3G Concerning the "prisoners' representative," see pp. 293-307 infra.
230 During the period 1942-45, inclusive, the ICRC alone handled over 380 million
kilograms of collective relief supplies. 3 ICRC Report 271. It concluded that collective relief for prisoners of war was much more efficient than individual parcels
when large numbers of prisoners of war were involved. Ibid., 202. So did the 1946
Conference of National Red Cross Societies. 1946 Preliminary Conference 85.
230
:l31
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be accomplished by special agreements; and that the Power of Origin
should be the one to fix the ratio between individual and collective
relief supplies. 237 All of these recommendations, except the last, are
to be found in the several articles dealing with the subject of relief
parcels which were included in the various preliminary drafts of what
ultimately became Articles 72-76 of and Annex III to the 1949
Convention.
The first paragraph of Article 72 is the basic provision with respect
to relief parcels. It not only includes the general requirement that the
Detaining Power shall permit prisoners of war to receive relief parcels,
but also imposes a number of specific requirements on the Detaining
Power: that the relief parcels may be received "by post or by any
other means"; that such relief may be individual or collective; and
that, in addition to the food and clothing referred to in prior international agreements, such relief may include four other general categories of supplies (medical, religious, educational, and recreational),
of which a number of specific examples are listed. 238 On the other
hand, the last paragraph of Article 72 imposes two limitations on the
contents of relief parcels: books may not be included in the same parcel
with food or clothing; and medical supplies should normally be included in collective, rather than individual, relief parcels.239
As was noted in the discussion of the problem of food, the second
paragraph of Article 72 specifically prohibits the Detaining Power
from considering relief shipments, individual or collective, as in any
way relieving it of the obligation to provide the prisoners of war with
the ration provided for in the first paragraph of Article 26. 240 While
this prohibition applies to all of the supply obligations imposed upon
the Detaining Power by the Convention, it is probably only with respect to food, clothing, and medical supplies that the problem will
arise; and it is with respect to these three areas that many Detaining
Ibid., 83-84.
The term "medical supplies" was apparently considered, like foodstuffs and
clothing, to be sufficiently all-embracing not to require elaboration (unless "scientific equipment" could be included here as well as under "articles of an educational
character") ; the term "religious character" would include specifically books and
devotional articles; the term "educational character" would include specifically
books, scientific equipment, examination papers, and miscellaneous materials; and
the term "recreational character" would include specifically books, musical instruments, and sports outfits. (It must not be assumed that every item which falls
within these categories must and will be permitted entry and distribution by the
Detaining Power. For a list of items which were excluded during World War II
and which undoubtedly will, at least for the most part, always be denied to prisoners of war, see 3 ICRC Report 12-13.)
239 The latter limitation was presumably imposed as a result of the experiences
of World War II. Ibid., 13-14.
240 See note 107 supra. Concerning the same limitation with respect to clothing,
see note 117 supra.
237
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Powers can be expected to disregard the mandate of the second paragraph of Article 72, particularly where, as a result of individual and
collective relief parcels, the prisoners of war are better off, or, at least
as well off, as the members of the civilian population of the Detaining
Power and, perhaps, as the members of its armed forces.
As in the case of correspondence, provision was made for the contingency that limitations might have to be imposed on the shipment
of relief parcels in the interest of the prisoners of war themselves
because of the possible inability of systems of transportation available
to the belligerents to handle the tremendous weight and bulk which
relief parcels might well engender. 241 The third paragraph of Article 72
provides that such limitations may be instituted only on the proposal
of the Protecting Power, although the ICRC or any other humanitarian organization engaged in relief activities, may, of course, place
limitations on its own shipments if, for example, it is confronted with
transportation problems.242
Relief shipments, like correspondence, are entitled to move postagefree. 243 They are also exempt from "import, customs and other
duties."244 The third paragraph of Article 74 is a somewhat strange
provision in that it states that if a relief shipment cannot be sent by
parcel post because of its weight or for any other cause, the Detaining
Power shall bear the cost of substitute transportation in any territories
under its control and other Parties to the Convention (whether or not
belligerents) shall bear the cost in their territories. 245 It would have
been more helpful overall if the Convention had specified maximum
weights and dimensions for relief parcels sent by mail. This was the
procedure followed during World War II, but since it was not prescribed by the 1929 Convention, each Detaining Power set its own

241 See p.147 supra.
242 It will be recalled that the first paragraph of Article 71 has a provision concerning possible limitation on mail to the prisoners of war, if such limitations are
deemed necessary. See note 180 supra. It would appear that this possibility is even
more cogent in the case of parcels.
243 See the second paragraph of Article 74 of the 1949 Convention and Article
16 (1) of the Rules applicable in common throughout the international postalservice attached to the 1974 Universal Postal Convention.
244 Article 74, first paragraph. In June 1942 the United States Congress adopted
a joint resolution exempting from duties and customs charges all articles addressed
to prisoners of war (56 Stat. 461, 462).
245 States not parties to the 1949 Convention would have a similar obligation
under Article 16(1) of the Common Rules attached to the 1974 Universal Postal
Convention. In any event, the penultimate paragraph of Article 74 provides that
costs not covered by the exemptions contained in the third paragraph of Article 74
shall be charged to the sender.
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weight Iimit.246 Of course, it may be argued that a unilateral action of
this nature is now proscribed by the provision in the third paragraph
of Article 72 to the effect that" [t]he only limits which may be placed
on these shipments shall be those proposed by the Protecting Power."
Once again, as in the case of letter mail,247 the first paragraph of
Article 75 provides for the emergency transportation of relief parcels
by the Protecting Power, the ICRC, or some other organization approved by the belligerents, when condition prevent a belligerent from
fulfilling its obligation in this respect.24S If a belligerent prefers to
make some arrangement other than the foregoing, it may do so ;249
and barring agreement on another method of payment for the costs
of the emergency transportation, the responsibility for such costs is
placed proportionately on the Parties concerned. 250
Another novel provision, and one which was also conceived because
of occurrences during World War II, is contained in the second paragraph of Article 76. It prohibits the Detaining Power from the predelivery inspection of individual relief parcels under conditions that
will expose the contents of the parcels to deterioration (such as the
inspection outdoors, in rain, of packages containing food or books) ;
and which requires that such inspection be conducted in the presence
of the prisoner of war to whom the parcel was sent, or his designee. 251
And just as in the case of correspondence, the Detaining Power is
directed not to delay the delivery of individual or collective relief parcels because of censorship problems.
During World War II relief shipments of food, clothing, and medi.
cal supplies made the difference between survival or nonsurvival to
literally tens of thousands of prisoners of war. 252 There is no reason
to doubt, and every reason to believe, that the same will be true in any

246 3 ICRC Report 12. Eventually most of the Detaining Powers settled on a
5-kilogram (ll-pound) maximum. Ibid. Article 16 (4) of the Common Rules attached to the 1974 Universal Postal Convention provides that free postage for
prisoner-of-war parcels is limited to 5 kilograms but with a 10-kilogram allowance
when the contents cannot be split up or when the parcel is sent to the prisoners'
representative for distribution.
247 See p. 153 supra.
248 For one ICRC effort to obtain trucks and perform this service during World
War II, see 3 ICRC Report 186-89. See also Feilchenfeld, Prisoners of War 37;
and Maughan, Tobruk 808.
249 Article 75, third paragraph.
250 Article 75, fourth paragraph.
251 Inspections of written or printed matter are specifically excepted from this
latter requirement because it was feared that the presence of the prisoner of war
might create difficulties which would react against him. 2A Final Record 370.
252 American Prisoners of War 72, 81.
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future international armed conflict which continues for a considerable
period of time. 253
10. Internal DiscipIine2G4
a. THE CAMP COMMANDER
Article 39 provides that the prisoner-of-war camp shall be "under
the immediate authority of a responsible commissioned officer belonging to the regular armed forces of the Detaining Power." The importance of the selection of the proper individual for this position cannot
be overemphasized.25G Unfortunately, just as bullies and sadists all too
frequently find their way into the civilian prison administration system sometimes as wardens, so they also often gravitate into the prisoner-of-war camp administration system, some becoming camp commanders.
Article 18 of the 1929 Convention had specified merely that a prisoner-of-war camp shouid be commanded by a "responsible officer."
During World War II noncommissioned officers were sometimes designated by Detaining Powers as camp commanders. 256 It would appear
that a good noncommissioned officer would make a better camp commander than a poor commissioned officer. Nevertheless, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference elected to eliminate this as a possibility by specifying that camp commanders must be commissioned officers.257
The 1947 Conference of Government Experts recommended that the
basic provisions of Article 18 of the 1929 Convention be altered to
provide that the camp commander must also be "an officer of the armed
forces of the DP [Detaining Power] ."258 The draft convention sub253 Two important facets of the problem of relief shipments are discussed elsewhere: the part played by the prisoners' representatives in the receipt and distribution of collective relief shipments (pp. 305-306 infra); and the agreements
which the opposing belligerents may enter into with respect to relief shipments
(PP. 84-86 supra.)
!l54 This section is not concerned with the imposition of disciplinary and penal
sanctions on prisoners of war for penal offenses, a subject which is discussed at
length in Chapter V. It is concerned with the responsibilities of the camp commander, regulations applicable to prisoners of war, military courtesies, rank, etc.
!luG One commentator has stated that "the attitude and tone of a camp for prisoners [of war] is often controlled by the attitude and the personality of its commandant." Grady, Evolution 102. The camp commander also commands all attached
labor detachments. See p. 245 infra.
!luG 1 ICRC Report 250.
!lu7 2A Final Record 264. Apparently the practice of naming noncommissioned
officers as camp commanders was almost entirely limited to the Japanese.
258 1947 GE Report 161. This was stated to be to prevent "the recurrence of certain unpleasant incidents." Weare not enlightened as to what these "unpleasant
incidents" were, or how selecting the camp commander from the armed forces
would prevent their recurrence. (The ICRC Report, note 256 supra, refers to occasions "when the camp commandant was not a national of the Detaining Power."
This could conceivably have been the situation which gave rise to the "unpleasant
incidc:nts.")
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mitted by the ICRC to the Stockholm Conference went a step further,
requiring the camp commander to belong to "the regular armed forces
of the Detaining Power,"259 and this requirement remained unchanged
at Stockholm and was ultimately approved at Geneva. On the occasion
of the only extensive debate on this Article none of the delegates at
Geneva thought it necessary even to mention this change, so it is not
possible to determine the problem which was thought to require solution. Moreover, as has already been stated in the discussion of Article
4, for the purposes of the Convention all full-fledged members of the
armed forces of a belligerent, no matter how they became such, are
members of its "regular armed forces."26o
The camp commander is responsible, "under the direction of his
government," for the application of the Convention in the prisoner-ofwar camp. This addition to the cognate provision of the 1929 Convention was added at Stockholm. 261 It was objected to by the ICRC, which
considered it to be "imprecise, and also superfluous" and recommended
its deletion. 262 This recommendation was supported by several delegations at Geneva263 but was ultimately rejected by Committee II (Prisoners of War),264 and the added clause remains. While it undoubtedly
is superfluous, as a military commander performs all of his functions
under the direction of his government, no harm can be perceived from
its having been included. Both the individual265 and the government200
remain fully responsible for any violations of the Convention occurring in the prisoner-of-war camp.267
Draft Revised Conventions 76. (Emphasis added.)
See note 1-138 supra. One explanation for the use of the term "commissioned
officer belonging to the regular armed forces of the Detaining Power" here is that
259

260

it was desired to prohibit a Detaining Power from designating as camp commanders commissioned officers of nonmilitary organizations such as the German S.S. and
Gestapo, as was done during World War II. British Manual para. 159 n.1.
261 Revised Draft Conventions 66.
262 Remarks and Proposals 48.
263 2A Final Record 264 & 401. The Coordination Committee took the same position. 2B Final Record 149.
2642A Final Record 401-02. The proposal to delete it had previously been rejected by the Second Committee's Drafting Committee. Ibid., 348.
265 The fear was expressed that the camp commander might be able to use
this provision as a means of evading person'll responsibility for unlawful acts
committed by him against prisoners of war. Ibid., 401. The principle denying "superior orders" as a defense to a war crime is now too well established to cause
such concern. I.M.T. 466; Niirnberg Principles, Principle IV, at 375; 1951 Draft
Code of Offences, Article 4. Article 77 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol dealt
with the subject of superior orders. It was not included in the 1977 Protocol I.
266 See Article 12, first paragraph.
261 When confronted with the problem of putting down the uprising that had
occurrpd in the United Nations Command prisoner-of-war camp on Koje-do Island, Korea, in May 1952, General Boatner immediately requested "the assignment of a judge advocate [military lawyer] who was thoroughly familiar with
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b. KNOWLEDGE OF AND AVAILABILITY OF THE CONVENTION
The very important Convention provisions respecting the requirement for the dissemination of, and instruction in, the contents of the
Convention are discussed elsewhere.268 Compliance with the related
provisions with respect to the camp commander and his personnel
are at least of equal importance.
The second paragraph of Article 127 provides that any military "or
other authorities"269 who are assigned prisoner-of-war responsibilities
"must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed
as to its provisions."270 The first paragraph of Article 39 repeats this
requirement specifically as to the camp commander, providing as it
does that he must have a copy of the Convention in his possession.
Moreover, the latter Article places upon him the responsibility for the
implementation of the requirement therein contained, that the provisions of the Convention be known to both his staff and to the members
of the camp guard. Obviously, there can be no more important requirement than that the individuals responsible for the direct daily supervision of the activities of prisoners of war be fully instructed concerning
the rights and obligations both of the prisoners of war and of the
representatives of the Detaining Power. Absent that instruction and
the knowledge resulting therefrom, the Convention serves no useful
purpose except to lay down rules the violation of which will, in some
cases, eventually result in the punishment of the violators. Certainly,
the objective of the Convention is to procure humanitarian treatment
for prisoners of war, not to serve solely as a vehicle for the punishment
of uninformed guards for their perhaps unwitting violations of its
provisions.
If there is to be some assurance that prisoners of war will receive
the humanitarian treatment which was contemplated by the 1949
Diplomatic Conference and to which they are entitled under the provisions of the Convention, obviously they, too, must be fully informed
as to just what that treatment is. Presumably, they will have received
instruction in this regard during their training by the armed force

the Geneva Conventions." Boatner, Lessons 35. Concerning this incident, which
has many instructive features, see Hermes, Truce Tent 233-62; Vetter, Mutiny,
passim; Harvey, Control, passim.
268 See pp. 93-96 supra.
269 While a civilian could not legally be designated as a camp commander (see
pp. 163-164 supra), there is no prohibition against the use of civilian guards who
might be used either in prisoner-of-war camps, or more probably, for labor detachments. See pp. 246-247 infra.
270 The Convention limits the applicability of this provision to "in time of war."
It surely was not intended that the provision woUld be inapplicable in the event
of the "any other armed conflict" of the first paragraph of Article 2.

166
to which they belong. 271 However, that instruction may have occurred
at some considerable time in the past and the prisoners of war cannot
be expected to have remained fully aware of the countless details of
the many provisions of the Convention. The last paragraph of Article
41 provides, therefore, that the text of the entire Convention, including
its annexes and any special agreements entered into between the Detaining Power and the Power of Origin, shall be posted in every prisoner-of-war camp in places where they will be available to be read
by any prisoner of war.272 In addition, a copy must be supplied to any
prisoner of war who requests it and who is, for some reason, unable
to gain access to the posted copy (individuals who are ill and confined
to bed or quarters, individuals in disciplinary or penal confinement,
individuals on location in labor detachments removed from the camp,
etc.) .273
There was a substantially similar provision in Article 84 of the
1929 Convention.274 Its value was demonstrated during the course of
World War II. One American author, writing during the course of
that armed conflict, said that "the most assiduous group of legal scholars in this country today are our Italian and German prisoners of
war."275 In Korea it was only after a board of officers was appointed
in February 1951 to investigate prisoner-of-war matters generally,
and it had---so recommended, that copies of the 1949 Convention were
reproduced in Korean and posted in the United Nations Command
271

See pp. 93-96 supra.

272 The posted copies must, moreover, be in the language of the particular prisoners of war.
273 It is undoubtedly with all of the foregoing in mind that the First United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
adopted a somewhat similar provision for the treatment of prisoners serving sentences for having committed a crime. See Article 35, Standard Minimum Rules.
Even though a set of Rules was approved by the League of Nations as far back
as 1934 (See League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 123,
VI.4, at 17 (1934», we shall have occasion to note many resemblances between
the 1949 Convention and the present Rules.
274 One author who was particularly concerned with German practices in this
regard during World War II wrote that certain Detaining Powers, including
Germany, "had deliberately prevented prisoners of war from becoming familiar
with the text [of the 1929 Convention]. For the future, the new Conventions have
remedied this lacuna." Tchirkovitch, Nouvelles conventions 106 (trans. mine).
There was no such lacuna; and it is being overly optimistic to state with such
assurance that the 1949 Convention has "remedied" the situation.
275 Brabner-Smith, Legal Aspects 44. He gives examples of several objections
made by the prisoners of war to various types of work assignments based upon
the wording of the 1929 Convention (picking cotton was alleged to have a "direct
relation with war operations" because cotton is used in gunpowder; lumbering
was alleged to be "unhealthful or dangerous work.") To the same effect, see Rich,
Brief History 427.
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prisoner-of-war camp.27G In Vietnam, the government of the Republic
of Vietnam did not permit the posting of the Convention because it
did not believe that all of the provisions of the Convention were applicable. 277
c. REGULATIONS
Every Detaining Power will have a number of different categories
of regulations (and orders) that are applicable to prisoners of war.
There will be the reI event regulations in force for its own armed
forces ;278 general regulations applicable only to prisoners of war;279
regulations peculiar to a particular prisoner-of-war camp, etc.280 The
available to the Detaining Power (Article 71, first paragraph). And
second paragraph of Article 41 provides that all such regulations, orders, etc., must, like the Convention itself, be posted and in a language
which the prisoners of war understand ;281 and all orders given orally
to individual prisoners of war must liKewise be in a language which
they understand. 282 These provisions of the Convention are clear and
unambiguous and, while compliance with them may cause some problems for the Detaining Power, they will obviously be of great value to
the prisoner of war.
d. RANK
Even Article 16, providing for the equal treatment of all prisoners
27G Meyers & Bradbury, Political Behavior 240. The Convention was not legally
in effect during that conflict (see note 1-114 supra). The Republic of Korea had
agreed to be bound only by Article 3 (1 lCRe, Confiit de Coree 12-13) and the
United States had agreed to be only "guided by the humanitarian principles" of
the Convention, particularly Article 3. Ibid., 13. The Convention was never posted
in North Korea.
:m Vietna,»~, Article- by-Article Review, Article 41. Of course, in both Korea and
Vietnam any compliance whatsoever by the Republic of Korea or the Republic of
Vietnam represented a more humanitarian approach to the treatment of prisoners
of war than th", complete noncompliance by the other side. Strangely, the Review
itself did not indicate any specific provisions of the Convention which the Republic of Vietnam considered to be inapplicable.
:l78 Article 82, first paragraph, makes prisoners of war subject to these regulations. See pp. 318-319 infra.
279 Article 82, second paragraph, envisages such regulations. See PP. 320-321
in/m.
Daily schedules, work assignments, class schedules, sports events, etc.
It will have been noted that while the first paragraph of Article 41 says "in
the prisoners' own language," the next paragraph says "in a language which they
understand." It is probable that this was merely an oversight of the Drafting
Committee. The difference in wording actually originated in the draft prepared by
the rCRC for the Stockholm Conference (Draft Revised Conventions 76-77) and
was never changed.
282 This will sometimes create major difficulties for a Detaining Power short of
personnel who speak the language of the prisoners of war; but it is a great deal
more logical than the giving of an order of which the prisoner of war does not
understand a single word and then permitting his punishment for his failure to
comply, a procedure frequently followed during W orId War II.
280
281
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of war "without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded
on similar critaria," makes an exception with respect to rank. 283
Because of the difficulty frequently encountered in attempting to
equate the ranks in various armed forces, the first paragraph of Article 43 calls upon the opposing belligerents to communicate to each
other immediately upon the outbreak of hostilitjes "the titles and ranks
of all the persons mentioned in Article 4"; as well as to communicate
information from time to time concerning titles and ranks subsequently created. Most of the belligerents exchanged the required information during World War II,284 but they often found it difficult to equate
the ranks involved. 285 Even where there was no difficulty in equating
ranks, problems arose with respect to this matter. Thus, when the
Germans ordered members of the French armed forces back into custody in 1941, many noncommissioed officers at first claimed to be privates because of a rumor that privates would be released first. When
they later found that there was no basis for this rumor and claimed
their proper grade, the Germans refused to restore it to them ;286 and
in the reverse of this situation, the United States found that many
German privates had been promoted to noncommissioned grade just
before capture in North Africa, presumably in order to remove them
from the category of prisoners of war required to perform labor for
the Detaining Power ;287 while others claimed to be noncommissioned
officers but had no documentary proof of this status.288 This latter
And sex. See pp. 178--180 infra.
1 !CRC Report 283; [1942] 3 For. ReI. U.S. 24-32 (1961). Concerning the
exchange of information regarding the ranks of medical personnel, see note IV121 infra.
285 German Regulations, No. 15, para. 117 (British midshipmen, warrant officers, and acting pilot officers); ibid., No. 25, para. 334 (American warrant officers); ibid., No. 29, para. 439 (commissioned officers in the Indian army) ; ibid.,
No. 33, para. 514 (noncommissioned officers in the British navy); ibid., No. 46,
para. 841 (noncommissioned officers in the Royal Air Force). The United States
also had difficulty with the ranks of the members of the German "quasi-military"
organizations. Rich, Brief :History 515.
286 German Regulations, No.7, para. 9.
287 Rich, Brief History 515; Lewis & Mewha 157. The diary of one captured
member of the German Afrika Korps reveals that after destroying everything
of military value in anticipation of the impending surrender of the German forces
in North Africa, he was promoted to NCO rank. Hoole, And Still We Conquer 9.
Concerning the labor of non('ommissioned officers, see pp. 221-224 infra.
288 Rich, Brief History 516. Their soldbuchs (individual personnel records normally in the possession of each German soldier) had, in many cases, been taken
from them for intelligence purposes and had not been returned. Perhaps because
of the obvious hardship thus caused to prisoners of war through no fault of their
own, U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 30b now provides that where an individual
has no documentary proof of his rank, he "may submit a request through channels
to his government for proof of status."
283
284
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problem may conceivably have been solved by the provisions of the
third paragraph of Article 17 for the issuance of identity cards in
duplicate showing, among other items, the rank of the individual, and
the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 18 which, in effect,
prohibit the taking from the prisoner of war of both copies of the
identity card furnished him by his own armed forces and requiring
the Detaining Power to provide such a card to any prisoner of war who
does not have one.289
As a result of the discovery of the mass, last-minute, "pre capture
promotions" accorded by the German command to many of its private
soldiers in North Africa during World War II, and as a method of
rectifying the situation with respect to at least a considerable number
of these promotions, the United States Army issued a directive denying recognition of any promotion if evidence of it was received after
the individual was already in custody.29o Of course, this prevented
recognition of even legitimate postcapture promotions. The second
paragraph of Article 43 now provides that the Detaining Power must
recognize promotions of which it is notified by the Power of Origin.
Presumably, this would include promotions made both before and after the individual becomes a prisoner of war.291 This appears eminently
fair-except that a Power of Origin may now do legally what the
German command in Africa attempted to do as a subterfuge during
World War II. What will a Detaining Power do if it is officially advised
that the Power of Origin has promoted to noncommissioned officer
grade all of the members of its armed forces who are being held as
prisoners of war? Will it thereafter assign them to supervisory work
only as provided by the second paragraph of Article 49-with no one
to supervise? This appears extremely unlikely. It would seem that
any action of this nature by the Power of Origin would be such a
violation of the spirit of the Convention as to warrant the Detaining
Power in refusing recognition to the promotions to noncommissioned
officer grade so accorded.
There are numerous advantages for the prisoner of war in the recognition by the Detaining Power of the prisoner of war's rank, commissioned or noncommissioned. As we have just seen, noncommissioned officers may be required to perform only supervisory work.
Under the last paragraph of Article 49 commissioned officers may volunteer for work but may not be compelled to perform any labor. They

289 See p. 111-112 supra.
290 Rich, Brief History 515.
291 U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 31 provides that "[w]hen evidence is received that a PW has been promoted, the promotion will be recognized."
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(and prisoners of war of equivalent rank) 292 are entitled to be treated
"with the regard due to their rank and age."293 Special camps for officer prisoners of war are contemplated and enlisted men of the same
armed forces are to be assigned as orderlies, which is to be their exclusive work assignment. 294 Moreover, under the last paragraph of
Article 44 commissioned officers are to be enabled to supervise their
own mess. The first two paragraphs of Article 45 provide similarly
that the other prisoners of war shall be treated with due regard for
their rank and age and are to be enabled to supervise their messes.
Provisions of the Convention concerning insignia and the military
courtesy of the salute are, to the prisoner of war, far more important
than they might at first appear. 295 As we have just seen, the first paragraphs of Articles 44 and 45 require the Detaining Power to treat all
prisoners of war with due regard for their rank. Article 40 requires
the Detaining Power to permit prisoners of war to wear insignia of
rank and grade, badges of nationality, and decorations. The fourth
paragraph of Article 87 goes a step further, forbidding the Detaining
Power to deprive the prisoner of war of his rank or to prevent him
from wearing his insignia. 296
Members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power are not required to salute prisoners of war of superior rank. 297 Ordinary mili292 This might, for example, be persons who accompany the armed forces pursuant to Article 4A(4) (see pp. 60-62 supra) if the identification card which the
Power of Origin has issued to them specifies an equivalent rank. 2A Final Record
268.
293 The Convention nowhere specifies what this "regard" is.
294 Article 44, second paragraph. During World War II the United States assigned to officer prisoners of war, in addition to cooks, "one orderly for each
general officer, one for each group of three field officers [majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels], and one for each group of six company officers [lieutenants:
and captains]." POW Circular No.1, para. 45. (Lewis & Mewha, 159, gives a different ratio and adds that the enlisted men chosen for this duty were those who
were incapable of doing a full day of labor.)
295 The recognition of their importance to morale was early recognized by the
Chinese Communists in Korea and the denial of rank was used as a method of
destroying prisoner-of-war morale. See pp. 172-173 infra.
296 This prohibition is in the context of punishment for a disciplinary or penal
offense. It would, a fortiori, apply to conduct which, while perhaps objectionable
to the camp commander or to a guard, did not attain the status of being judicially
punishable.
297 It might be argued that the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 44
to the effect that prisoner-of-war officers "shall be treated with the regard due
to their rank" requires members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power to
salute prisoner-of-war officers of superior rank. However, the second paragraph
of Article 21 of the 1929 Convention was substantively identical and it was not
the practice during World War II, nor did any belligerent claim that it should
be. As the matter was not even mentioned at the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference, it must be assumed that there was no intention to change the prior practice. Hitler is quoted as having said that "the most humble German national is
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tary courtesy, however, calls for them to return the salute of a prisoner
of war.298 Prisoners of war other than officers must salute all officers
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power and must comply with any
other requirements for external marks of respect contained in their
own military regulations. 299 Officer prisoners of war are required to
salute only the camp commander, whatever his rank may be, and officers of the armed forces of the Detaining Power who are their superior
in equated rank. 300
One other problem with respect to saluting arose during World War
II-the type of salute to be given. The relevant clause in the second
paragraph of Article 18 of the 1929 Convention merely said that "prisoners of war must salute all officers of the Detaining Power."301 Germany insisted that prisoners of war held by it use "the established
military salute of their native country" ;302 while some Detaining Powers refused to permit prisoners of war to give the German Nazi and
Italian Fascist extended-arm salutes and insisted that these prisoners
deemed more important than the highest ranking [prisoner of war]." German
Regulations, No. 14, para. 79. To a certain limited extent this is correct. The private who is a guard in a prisoner-of-war camp need not salute the prisoner-of-war
field marshal-but neither need the latter salute the former. See text in connection with note 300.
298 The military salute is a twofold action: it is initiated by the lower in rank
and returned by the superior. While the member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power need not initiate the salute even to a prisoner of war of superior
rank, he should, as a matter of military courtesy, return it. Rich, Brief History
483.
299 Article 39, second paragraph. Other external marks of respect would include
standing when the officer enters the room, remaining at attention while conversing with the officer, etc. These are not marks of obsequiousness, but of disciplined
training. (One report on World War II comments on the high morale of prisoners
of war who "showed their hostility toward the Germans by often refusing to
salute [and] by failing to come to attention when a German officer entered the
barracks." American Prisoners of War 80. Their morale may well have been high,
but they would have had no valid complaint had they been punished for their insubordinate violations of the Convention and German regulations.)
300 Article 39, third paragraph. Article 18, third paragraph, of the 1929 Convention .had not included a provision requiring all prisoners of war to salute the
camp commander, and this had occasioned a number of disputes when he was of
inferior rank or a noncommissioned officer. 1 ICRC Report 250. The 1949 Convention provides a sort of compromise by requiring the camp commander to be a
commissioned officer (Article 39, first paragraph) and by aberrantly requiring all
prisoners of war to salute him even if they are his superior in rank (Article 39,
last paragraph).
301 The clause concerning compliance by prisoners of war with the regulations
of their own armed force was so placed in the sentence as probably not to be
applicable to the clause concerning the salute. (The ICRC felt otherwise. Ibid.)
302 German Regulations, No. 16, para. 140. This position, of course, was consistent with the German argument for permitting the members of its armed forces
who became prisoners of war to use the Nazi salute. See text in connection with
notes 303 and 304.
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of war give the form of salute used by the armed forces of the Detaining Power.a03 This was finally resolved by permitting all prisoners
of war to use the salute prescribed by the military regulations of the
armed forces of which they were members.30! This problem should not
arise again because of the precedent established by the World War II
decision, and because there is a more valid basis than there was under
the 1929 Convention for arguing that the clause "by the regulations
applying in their own forces" contained in the second paragraph of
Article 39 of the 1949 Convention applies to the form of the salute
as well as to external marks of respect. While, grammatically, the
paragraph as redrafted still leaves much to be desired,305 the members
of the national delegations at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference were
certainly well aware of the problem and of its World War II solution,
and can validly be assumed to have adopted that solution as their own.
While acting as the Detaining Power in North Korea, the Chinese
did everything in their power to destroy morale by breaking down
the military group structure.30G Officers were not permitted to wear
their insignia of rank; distinctions of rank were prohibited; and any
officer, commissioned or noncommissioned, who attempted to give an
order was humiliated and punished. 307 The Chinese insisted that members of the armed forces lost their rank when they became prisoners
of war-and they frequently and intentionally appointed the more
junior prisoners of war as leaders in the prisoner-of-war camps.308
The Chinese practices were in direct violation of a number of the articles of the Convention. 309 They were also contrary to general military
303 1 ICRC Report 250; Rich, Brief History 482.
304 1 ICRC Report 250. The military authorities in the United States were
severely criticized for permitting prisoners of war to use the Nazi salute. Rich,
Brief History 482.
305 The discussion of Article 39 in its origin and at the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic
Conference is not helpful.
30G Schein, Patterns 257.
307 U.K., Treatment 19.
308 Ibid., 17. It was this practice against which part of Sec. IV of the Code of
Conduct was directed. Ineptly, it states: "If I am senior, I will take command. If
not I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed ovel· me and will back them
up in every way." (Emphasis added.) Certainly, there was no intention to give
a legal status to the type of "appointments" made by the Chinese Communists in
Korea-but that would likely be the defense, and an arguable one, made by any
American prisoner of war who, after repatriation, was court-martialed for cooperating with the enemy by obeying the orders of a fellow prisoner of war "appointed over him" by the enemy Detaining Power. (While the "Instructional Material"
under Sec. IV of the Code of Conduct does clarify the matter to some e.,'.:tent. it
certainly does not completely clear up the discrep?ncy.) The North Vietnamese apparently followed the Chinese procedure. Naughton, Motivational Factors 11.
30ll Article 39, last paragraph; 40; 44, first two paragraphs; 45, first paragraph; 79, first two paragraps; and 87, last paragraph, among others.
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usage. 3lO It was part of a "brainwashing" technique which was only
very marginally successfu1.311
11. Miscellaneous Protections
a. COMMON TREATMENT
The preceding subsection opened with a quotation from Article 16
of the Convention3l2-but only to point out that rank was one of the
exceptions specified therein. What that Article does is to place upon
the Detaining Power the duty to treat all prisoners of war alike, "without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief
or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar
criteria."
The 1907 Hague Regulations were criticized for not including a prohibition against discrimination in the treatment of prisoners of war.313
Article 4 of the 1929 Convention remedied this situation to some extent by providing that any difference in treatment accorded various
prisoners of war was only lawful when it was based on rank, health,
professional qualifications, or sex. 314 However, despite the foregoing,
there were extremes of treatment of different nationalities, and even
of identifiable groups within nationalities, by the same Detaining Power during World War II.315 All, or nearly all, of the belligerents made
national and political distinctions in asigning prisoners of war to par-

310 See, e.g., Britwh Manual para. 159 n.2, which states: "By Q.R. 286, when
members of the British army become prisoners of war the ordinary relations of
superior and subordinate remain unaltered." See also U.S. v. Floyd; and Re
Tassoli.
311 As yet not enough information is available to determine -whether the North
Vietnamese failure to follow the Chinese practice was because of its lack of quantitative success, because of the relatively small number of prisoners of war held
by them, or because of some other reason.
312 See pp. 167-168 supra.
313 Phillimore & Bellot 60.
314 Article 1 of the 1929 W ounded-and-Sick Convention specifically required
that individuals protected by that Convention be "treated...and cared for...without distinction of nationality," a provision, which, for some unknown reason, was
not repeated in the 1929 Prisoner-of-War Convention drafted at the same time
and by the same Conference.
315 Germany at least generally attempted to apply this provision with respect
to British and American prisoners of war, and 99 percent of the American prisoners of war held by Germany survived. The American Red Cross attributed this to
reciprocal compliance with the provisions of the 1929 Convention. New York
Times, 2 June 1945, at 8, col. 6. See also note 324 infra. Estimates of the mortality among Russian prisoners of war captured by the Germans go as high as 95
percent. Dallin, German Rule 414-15; Davidson, The Trial of the Germans 32-33.
The 1929 Convention was not in effect as between Germany and the Soviet Union.
See note 1-2 supra.
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ticular camps.3l6 There is nothing inherently wrong with this procedure, providing all prisoners of war in all camps receive the same
treatment.317 The objection to it is that, whatever the original motivation for the separation, there will inevitably be a tendency to give
better treatment to the more pliant prisoners of war, and less favorable
treatment to the more aggressive and antagonistic prisoners of war.
In an effort to remedy this situation, the 1946 Preliminary Conference recommended that the rights of all prisoners of war to like treatment be recognized "without distinction of opinion [,] race, religion,
or nationality."3l8 This was just a general recommendation, unrelated
to any particular article. However, in dealing with proposed revisions
of the 1929 Wounded-and-Sick Convention, the Preliminary Conference specifically recommended that the appropriate article be changed
to provide for like treatment "without any distinction whatever, particularly of nationality, race, sex, religion or political opinion.":1l9 This
was the source for much of what became Article 16 of the 1949 Prisoner-of-War Convention. 320
Although the general approach to the problem has been somewhat
widened (while the 1929 Prisoner-of-War Convention enumerated only
the items which :would justify discriminatory treatment, the 1949 Convention enumerates both the items which will justify it and the items
which may not be a basis for discriminatory treatment), it is doubtful
that this has either ensured greater protection for the prisoner of war
or imposed any obviously greater restrictions on the actions of the
Detaining Power. If the Detaining Power may only lawfully discriminate in its treatment of prisoners of war by reason of rank, health,
professional qualifications, or sex (as provided in the 1929 Convention
and as more or less repeated in the 1949 Convention), then obviously
316 At least six different national and political groupings were established and
maintained for the allocation of prisoners of war to permanent prisoner-of-war
camps in the United States; (1) German army anti-Nazis; (2) other German
army; (3) German navy anti-Nazis; (4) other German navy; (5) Italian; and
(6) Japanese. Lewis & Mewha 91 n.44; see also, Tollefson, Enemy Prisoners of
War 59.
317 One commentator asserts that the only objective of categorizing by political
conviction is inequality of treatment. Flory, Nouvelle conception 66. That this is
a possibility cannot be doubted. See text in connection with notes 332-334 infra.
However, the official ICRC discussion of Article 16 states that "[t]he wording
excludes differentiation only when it is of an adverse nature." Pictet, Commentary 154. And in Korea the ICRC Delegate specifically recognized the urgent need
that in establishing a new camp for officer prisoners of war "the two political categories [Communist and anti-Communist] would be kept apart and every group
could have an adequate amount [sic] of orderlies recruited among volunteer E.l\1.
[enlisted men] of the same political colour." 2 ICRC, Con/lit de Coree, No. 341.
See also the discussion of the third paragraph of Article 22 at pp. 175-178 infra.
318 1946 Preliminary Conference 68.
319 Ibid., 19.
320 Draft Revised Conventions 60-61.
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it may not lawfully discriminate by reason of race, nationality, religious belief, or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on
similar criteria. In other words, while perhaps somewhat more specific, the provisions of Article 16 of the 1949 Convention do not really
go beyond those of Article 4 of the 1929 Convention.3 :!1
Moreover, the third paragraph of Article 22 actually requires the
Detaining Power to allocate prisoners of war to its various prisonerof-war camps on the basis of nationality, language, and customs. The
1907 Hague Regulations had contained no prohibition against the mixing of prisoners of war of different nationalities, races, and colors in
a prisoner-of-war camp. It was criticized for thus permitting the bringing together of individuals who could communicate to each other infectious diseases 322 against which the infected individuals would not
have a natural immunity. Perhaps as a result of this criticism, when
the 1929 Convention was drafted, it contained a provision in its third
paragraph of Article 9 prohibiting the Detaining Power, so far as
possible,323 from "assembling in a single camp prisoners of different
races or nationalities." We have already seen that many nations did
segregate by nationality during World War II.324 They were thus actually complying with the requirements of the 1929 Convention, whatever their motive in so doing may have been.
The portion of the third paragr.aph of Article 22 discussed above
could, under some circumstances, result in an unintended hardship
either for the Detaining Power or, of more importance, for the prisoner of war. Some armed forces are composed of individuals of many
nationalities, languages, and customs, mirroring the nation of which
they are a part. When these individuals become prisoners of war,
should the Detaining Power be required to separate them into those
constituent categories, perhaps even against their desires? And what
of the national of one country who is captured while serving in the
armed force of another? Should he be separated from the men with
321 Article 6 (1) of the Standard Minimum Rules, while obviously deriving from
Article 16 of the 1949 Convention, has clearly benefited from the latter's birth
pains.
322 Phillimore & Bellot 56-60.
323 For example, a Detaining Power might hold a very limited nU!p.ber of prisoners of war of a particular race or nationality. It might then put them in a separate compound which was part of a larger prisoner-oi-war camp. This complied
with the third paragraph of Article 9 of the 1929 Convention. 1 ICRC Report 248.
3~4 See text in connection with note 316 supra. Germany attempted to go a step
further and to separate Jewish prisoners of war from the other prisoners of war
of the same nationality, with the admonition that "in all other respects" they were
to receive treatment identical to that received by their fellow nationals. German
Regulations, No. 48, para. 876. Sometimes the German camp commander was successful in complying with this mandate (American Prisoners of War 90-91) and
sometimes he was unable to overcome the resistance of the non-Jewish prisoners
of war of the same nationality (ibid., 75) .
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whom he has served and, perhaps, with whom he has been captured?
The provision approved at Stockholm would probably have mandated
such procedure in each of these cases. 325 At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the United Kingdom representative proposed an amendment
which was directed at preventing the separation of an individual from
other members of the armed force in which he was serving at the time
of his capture. 326 After some colloquy between the representatives of
the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the proposal which had
been made by the latter was adopted by Committee II (Prisoners of
War) ;327 but at the Plenary Meeting the Soviet proposal, with a British
amendment permitting a prisoner of war to be separated from other
members of the armed force in which he was serving at the time of
capture only if he consented to such separation, was approved. 328 Thus,
the individual who is serving in the armed force of an ally of his country
at the time of his capture will normally be confined in a prisoner-ofwar camp with other members of that armed force. However, if the
Detaining Power so desires, and if the prisoner of war consents, he
may be transferred to confinement with the members of the armed
forces of his own country.329
What of the situation where an armed force is composed of individuals of many nationalities, languages, and customs? Although the
travaux preparatoires referred to above indicate that this problem
was not mentioned during the discussion and amendment of what is
now the third paragraph of Article 22, it is fairly obvious that this
was a motivating factor in the position taken by the Soviet representative. 330 The Soviet Union and, hence, the Soviet armed forces, is composed of people of many nationalities, many languages, and many cusRevised Draft Conventions 60.
2A Final Record 347.
327 Ibid., 353-54. Actually, it is somewhat difficult to discern how the Soviet proposal differed substantively from that of the United Kingdom proposal of that
time.
328 2B Final Record 281.
329 Thus, in a situation such as that which occurred during World War II,
where many Americans had joined the British or Canadian armed forces before
the United States became a belligerent, and had elected to continue to serve in
the allied armed force after that event, if they were captured they were normally
confined with other members of the armed force in which they were serving at the
time of capture. See note 1-299 supra. However, with their consent, they could now
be confined with other American prisoners of war, i.e., with American nationals
who were serving in the United States armed forces at the time of capture.
330 It is also why he objected to the United Kingdom proposal to add the clause
concerning the consent of the prisoner of war-until, probably, the Soviet Delegation concluded that this could be made to serve the Soviet interest. The Soviet
representatives were not here concerned with problems which might arise when
the Soviet Union was the Detaining Power, but only with those arising when
members of their armed forces became prisoners of war. (The foregoing is not
intended to have pejorative implications. It is the way every nation negotiates.)
325

3:!6

177
toms. However, as they would all have been serving in the same armed
force when captured, they would have a right to be confined together
and could only be segregated with their consent. Of course, this does
not mean that all of the prisoners of war of one armed force must be
assembled in one prisoner-of-war camp. There may, and usually wiII,
be a number of camps and in each camp there may, and usually wiII,
be a number of compounds (or other smaller enclosures). In breaking
the mass of prisoners of war down into camps and compounds, the
Detaining Power will probably, for its own administrative purposes,
put all of the prisoners of war of a particular nationality or language
in the same compound or compounds, camp or camps.331 As the prisoners of war so combined in the compounds or camps would, in each
case, as well as overall, all be members of the same armed force, not
only is there no prohibition against such procedure, but it is actually
contemplated and required by the third paragraph of Article 22.
Although Article 16 and the third paragraph of Article 22 certainly
represent one of the basic "humanitarian principl~s" of the Convention
with which the belligerents in Korea agreed to comply,332 there can
be no doubt of its utter disregard by the Chinese Communists during
the course of their participation in that armed conflict. For example,
despite the prohibition against discrimination based on political opinions, the Chinese Communist treatment of prisoners of war held by
them in North Korea was based entirely on a policy of good treatment
for the so-called progressives (those prisoners of war who would cooperate with them in the political field) and bad treatment for the socalled reactionaries (those prisoners of war who refused to cooperate
with them in the political field).333 The discrimination based on political opinion included good food for the progressives and poor food for
the reactionaries. 334
While the maintenance of discipline and order in prisoner-of-war
camps has frequently been somewhat of a problem, it only reached
really serious proportions in Korea where the Communists, North Ko331 For example, India, and its armed forces, is composed of many nationalities
with different languages and different customs-Hindus, Sikhs, Bengalis, Panjabis, etc., etc. If any large number were captured the Detaining Power might,
perhaps, try to identify and segregate in separate compounds or camps the members of each of these groups.
332 See note 1-114 supra. Even though this commitment was made on the Communist side by the North Koreans only, it must be recalled that the People's Republic of China insisted that the million or more fully equipped, trained, and organized Chinese troops in Korea were merely "volunteers" serving in the North
Korean army.
333 U.K., Treatment 32. One student of the practices of the People's Republic of
China apparently considers it to be almost inconceivable that the PRC would not
make that same distinction in any future international armed conflict in which
it might be involved. Miller, The Law of War, 238 and 243.
334 See text in connection ,vith notes 161 and 162 supra.
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rean and Chinese, used the prisoner-of-war camps as a second battlefront.335 The incidents which occurred in the prisoner-of-war camps
there 336 demonstrated that where ideology is concerned, and where
there is a major schism within the prisoner-of-war group itself, segregation by political opinion may be an absolute requirement in order to
ensure the safety of many of the prisoners of war.337 Once again, it
is necessary to state that there is no valid objection to this procedure
as long as there is, nevertheless, compliance with the provisions of the
third paragraph of Article 22 and as long as there is no discrimination in the treatment received by the individuals confined in different
camps or compounds.

b. WOMEN PRISONERS OF WAR
References to sex generally or to women specifically will be found
in nine different provisions of the Convention. The provisions referring to women specifically have two basic aims: (1) to guarantee to
women prisoners of war treatment as favorable as that accorded to
male prisoners of war; and (2) to afford them protection from sexual
molestation to the maximum extent possible. 338
During World War I comparatively few women participated as
members of the armed forces in capacities which made becoming a
prisoner of war a foreseeable possibility. Accordingly, it is understandable that Article 3 of the 1929 Convention, containing the only
reference in that Convention to women, provided merely that they
should be treated "with all consideration due to their sex." The situation changed radically during World War II with large numbers of
women serving in the armed forces and in the resistance movements
of many belligerents and in many capacities, including combat. 33!J It
is not surprising, therefore, that the 1947 Conference of Government
Experts proposed that to the clause quoted above there should be added
the provision "and their treatment shall in no case be inferior to
that accorded to men."340 Prior to the 1948 Stockholm Conference the
ICRC made some editorial changes (which included making the pro335 UNC., Communist War, passim. The extract of this study which was published in 28 Dept. State Bull. 273 covers this subject.
33G See Hermes, T1-uce Tent, ch. XI (pp. 233-62).
337 Ibid., 260. The United States Army now officially takes the position that under Article 16 prisoners of war may legally be segregated for the purpose of the
maintenance of order. U.S. Manual para. 92b. Concerning the problem of the
maintenance of order generally, see Harvey, Control, passim.
338 Pictet, Commentary 146-47. The second paragraph of Article 27 of the
Fourth (Civilian) Convention accomplishes this much more succinctly than does
the Third (Prisoner-of-War) Convention, specifically providing that "[w]omen
shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."
339 See, e.g., the comment at p. 66 supra.
340 1947 GE Report 119.
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vision affirmative instead of negative) ,341 and the provision as so enlarged became the second paragraph of Article 14 of the 1949 Convention. It is the basic provision concerning the rights of women who
become prisoners of war. It states that" [w] omen shall be treated with
all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favourable as that granted to men."
Having established that the basic norms for the treatment of women prisoners of war were to be regard for their sex and equality with
the treatment received by men prisoners of war, additional provisions
for the protection of women prisoners of war were added to the Convention in a number of areas considered to be particularly sensitive.342
Thus, the fourth paragraph of Article 25 provides that if women are
interned in a prisoner-of-war camp with men, they are to be billeted
in "separate dormitories" ;343 and the second paragraph of Article 29,
after providing that toilet facilities ("conveniences") are to be available for the use of prisoners of war day and night,344 goes on to provide that separate such facilities shall be provided for women prisoners of war.
In the chapter of the Convention dealing with disciplinary and penal
sanctions, the draftsmen deemed it appropriate to include four separate provisions with respect to women prisoners of war. Article 88,
which is concerned with punishment generally, was amended by the
1949 Diplomatic Conference, upon the recommendation of the British
delegation, by the addition of the middle two paragraphs.345 The second paragraph of Article 88 provides that a woman prisoner of war
shall not receive a sentence to punishment which is more severe, nor
be treated more severely while undergoing punishment, than a women
member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power sentenced for
th same offense; and the third paragraph of Artic1e 88 repeats the
same prohibitions but with respect to the standards applied to male
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power sentenced for
the same offense.
As parallels to the "separate dormitory" provision of the last paragraph of Article 25, the last paragraph of Article 97 provides that
Draft Revised Conventions 60.
One of the French delegates at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference thought that
the second paragraph of Article 14 was sufficiently broad to cover all contingencies, but he nevertheless concurred in the repetition which resulted from the subsequent specific provisions. 2A Final Record 489.
343 Article 75 (5) of the 1977 Protocol I uses the phrase "held in quarters separated from men's quarters." The Standard Minimum Rules are much more specific in this respect, Article 8 (a) thereof providing that "in an institution which
receives both men and women the whole of the premises allocated to women shall
be entirely separate."
3-14 See note 122 supra.
34G 3 Final Record, Annex No. 150; 2A Final Record 489-90, 502, & 311.
341
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women prisoners of war undergoing disciplinary punishment "shall be
confined in separate quarters from male prisoners of war," and the
second paragraph of Article 108 contains the same provision with respect to women prisoners of war undergoing punishment after conviction of a penal offense.346 Both of these articles provide further
that women prisoners of war so confined shall be under the supervision
of women. 347
As has already been mentioned, Article 16 requires that in applying
it provisions against discriminatory treatment, the other provisions of
the Convention relating to sex should be taken into consideration.348
Those which have just been discussed can scarcely be said to provide
for preferential treatment for women. What they actually require is
"equal, but separate" treatment. The first paragraph of Article 49,
which requires the Detaining Power to take sex into account in the
utilization of the labor of prisoners of war, is probably the sole provision to fall within the ambit of the Article 16 exception. Presumably,
the Detaining Power could favor women prisoners of war in making
work assignments, excluding them from the more arduous tasks, without violating the "no discrimination" provision of Article 16.
All of those who had a hand in the drafting of the 1949 Convention
did their utmost to provide the special protection which is unquestionably required for women prisoners of war, both from the representatives of the Detaining Power and from their male fellow prisoners
of war. The provisions ultimately incorporated into the Convention
appear to be adequate. However, once again, their effectiveness will
depend almost entirely on the will of Detaining Powers to see them
properly and fully applied.
c. CIVIL RIGHTS
It may appear anomalous to speak of the "civil rights" of a prisoner
of war, particularly in the light of the fact that historically prisoners
of war could be killed or enslaved-certainly a denial of rights far
more important than those denominated "civil." Although the principle that being a prisoner of war was not a dishonorable state and that
captives were not held as prisoners of war as punishment, but only
to prevent their further participation in the armed conflict, had evolved
in the eighteenth century,:H9 the theory that a prisoner of war retained
"civil rights" is a development which may be ascribed to the twentieth
See note 343 supra.
Article 75 (5) of the 1977 Protocol I is quite similar. Compare Article 53 of
the Standard Minimum Rules. At the prisoner-of-war camp at Qui Nhon, in South
Vietnam, there were separate facilities for women prisoners of war. Originally,
women members of the Republic of Vietnam acted as guards, but this was discontinued when it was found impossible to maintain the morale of the women guards!
348 See note 283 supra, and the text in connection therewith.
349 See note 1-18 supra.
346
347

181
century and, really, to the events of World War 1.3 50 The 1907 Hague
Regulations contained no general provision with regard to civil rights.
Such a provision made its first appearance in the second paragraph
of Article 3 of the 1929 Convention with the rather broad and ambiguous statement that "[p]risoners retain their full civil capacity." As
we shall see in the following discussion of various specific civil rights,
a number of problems arose in the implementation of this provision. 351
Some prisoners of war (and some Detaining Powers) were misled into
assuming that the quoted provision secured for them full civil rights
in the territory of the Detaining Power.352 Actually, a prisoner of war
had, in the territory of the belligerent in which he was held (or in
the territory of the neutral in which he was interned), only the civil
rights which that country elected to permit him to exercise. 353
The preparation of wills, together with their execution and transmission to the family of the prisoner of war, was probably the most
important- and the least controversial- civil right possessed by prisoners of war during World War II. The first paragraph of Article 76
of the 1929 Convention (which derived from Article 19 of the 1907
Hague Regulations) constituted a specific mandate in this area of civil
rights. It provided that prisoners of war should receive the same assistance in drafting their wills as did members of the armed forces
of the Detaining Power. Moreover, the second paragraph of Article 41
provided for assistance in their authentication; and the first para350 See, e.g., Article 93, Agreement between the United States of America and
Germany concerning Prisoners of War, Sanitary Personnel, and Civilians (1918).
Pictet refers to Article 72 of Lieber's Code as part of the history of the evolution
of prisoner-of-war civil rights; but this merely protected a prisoner of war's personal property and money and is analogous to various provisions of Article 18 of
the 1949 Convention, and not to the third paragraph of Article 14 thereof, the
major provision with which we will here be concerned. Pictet, Commentary 148.
[This portion of the Commentary is apparently a redraft of Preux, Le probleme
de la capacite civile des prisonniers de guerre ..., 35 RJ.C.R. 925.]
351 In 1939 a lengthy article-by-article review of the 1929 Convention by Radu
Meitani, a Roumanian, entitled Le regime des prisonniers de guerre (Regime)
appeared in three parts in the Revue internationale franraise du droit des gens.
It contained a discussion of the second paragraph of Article 3 of that Convention
which could have been helpful had there been an opportunity for the study to become more universally known.
352 1947 GE Report 119-20. Under the laws of some Detaining Powers, prison~rs of war were apparently placed on a par with "any ordinary resident." McNair, Legal Effects 93-94. The more general rule is that a prisoner of war will
not be considered a "resident" of the country in whose territory he is held in
custody. Pictet, Commentary 149.
353 It can, of course, be argued that it would have been inappropriate, and
could not have been intended, to secure for a prisoner of war in an international
agreement the rights that he would retain in his own country, certainly a matter
for domestic law only. 2A Final Record 248. However, it is equally clear that
there was no intent to give prisoners of war "full ci~il status" under the laws of
the Detaining Power.
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graph of Article 41 provided for the furnishing of facilities for the
transmission of these documents to the home of the prisoner of war.
Another legal document which ranked with the will in its frequent
importance to the prisoner of war and to his family was the power
of attorney. Because of this importance, the power of attorney was
specifically mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 41 of the 1929
Convention, along with wills. Apart from these two, the phrase "instruments, papers or documents" was used to cover the whole gamut
of legal documents which the prisoner of war might find it necessary
to execute in his own or in his family's best interest. Needless to say,
the Protecting Powers and the ICRC were very frequently called upon
to ensure the delivery to the prisoner of war, the execution by him,
and the return to his family, of these various documents, each of which
was undoubtedly of major importance to the individual prisoner of
war and to the family concerned. 354 Normally, of course, a Detaining
Power will have nothing to gain by denying assistance to the prisoner
of war in the execution of any legal document and its transmission
back to his family, as it will rarely have any impact within the territory of the Detaining Power. However, two comparatively minor
problems in this regard did arise in Germany (and probably elsewhere) during World War II. The first of these problems was how
to meet any legal fees or expenses (for example, fees for the services
of notaries and for prothonotarial certificates) which might arise in
connection with the legal problems of the individual prisoner of war.
The German solution to this problem was that if the prisoner of war
had no funds, payment would be made from canteen funds or prisonerof-war :l;unds.355 The second problem was with respect to the work
time lost by prisoners of war, who were at first permitted to leave their
work detachments in order to have consultations on personal problems
with the legal adviser of the prisoners' representative. The German
solution to this problem was to permit the legal adviser to make occasional visits to the work detachments; and to require that all such consultations take place during "free time."356 No objection can be seen
to either of these decisions.
The area of civil rights in which problems apparently most frequently arose during World War II was, strangely, that of marriage.
The position has been advanced, and appears to be correct, that a
Detaining Power is free to permit or to prohibit marriage by a pris-

354Janner, Puissance protectrice 55; 1 ICRC Report 295; Rich, Brief History
488.
355 German Regulations, No. 23, para. 293.
356 Ibid., No. 43, para. 798.
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oner of war.357 Many Detaining Powers prohibited such marriages.358
However, a number of Detaining Powers permitted a prisoner of war
to marry by proxy if the other party to the marriage resided in the
territory of the Power of Origin of the prisoner of war.359 Of course,
this could only be done if the laws of the Power of Origin permitted
proxy marriages.36o
In modern wars Detaining Powers have required prisoners of war
to perform labor, including services under contract to civilian employers.a61 What were the rights of a prisoner of war who was injured,
perhaps permanently, in an industrial accident? The last paragraph
of Article 27 of the 1929 Convention made him eligible for "the enjoyment of the benefit of the provisions applicable to laborers of the same
class according to the legislation of the Detaining Power" (emphasis
added) ; and it further provided that if such legislation was imipplicable, the Detaining Power would seek compensatory legislation.362
Some belligerents permitted prisoners of war to make a claim against
the responsible "employer," by way of either workmen's compensation
or civil suit ;363 however, probably the more general rule precluded
either type of remedy for the injured prisoner of war.364
3u7 Sereni, Statut juridique 55; Werner, Croix-Rouge 276.
3us See, e.g., Rich, Brief History 445; and Meitani, Regime 281 & 301. The latter

stated that in Roumania should a prisoner of war succeed, nevertheless, in getting
married, the marriage would be valid.
359 1 ICRC Report, 294; Rich, Brief History 445. See German Regulations, No.
6, para. 3. For a detailed description of the festivities attendant upon a proxy
marriage by a German prisoner of war in a camp in the United States, see Hoole,
And Still We Conquer 48-50.
360 One commentator is of the opinion that under the second paragraph of Article 3 of the 1929 Convention a Detaining Power could not prevent a prisoner-ofwar clergyman from celebrating a marriage between two prisoners of war. Sereni,
Statut juridique 56 n.8. While a Detaining Power might permit such a marriage
inasmuch as its own nationals are not involved, that it could not prohibit such
a marriage if so minded appears to be a rather extreme position.
361 See Chapter III infra. Article 28 of the 1929 Convention specifically contemplated such a possibility.
362 It should also be noted that Article 71 of the 1929 Convention made workinjured prisoners of war eligible for repatriation-unless the injury was voluntary-on the same basis as other seriously sick or seriously wounded prisoners
of war.
363 With respect to the rights of prisoners of war in this area, McNair says that
"if he is allowed by the British Government to enter into a contract of service with
a farmer, he may recover wages and he may sue .for damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of his employer." McNair, Legal Effects 93. (If this
was ever the method by which a prisoner of war came to work for a civilian employer, it is not the present method, at least in the United Shtes, where the contract for prisoner-of-war labor is between the private emnloyer and the government. Lewis & Mewha 108; U.S. Army Regs. paras. 633-50, sec. XI.)
364 A 1944 opinion of the Judge Advocate Gener~l of the United States Army
held that prisoners of war were not residents of the United States and, therefore,
were prohibited from having recourse to the courts of the United States because
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These were the most prominent areas in which there had been an
attempt to exercise civil rights, or an actual exercise thereof, during
World War II. When the Conference of Government Experts met in
1947, some of the participants supported the inclusion in the Convention of a provision clearly specifying that prisoners of war enjoy no
civil rights in the territory of the Detaining Power. They were dissuaded from this, and the Conference merely proposed the addition of
a clause to the provision of the second paragraph of Article 3 of the
1929 Convention quoted above, which would state: "they may acquire
and exercise all rights grante~ them by the DP."365 This was apparently felt to be an inadequate solution to the problem by the ICRC,
which attempted to clarify the redrafted article to indicate beyond
any question that the "full civil status" which prisoners of war retained under the Convention was that accorded by the legislation of
their own country, while at the same time retaining the clause which
had been proposed by the Government Experts. 366 With slight editing,
this ICRC draft was approved at Stockholm367 and became the working
draft for the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, where it was the subject of
several rather extended debates.
When strong obj ections were voiced at the Diplomatic Conference
to the provision as redrafted, the representative of the ICRC explained
that what had been attempted was to draft language which would
avoid giving prisoners of war the impression (which they had frequently drawn from the 1929 text) that they had full civil rights in
the territory of the Detaining Power.3G8 This explanation was apparently considered to be inadequate by the representatives of several
delegations360 and, thereafter, the Drafting Committee produced a
substantially new version of the provision which was accepted,370
although not without further debate,371 and which became the third
paragraph of Article 14 of the 1949 Convention. It reads:
Prisoners of war shall retain the full civil capacity which they
of the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, 417, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §7b (1970). SPJGW 1943/19573. However, a 1945 opinion of
that same office concluded that "although the precedents on the point are not conclusive, it is very probable that the courts would allow a prisoner of war to maintain an action" for injuries sustained because of the negligence of a prisoner-ofwar labor contractor. SPJGW 194511878. This opinion was subsequently reaffirmed on the basis of the fact that Federal and state workmen's compensation acts
were, for the most part, inapplicable to prisoners of war. SPJGW 1945/3028.
See, generally pp. 249-252 infra.
365 1947 GE Report 119-20. It was also proposed to edit the original clause
very slightly.
366 Draft Revised Conventions 60.
367 Revised Draft Conventions 57.
368 2A Final Record 248.
360 Ibid., 249.
370 Ibid., 350.
371 Ibid., 400 & 403-04.
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enjoyed at the time of their capture. The Detaining Power may
not restrict the exercise, either within or without its own territory, of the rights such capacity confers except in so far as the
captivity requires.
The Coordination Committee subsequently recommended the elimination of the words "which they enjoyed at the time of their capture,"
stating that its proposal was made in order to permit the exercise of
their civil rights by prisoners of war who reached their majority while
in captivity.372 The British representative expressed the opinion that
no Detaining Power would interpret that clause so as to deny their
civil rights to such prisoners of war.373 A problem of far greater importance created by that clause is to find a reason why an international
humanitarian agreement should restrict the civil rights granted to a
prisoner of war by his own Power of Origin to those in existence on
the date of his capture. 374 If, for example, a Power of Origin has no
law permitting proxy marriages at the time that a prisoner of war is
captured, there does not appear to be any valid reason why he should
be denied, by the terms of an international agreement, the benefit of a
law subsequently enacted by his Power of Origin which permits proxy
marriages and which, perhaps, is specifically stated to be applicable
to then prisoners of war, among others.375 During and after World
War II the lack of adequate existing legislation relating to the civilrights problems of prisoners of war and their families was a matter of
maj or concern in France. 376 Under the clause above referred to, in a
similar future situation, no corrective legislation enacted by the French
Parliament would apply to the very persons whom it was desired to
assist!
That the overall Article 14, third paragraph, will ,clarify the situation as it existed under the second paragraph of Article 3 of the 1929
372

Ibid., 400.

373 Ibid. The ICRC has since conceded that this is 'one possible interpretation
of the clause; but has rejected it as "contrary to the spirit of the principle stated
in the Article." Pictet, Commentary 149.
374 This was stated to be the meaning of the provision. 2A Final Record 403-04.
370 In the United States a treaty such as the 1949 Convention is a part of "the
supreme law of the land." Article VI, United States Constitution. Suppose that,
after a citizen of the United States is captured, the state in which he has his
domicile enacts a statute authorizing proxy marriages, something which had previously been specifically prohibited. The prisoner of war thereafter marries by
proxy in accordance with the provisions of the new law and with the permission
of the Detaining Power. The validity of the marriage would be subject to attack
as being contrary to the self-executing limitation contained in the third paragraph
of Article 14, part of the supreme law of the United States.
376 Sevant, Le droit des prisonniers de guerre; Charricre & Duguet, Traite
theo)'ique ct pratique des P"isonnie,'s de Guen'e, Deportes et Travailleurs en Allemagne en d)'oit fran{:ais; and Charon, De la condition du prisonnier de guerre
fran«rais en Allemagne au regard du droit prive, (cited at Pictet, Commentary
150 n,1).
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Convention appears doubtful in other respects as well. Prisoners of
war are stated to have "the full civil capacity which they enjoyed at
the time of their capture" ;377 and the Detaining Power may not restrict
the exercise of those rights, "either within or without its own territory ... except in so far as the captivity requires." A proxy marriage
certainly does not so conflict with the status of captivity as to "require"
the Detaining Power to prohibit it. Does this mean that the Detaining
Power may no longer do so if proxy marriages were permitted by the
laws of the Power of Origin at the time of capture and even if they are
prohibited by the laws of the Detaining Power? Suppose that a prisoner of war owns property in the territory of the Detaining Power.
May he sell that property if the laws of the Power of Origin at the time
of capture permit him to do so and even if the laws of the Detaining
Power prohibit such sales? These are but a few of the numerous problems which the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 14 raise,
the answers to which will have to be given at some future date. Far
fewer difficulties would have been created had the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference accepted the provision approved at Stockholm378 without
the extensive tinkering in which it engaged, the sole effect of which
was to confuse what had been largely clarified.
The first paragraph of Article 120 and the first two paragraphs of
Article 77 of the 1949 Convention are concerned with the drafting,
execution, and transmission of legal documents, including wills and
powers of attorney. It will be recalled that the first paragraph of
Article 76 of the 1929 Convention required the Detaining Power to
afford the same assistance to prisoners of war in the drafting of wills
as it did to members of its own armed forces.: ml The provisions of the
1949 Convention adopt a somewhat different approach. While the
second paragraph of Article 77 again requires the Detaining Power to
facilitate the preparation and execution of legal documents, it also
specifically requires the Detaining Power (1) to allow prisoners of war
to consult a lawyer,38() and (2) to arrange for the authentication of
377 The legislative history of the words "at the time of their capture" as used
here (and in the third paragraph of Article 22) is rather strange for still another
reason. The Rapporteur pointed out that the word "capture" had been deleted
everywhere else "in order to give the Convention the widest scope possible by covering members of armed forces taken prisoner on surrender or in other circumstances which cannot, properly speaking, be described as capture." 2B Final Record
324. (See note 1-133 supra.) The words in the French version of the third paragraph of Article 14 [and of the third paragraph of Article 22] were accordingly
changed to "au moment oii ils ont ete faits prisonniers"-but the words "at the
time of their capture" were left untouched in the English version!
:178 Revised Draft Conventions 57.
379 See p. 181 supra.
380 No mention is made as to how this is to be accomplished if there is no prisoner-of-war lawyer available. Under the 1929 provision, a military lawyer of the
Detaining Power would have had to be made available if this was the procedure

187
their signatures.381 Moreover, the first paragraph of Article 120 provides that prisoner-of-war wills be so drafted as to satisfy the requirements of the laws of the Power of Origin, the latter having the obligation to inform the Detaining Power of the legal requirements in this
respect; the first paragraph of Article 77 requires the Detaining Power
to provide facilities for the traI}smission, through the Protecting Power or the Central Prisoners of War Agency, of the executed documents ;
and the first paragraph of Article 120 provides that, at the request
of the prisoner of war, the will shall be sent to the Protecting Power;
and that, upon the death of the prisoner of war, the will shall be sent
to the Protecting Power and a certified copy to the Central Agency.
Some degree of improvement may be found in these new provisions
relating to the preparation, execution, and transmission of legal documents. However, in other respects it is very probable that the exercise
of civil rights by prisoners of war will be even more restricted than
during World War II, despite the very well intentioned, but badly
executed, aims of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference.382
12. Transfers beween Prisoner-of-War Camps
It would seem that the transfer of a prisoner of war from one camp
to another would be a comparatively rare but routine procedure requiring only passing mention in an international agreement such as
the 1949 Convention.383 On the contrary, the draftsmen found it necessary to deal with the subject in all or part of seven different articles,
attempting, with considerable success, to cover every aspect of the
matter in order to provide adequate protection, both physical and
other, to the prisoner of war at a time when he is removed from that
which is presumably afforded by a well-organized, permanent camp.384
Chapter VIII of Section II of the 1949 Convention, consisting of
Articles 46, 47, and 48, was given the title "Transfer of Prisoners of
War after Their Arrival in Camp." This was done "so as to avoid any

followed for the Detaining Power's own military personnel. The Detaining Power
appears to continue to have this obligation.
381 If only witnesses to the signature are required, no problem arises. However,
if a document must be notarized, it is extremely unlikely that a prisoner-of-war
notary will be available and the use of a notary of the Detaining Power, even if
one is made available by the latter, would very possibly create legal problems concerning the validity of the document.
382 Concerning the rights under the 1949 Convention of a prisoner of war injured
in an industrial accident, see p. 183 supra and pp. 249-252 infra.
383 The subject was not specifically mentioned in the 1929 Convention.
384 The events of World War II clearly demonstrated that a "death march" can
occur on a transfer from one prisoner-of-war camp to another, as well as on the
original evacuation. See, e.g., I.M.T.F E. 1047-49; Trial of Baba Masao; and Trial
of Mackensen.
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confusion with the Articles on evacuation."385 While the provisions of
the two sets of articles are, in many respects, substantially parallel,
those concerned with intercamp transfers include a number of matters
not covered by those concerned solely with the original evacuation
from the place of capture. It is with these supplementary provisions
that we will be primarily concerned here. 386
The second paragraph of Article 46 contains the basic policy statement with respect to intercamp transfers and, like the first paragraph
of Article 20 dealing with evacuations, it is a specific reiteration of the
fundamental rule expounded in the first paragraph of Article 13 that
prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Once again,
as in the first paragraph of Article 20, there is the requirement that
transfers shall be effected "in conditions not less favourable than those
under which the forces of the Detaining Power are transferred." Generally speaking the Detaining Power realistically should be able to,
and therefore should, comply with this requirement, and the situation
would be unlike that frequently presented upon the evacuation from the
battlefield. 387 Transfers between prisoner-of-war camps will usually
take place in what one author very aptly calls "the hinterlands" ;388
hence the Detaining Power should be able to furnish the same type of
facilities for such transfers as it uses when moving its own troops in
the same or similar areas. 389 Moreover, the second paragraph of Article 46 provides that in camp-to-camp transfers the climate to which
385 2A Final Record 268 (The Conference of Government Experts had suggested
the use of the caption "Transfer between Base Camps" (1947 GE Report 164) but
the ICRC had changed this because the term "base camp" does not appear elsewhere in the Convention. Draft Revised Cont.entions 79.) General Dillon, a member of the United States Delegation at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, clearly
errs when he asserts that Articles 45-47 were designed for the purpose of outlawing, among others, "the horrors of the Death March of Bataan." Dillon, Genesis
51. As is well known, that was an original evacuation from the battlefield to a
prisoner-of-war camp, and it would fall within the ambit of Articles 19 and 20.
See pp. 98-104 supra. The presence of the quoted statement in the Dillon article
is even less understandable when it is noted that at the Diplomatic Conference
General Dillon himself st~ted, in the discussion of Article 38 (now Article 46),
that "it was important to indicate, not only in the Article itself, put also in the
Chapter heading, the fact that it dealt with transfers from camp to camp." 2A
Final Record 269.
386 This section should, of course, be read in conjunction with section B.1 of this
chapter, pp. 98-104 supra.
387 See p. 101 supra.
388 Spaight, Air Power 229.
389 Of course, as we shall see, sometimes such transfers may be necessitated by
the approach of battle and once again the Detaining Power may be unable to provide the transportation facilities normally used for moving its own troops. But
even this would not excuse the inhumane methods adopted by the Germans (3
ICRC Report 88-89; Trial of Mackensen) and Japanese (I.M.T.F.E. 1047-51;
Trial of BabaMasao) during World War II.

189
the prisoners of war are accustomed390 must be taken into account "and
the conditions of transfer shall in no case be prejudicial to their
health."391
The third paragraph of Article 46 parallels the provisions of the
second paragraph of Article 20 relating to evacuations. It requires
the Detaining Power to provide prisoners of war being transferred
with an adequate supply of food and drinking water, as well as clothing, shelter,392 and medical attention.393 And the last sentence of that
Article requires the Detaining Power to take the precautions necessary
to ensure the safety of the prisoners of war during the course of the
transfer, "especially in case of transport by sea or air,"394 and to make
a roster of all the prisoners of war involved in the transfer, presumably so that if casualties occur en route it will be possible to identify
them. As long as States refuse to agree upon a special marking for
vessels or planes being used for the purpose of transferring prisoners
of war by sea or by air,39;; it is somewhat difficult to envision exactly
what precautions can be taken by a Detaining Power to ensure the
safety of prisoners of war during the course of their transfer. 396 Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that new techniques will be developed which
300 Presumably, they are "accustomed" to the climate of their homeland, usually
that of the Power of Origin, and not to that of the prisoner-of-war camp from
which they are being transferred.
391 These two provisions were added to the Working Draft as a result of a proposal made by the New Zealand representative at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference.
2A Final Record 268 & 359-60. He undoubtedly had in mind instances, such as
those mentioned in I.M.T.F.E. 1047-51 and Trial o{Baba Masao, where prisoners
of war from temperate climates (British, Australians, and Americans, and, probably, New Zealanders), many of them seriously ill, were required to make long
marches in a tropical climate.
39:! There is no mention of "shelter" in Article 20 ex.cept the inference which may
be drawn from the reference to "transit camps" which appears in the third paragraph of Article 20 and the requirements for transit camps set forth in Article 24.
393 The urgent need for these provisions can easily be found by reference to the
experiences which occurred during World War II cited in notes 389 and 391, supra.
394 During World War II there were several tragic incidents of Japanese vessels
carrying Allied prisoners of war being torpedoed by American submarines. 12
Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II 400-01. It
is estimated that 10,000 prisoners of war lost their lives in this manner. Remarks
and Proposals 49.
395 The World War II belligerents would not consider the use of a special marking for the vessels being used to transport prisoners of war because of the strong
likelihood of its misuse. 1947 GE Report 166-68; Remarks and Proposals 50. Such
a possibility was mentioned at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference but not a single
delegate spoke in favor of it. 2A Final Record 269-70.
396 The ICRC would probably interpret this provision to be a general statement
covering its specific proposal to require "life-boats, life-belts, etc. for transports by
sea; anti-aircraft protection for those by land." 1947 GE Report 167; Remarks
and Proposals 49-50. However, for some unknown'reason, no reference is made to
the foregoing in the discussion of the third paragraph of Article 46 which appears
at Pictet, Commentary 254-55.
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will make it possible for the Detaining Power to afford the prisoners of
war being transferred the safety which the third paragraph of Article
46 already requires.
The first paragraph of Article 46 is of debatable value. It provides
that before deciding to transfer prisoners of war, the Detaining Power
should "take into account the interests of the prisoners themselves";
and that particular account should be taken that the transfers do not
increase the difficulty of repatriation. The first provision is, for all
practical purposes, meaningless;397 and the second provision is almost
so, given the physical problems which will frequently confront the
Detaining Power plus the methods of transportation for repatriation
which are available now as well as those which will undoubtedly become available in the future. Certainly, during World War II it would
have made repatriation far less difficult if all Germans and Italian
prisoners of war held by the United States after their capture in North
Africa and in Europe had been detained in the United Kingdom or
on the European continent. However, this was not feasible, primarily
for logistic reasons but also because of the need for their use in the
United States as a labor force. Accordingly, they were transferred
from prisoner-of-war camps in the United Kingdom and on the Continent to the United States.398 It is extremely unlikely that were the
identical situation to occur again the United States would act any
differently even in the face of this paragraph of Article 46. It is
equally unlikely that any other Detaining Power confronted with such
a situation would act any differently.399 Geography, the availability
of the necessary space, logistics, labor requirements, and many other
factors will be considered by a Detaining Power in making the decision
as to whether prisoners of war should be transferred; and as long as
the prisoners of war are not thereby deprived of any of the protections
of the Convention, the fact that they are being moved farther away
397 Support for this conclusion can be found in the manner in which t~e provision is treated in ibid., 253-54.
398 The peak number of prisoners of war held within the territory of the continental United States was 425,871 in May 1945. Lewis & Mewha 90-91. By June
1946 all except 162 (who were serving prison sentences for postcapture offenses)
had been returned to Europe. Ibid., 91, Table 2, n.a.
399 The movement of all Allied prisoners of war by the Japanese in Borneo from
Sandakan and Kuching to Ranau (I.M.T.F.E. 1047-49; Trial of Baba Masao) was
a logical one even though their removal inland from a port undoubtedly would
have made their repatriation more difficult. An Allied landing was anticipatedand did occur. The Japanese army could not be expected to leave these prisoners
of war in a place where they might well be retaken by their own forces. No Detaining Power would do so, even if their removal would inevitably make their ultimate repatriation more difficult. It was not the fact of their movement, but the
methods employed in moving these prisoners of war, which were found to have
violated the law of war.
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from their homeland, and perhaps from airfields or ports, will make
little difference.4oo
It will be recalled that the second paragraph of Article 19 provides
that wounded and sick prisoners of war may be temporarily retained
in the combat zone, despite its inherent dangers, if evacuation would
constitute an even greater risk to their well-being.401 The first paragraph of Article 47 contains a prohibition against the transfer of such
prisoners of war if their recovery will be impeded as a result, "unless
their safety imperatively demands it."402 The transfer of seriously
wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war whose recovery would
be adversely affected by the move would be justified if, for example,
they were in an installation located in an area which, because of military developments, had become subject to bombardment; it would not
be justified merely because of the impending likelihood of its being
overrun by enemy infantry. Moreover, the second paragraph of Article
47 carries this matter a step further, prohibiting the transfer of all
prisoners of war from a camp which is threatened by the approach
of the combat zone, unless such transfer can be safely accomplished
under "adequate conditions"-which must be intended to mean under
the conditions set forth in the last two paragraphs of Article 46; with
an escape clause which permits their movement if "they are exposed
to greater risks by remaining on the spot than by being transferred"403
-a decision which the Detaining Power will make unilaterally and
400 Suppose that during World War II there had neen 100,000 German prisoners
of war in camps in the United Kingdom which had been built to accommodate
25,000-and the necessary additional space was just not available; while in the
United States, prisoner-of-war camps, west of the Rocky Mountains, built to accommodate 100,000 prisoners of war, were almost empty. Wouldn't the surplus
75,000 German prisoners of war in the United Kingdom have been better off overall
if they were transferred to the camps in the United States even if this meant that
when repatriation ultimately occurred they would be some 4,000 miles further
away from Germany?
401 See pp. 99-100 supra.
402 In Article 25 of the 1929 Convention the escape clause was "unless the course
of military operations demands it." Obviously, the standard of that clause has been
changed from one catering to the needs of the Detaining Power to one for the
greater protection of the prisoners of war.
403 It will be noted that under the second paragraph of Article 19 wounded and
sick prisoners of war may only be retained in the combat zone if they would run
greater risks by being evacuated; while under the second paragraph of Article 47
prisoners of war may only be transferred from camp to camp if they would run
greater risks by remaining on the spot. This seeming inconsistency is, in fact,
logical. In the first instance, the tendency of the troops of the Capturing Power
would be to care little if the newly captured prisoners of war were kept in the
combat zone and thus continued to be exposed to the dangers of that area; in the
second instance, the tendency of the Detaining Power would be to desire to move
the prisoners of war in order to overcome the possibility of their rescue by their
own or allied armed forces. In each case, the provision of the Convention is directed
against the natural tendency of the Detaining Power or its agents.
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which will, of course, be based wholly upon subjective considerations.
Most camp-to-camp transfers will be made in the self-interests of
the Detaining Power. Thus, while the movement of a proportion of
the prisoners of war from an overcrowded camp to one which is less
crowded, or which, perhaps, is just being opened, will undoubtedly
improve the lot of the prisoners of war, in most cases it will be done
by the Detaining Power not for this reason but because it will ease
logistic problems, or move prisoner-of-war labor to an area where it is
more urgently needed, or because of the danger of losing control over
an overcrowded prisoner-of-war camp.404 Similarly, while the transfer
of prisoners of war from one camp to another because of the approach
of the combat zone will usually mean that they are being moved from
a place where they may suffer some harm to a place of comparative
safety, it is an action which will be taken by the Detaining Power
basically in its own interest in order to prevent escape or release. The
Detaining Power is thus given the choice: transfer the prisoners of
war under conditions which will ensure their safety and well-being;
if that is not possible, do not move them, even is the possibility exists
of the camp being overrun by the enemy. During World War II several
Detaining Powers elected to move the prisoners of war in order to
prevent their rescue, but moved them under conditions which were so
horrendous that they cost the lives of a large proportion of the prisoners of war who were moved. 405 Article 47 was drafted and included
in the Convention in order to codify the requirements with which the
Detaining Power must be able to comply if it proposes to move prisoners of war so as to prevent their being retaken by forces friendly
to them. The provisions are clear even with the "escape clause" which
is subject to the unilateral determination of the Detaining Power. If
the Detaining Power elects to transfer the prisoners of war when it
is, or should be, obvious that adequate supplies of food, water, proper
clothing, etc., are not available, and, as a result, the prisoners of war
are adversely affected by the move, the Detaining Power's decision
violated Article 47 and the individuals responsible for making that
decision and for carrying it out would be subject to trial, conviction,
and punishment.406
404 The United Nations Command discovered the importance of this latter reason
for transferring prisoners of war during hostilities in Korea (1950-53). Hermes,
Truce Tent 255 et seq.
405 See notes 389 and 391 supra. Thus, the I.M.T.F.E. found that "less than onethird of the prisoners of war who began these marches at Sandakan ever reached
Ranau." I.M.T.F.E. 1048.
406 In interpreting these provisions of Article 47, one must not lose sight of the
provisions of the first paragraph of Article 23, which contains the flat sta:tement
that "[n]o prisoner of war may at any time be ... detained in areas where he may
be exposed to the fire of the combat zone." (Emphasis added.) The Detaining
Power which elects to transfer prisoners of war as the combat zone draws close to
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The other provisions of the Convention relating to transfers from
one prisoner-of-war camp to another are, for the most part, administrative in nature, being directed toward maintaining the morale of
the prisoner of war rather than his life and continued well-being.
Thus, the first paragraph of Article 48401 requires that the Detaining
Power give the prisoners of war sufficient advance information concerning an impending transfer408 to enable them to pack their belongings and to send their new address to their families ;409 the second
paragraph of Article 48 authorizes the prisoners of war to take with
them their personal effects, as well as "correspondence and parcels
which have arrived for them,"410 limited to what each can carry, with
a 25-kilogram (roughly 55 pounds) maximum; the third paragraph
of Article 48 imposes upon the Detaining Power the obligation to arrange for the prompt forwarding of mail and parcels arriving at the
former camp after the transfer; and also provides that the camp commander and the prisoners' representative411 shall agree on the method
for the delivery to the transferred prisoners of war of "community
property" (such as collective relief shipments) as well as personal
effects left at the former camp because of the 25-kilogram weight
limit; the fifth paragraph of Article 81 provides that if the prisoners'
representative is himself transferred, he must be allowed a reasonable
time in which to orient his successor; and the third paragraph of

the camps in which they are confined might well claim that to have left them in
their original camps would have been to subject them to the hazards of the combat
zone and would have been a direct violation of the first paragraph of Article 23,
even though in making the transfer it could not fully comply with the provisions
of Articles 46 and 47; and that it chose the course of action which, in its judgment,
was the lesser of two evils.
401 Article 48 of the 1949 Convention is basically an edited version of Article 26
of the 1929 Convention.
408 Of course, if the transfer is being made under the emergency provisions of
the second paragraph of Article 47, this might not be possible.
409 Article 70 also specifies that when a prisoner of war is transferred to another
camp he must be given the opportunity to send a Capture Card (Annex IVB) to
his family and to the Central Prisoner of War Agency; and the fifth paragraph of
Article 122 places certain duties in this regard upon the Information Bureaux.
410 This would appear to mean any correspondence and parcels awaiting dis";
tribution and which are distributed immediately prior to departure. If these items
have been received at an earlier date, and have been distributed and opened, they
have become merged in the general category of "personal effects." (In fact, it is
somewhat difficult to determine why any suc~ special mention was considered
necessary.)
411 Concerning these latter individuals, see pp. 293-307 infra.
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Article 65 provides that upon transfer the personal financial account412
of each prisoner of war is to follow him.
It can readily be seen that a number of humanitarian provisions
have been included in the 1949 Convention which clearly establish the
responsibilities of the Detaining Power and the rights of the prisoners
of war in connection with the transfer of the latter from one prisonerof-war camp to another, whatever the reason for such transfer may
be.413
13. Financial Resources
Unlikely as it may seem, a prisoner of war has a number of sources
of personal funds and there are a great many provisions of the Convention which are concerned with this subject. Inasmuch as few Detaining Powers will allow a prisoner of war to retain or to receive
cash, an important element of all escape attempts, the financial assets
of each prisoner of war will be represented by book credits. We shall
examine here the sources of these credits, the extent to which and the
manner in which the prisoner of war may use them: and their ultimate
disposition upon the termination of the individual's status as a prisoner of war.
Article 64 requires the Detaining Power to maintain a separate
financial account for each prisoner of war consisting of the following
items:
Credits
Sums taken on capture:
In currency of the Detaining Power;
In other currencies but converted at his request into the currency of the Detaining Power;
Advances of pay;
Working pay;
Amounts derived from any other source.
412 See pp. 209-211 infra. It will be noted that there is no specific provision for
the transfer of the proportionate shares of canteen profits-unless thes~ can be
considered to fall within the category of "community property." The ICRC apparently believes that they do (Pictet, Commentar1j 258), although at no time was any
mention made of them in the discussion of Article 48 (then Article 40) at the 1949
Diplomatic Conference. For the United States practice during World War II, see
note 170, supra.
413 The last sentence of Article 48 provides that the costs of the transfers shall
be borne by the Detaining Power. This was merely a retention of the equally useless provision of the last sentence of Article 26 of the 1929 Convention. Apart from
the fact that Article 15 makes the Detaining Power responsible for all of the expenses of maintaining prisoners of war, it is inconceivable that any Power of
Origin could ever be prevailed upon to meet the expenses of a transfer of prisoners
of war by the Detaining Power from one camp to another, an action which, as has
already been noted, will most usually be accomplished by the Detaining Power in
its own interests. See p. 192 supra.
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Debits
Payments made to him ;n~
Payments made on his behalf;
Sums transferred at his request.
Each of the foregoing items is based upon substantive provisions
appearing elsewhere in the Convention.
a. CREDITS
(1). Sums Taken on Capture
It will be recalled that the fourth paragraph of Article 18 provides
that when money in the currency of the Detaining Power is taken from
a prisoner of war upon capture, it will be credited to his personal
account.4111 When money so taken is not in the currency of the Detaining Power, the prisoner of war has a choice between two alternatives:
under the fourth paragraph of Article 18 he may request that it be
converted into the currency of the Detaining Power and credited to
his personal account ;416 if he elects not to do so, then, under the last
paragraph of Articule 18, it will be retained "in [its] initial shape" by
the Detaining Power, together with the other articles of value which
have been taken from the prisoner of war for reasons of security.411
One other aspect of the problem of the possession of actual cash by
prisoners of war must be mentioned at this point. It has been stated
above that no Detaining Power can be expected to allow a prisoner of
war to retain or to receive cash, primarily because of its importance in
escape attempts. The first paragraph of Article 24 of the 1929 Convention provided that the maximum amount of cash ("ready money")
that a prisoner of war might have in his possession would be determined by agreement between the belligerents. Few such agreements
were reached during World War Il,4lS and other restrictive measures,
such as the issuance by the Detaining Power of special token money
414 The second paragraph of Article 64 refers to "payments made to the prisoner
[of war] in cash." However, as we shall see, the likelihood of any Detaining Power
permitting such payments is rather remote.
415 See pp. 115-116 supra.
416 For some inexplicable reason the early conferences redrafting the Convention thought it necessary to repeat in the section dealing with financial resources
the foregoing provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 18. Despite the close
review of all of the relevant articles by a special "Sub-Committee of Financial
Experts of Committee II" (2A Final Record 529-58), these totally redundant provisions were perpetuated by the complete acceptance of what is now Article 59which states in two fairly lengthy paragraphs what is stated in the last sentence
of the fourth paragraph of Article 18.
417 "In [its] initial shape" obviously means that the actual currency itself will
be placed in safekeeping along with other articles of value taken from the prisoner
of war and impounded because they might be useful to a prisoner of war in an
escape attempt.
418 1 ICRC Report 282. Italy and the United States agreed that prisoners of war
would not be allowed to have any "negotiable money," but only the Detaining
Power's special monetary substitute. [1942] 3 For. Rel. U.S., Europe at 25 & 30.
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for prisoners of war (scrip, canteen coupons, etc.), frequently negotiable at only the prisoner-of-war camp of issue, were taken by Detaining P~wers in order to prevent prisoners of war from having cash in
their possession which might facilitate escape.419 The first paragraph
of Article 58 of the 1949 Convention modified its predecessor by providing that the maximum amount of money "in cash or in any similar
form" (emphasis added) that a prisoner of war may have in his possession shall be determined, not by agreement between the belligerents,
but by agreement between the Detaining Power and the Protecting
Power, with the right in the Detaining Power to establish a maximum
amount until an agreement covering the subject had been reached.420
Thus, this provision legalizes the use of special "prisoner-of-war
money," the use of which had not previously been specifically authorized, even though it had rarely been disputed; authorizes the Detaining Power to establish unilaterally a temporary maximum amount of
money, actual or special, which a prisoner of war will be entitled to
have in his possession in the prisoner-of-war camp; and substitutes
the Protecting Power for the Power of Origin as the other party to
the permanent agreement, with the Detaining Power setting the maximum amount which a prisoner of war will be authorized to have in
his possession. While this last modification may result in more agreements on the subj ect in any future international armed conflict than
were reached in past conflicts, it is still extremely unlikely that any
Detaining Power will agree to permit prisoners of war to retain in
their possession any actual cash, particularly in the currency of the
Detaining Power.
Another new provision of the first paragraph of Article 58 is also
worthy of note. The United Kingdom delegation thought it appropriate to permit a Detaining Power to confiscate any money in excess of
the specified maximum found in the possession of prisoners of war
and, accordingly, proposed that the wording of the draft provision be
amended to read that "[a]ny amount in excess [of the permitted maximum], which was properly in their possession" (emphasis added)
would be credited to their personal accounts. 421 Obviously, excess
amounts which are not properly in their possession will be forfeited
419 McKnight, POW Employment 62; Kisch, War-prisoner money 452 & 455;
Rundell, Paying the POW 123; 1 ICRC Report 288. Substantially the same procedure had been followed during World War 1. Belfield, Treatment 144.
420 The authorization for the Detaining Power to set a temporary maximum
(which may become semipermanent, or even permanent, if difficulty is encountered
in reaching an agreement with the Protecting Power) necessarily implies that
some maximum amount will be set, even though it may well be limited to special
prisoner-of-war money.
421 2A Final Record 475. Of course, once again conversions of currency other
than that of the Detaining Power taken from a prisoner of war when properly in
his possession will be made only upon his request.
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and will not be credited to their accounts. This is the type of provision
which this author has found to be lacking in the fourth paragraph of
Article 18.m
(2). Advances of Pay
It has long been the custom for the Detaining Power to make advances to officer prisoners of war on account of their pay so that they
would have funds with which to purchase tobacco, toilet articles, etc.,
beyond that which might be issued to them or which might reach them
in relief parcels.423 Article 17 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provided
that officers would receive the same pay as officers of equivalent rank
in the armed forces of the Detaining Power, the amount so advanced
to be ultimately refunded by the Power of Origin.424 Article 23 of the
1929 Convention had a somewhat similar provision but with the proviso that in no case would the pay reeeived exceed the pay to which
they were entitled from the Power of Origin.425 Once again, specific
provision was made for reimbursement by the Power of Origin at the
end of hostilities.426
Apparently, these provisions of the 1929 Convention worked no
more effectively during World War II than their predecessors had

422 See pp. 115-116 supra. It is somewhat difficult to conceive of circumstances
under which the possession of an excess amount of money by a prisoner of war in
a prisoner-of-war camp would ever be "proper"-unless he can show that he had
it at the time of capture and no one from the Detaining Power had ever searched
him or even asked for the surrender of cash (or unless the Detaining Power is
willing to accept the frequently advanced claim that it was won by gambling with
other prisoners of war) .
423 This was probably a holdover from the days when officers, while awaiting
exchange, were paroled locally and had the obligation to arrange for their own
board and lodging and to pay for it. Concerning exchange and parole, see pp. 397402 infra.
424 During World War I Germany did not pay British officers who were prisoners
of war despite this provision, so the British reciprocated by putting German officerprisoners of war on special rates. United Kingdom, Foreign Office, The Treatment
of Prisoners of War in England and Germany during the First Eight Months of
the War 12-13. At a later date, when the Germans proposed that both sides should
comply with the provision, the British military authorities would not agree-not
only because they had learned that there was practically nothing that a British
prisoner of war could buy in Germany, but also because whatever he was paid by
the Detaining Power was deducted from the amount paid to his family and this
could have had serious consequences. Belfield, Treatment 146.
425 Mter the British experiences of World War I (note 424 supra), it is surprising that this was the only relevant change in the provision.
426 One very important, and needed, addition was a provision for the fixing of
the rate of exchange by agreement between the belligerents with a proviso that,
absent such an agreement, the rate in effect at the opening of hostilities would be
used. A number of agreements were reached on this subject. 1 ICRC Report 28384. Nevertheless, problems on rates of exchange did arise. Ibid., 284.
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worked during World War 1::127 As a result, the preliminary conferences recommended, and the 1949 Diplomatic Conference adopted,
what is now Article 60, containing a number of major changes in the
basic approach to the problem. These include (1) a provision for
advances of pay to enlisted men (other ranks) as well as to officers;
(2) elimination of the practice of tying the amount of the advance
of pay to the pay scale of the armed forces of either the Detaining
Power or the Power of Origin; (3) specifying exactly what the
advance in pay will be for each rank from private to general; (4)
using the value of the Swiss franc42s as the common denominator
with each Detaining Power converting the amount of the advance in
pay specified in Swiss francs into an equivalent amount in its own
currency based on the rate of exchange ;429 and (5) providing a method by which the Detaining Power may institute a specific temporary
system of advances in pay pending the conclusion of a special agreement with the Power of Origin.430
The first paragraph of Article 60 divides all military ranks into five
categories and specifies the monthly advance in pay each category is
to receive, the range being from 8 Swiss francs for Category I ("Prisoners ranking below sergeants") to 75 Swiss francs for Category V

427 A survey made by the United States in November 1945 disclosed that there
had apparently been no national policy in Germany and that advances of pay were
different in amount in almost every prisoner-of-war camp. American Prisoners of
War 19, 28, 60, 71, 79, 90, & 105. The United States, on its part, gave all enlisted
prisoners of war canteen coupon books worth $3 every month as a gratuity in order
to enable them to make purchases at the camp canteen. Rich, Brief History 437;
Hoole, And Still We Conquer 36.
42S This is the Swiss paper franc. As originally drafted, Article 51 (now Article
60) provided for the use of the Swiss gold franc at 203 milligrams of fine gold. As
a result of the singlehanded campaign of the delegate from the United Kingdom
(Gardner) in the Financial Sub-Committee, in Committee II, and at the Plenary
Meeting, the latter finally voted to remove all references to gold from the text of
the Convention. 2B Final Record 301-02. See note 431a infra.
429 There is no specification as to how the rate of exchange to be used will be
determined. It could be the rate of exchange on the date of the commencement of
hostilities. A more logical, but also more complicated, system would be to use the
rate available on the Swiss money market at the time each advance of pay is made.
430 Article 60, fourth paragraph, requires the Detaining Power to advise the
Protecting Power ,vithout delay of the reasons for such action. However, the Protecting Power is neither required nor authorized to evaluate or to approve the
reasons given.
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("General officers or prisoners of equivalent rank") .431 Although for
the members of the armed forces of many countries the amounts so
provided will appear minuscule, for the governments of other countries the amounts will appear completely disproportionate to the pay
scale of their own armed forces, with the advances in pay specified
in the Convention perhaps sometimes exceeding the full pay for the
various ranks. 432 This was foreseen, and provision was made in the
second paragraph of Article 60 for special agreements between the
belligerents which would modify the "statutory" scale.433 Moreover,
pending the reaching of such a special agreement, the third paragraph
of Article 60 permits the Detaining Power to put into force unilater431 The following table presents a comparison of a number of illustrative exchange values as of 27 July 1949, when the first paragraph of Article 60 was approved by the Plenary Meeting of the 1949. Diploma tic Conference, and as of 1
January 1977:
Comparative Table of Advances of Pay
I
III
V
II
IV
Gen.
Private
Sgt.
Capt.
Lt. Col.
Swiss franc
75
1949
50
60
12
8
75
1977"
50
60
8
12
British £
4.70
1949 b
3.75
0.50
0.75
3.10
18.02
1977
12.01
14.33
1.92
2.88
French franc
1949<
4,040
425
640
2,675
3,210
152.09
1977
16.22
101.39
121.67
24.43
Italian lire
10,725
1949
7,150
8,580
1,145
1,715
26,674
1977
2,845
4,268
17,783
21,339
United States $
18.75
1949
12.50
2.00 4
3.004
15.00
4.914
30.68
1977
24.54
20.45
3.274
Notes:
" Had the Swiss gold franc been retained as the standard, the converted figures
in the 1977 columns would have been between five and six times larger.
b While the United Kingdom had not yet converted to the decimal system in 1949,
it is used here in order to simplify comparisons.
<This was the "old franc," which was divided by 100 in 1958.
d These figures can be compared with the $3.00 per month in canteen coupons
which the United States issued gratuitously to all enlisted prisoners of war during
World War II. See note 427 supra.
432 At the time of signing the Convention on 12 August 1949, Portugal made a
reservation to this provision, stating that it would not bind itself to monthly advances in pay in excess of 50 percent of the Portuguese scale of pay. 1 Final
Record 351. This reservation was not maintained on ratification, 394 U.N.T.S. 257.
433 An agreement reducing the amount of advances of pay would "adversely
affect the situation of prisoners of war," and appears to be contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 6. However, it is obvious that this is what
the 1949 Diplomatic Conference intended. 2A Final Record 279, 532-38, passim.
For a discussion of agreements between belligerents, see pp. 84-86 supra.
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ally certain specified emergency measures where it would be seriously
embarrassed because the advances in pay which it would otherwise be
required to make "would be unduly high compared with the pay for
the Detaining Power's armed forces," or for any other reason. These
emergency measures require the Detaining Power to continue to credit
the individual prisoner-of-war accounts with the amounts specified
in the first paragraph of Article 60, but permit it to limit temporarily
the use of these credits by the prisoners of war to amounts considered
to be "reasonable."434 However, under the fourth paragraph of Article
60, the Protecting Power must be advised of the reasons for the limitations so imposed by the Detaining Power. One further limitation
is still placed on the Detaining Power's actions in this regard: it may
not reduce the advance of pay for Category I ("Prisoners ranking
below sergeants") below that which the members of its own armed
forces receive. 435
It has been mentioned above that under both the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929 Convention, the Detaining Power was to be reimbursed by the Power of Origin at the termination of hostilities for
the pay advanced to prisoners of war. Article 67 of the 1949 Convention adopts a somewhat different approach to the problem. While
stating affirmatively that advances of pay made by the Detaining Power
pursuant to Article 60 are made on behalf of the Power of Origin, it
provides for the negotiation of arrangements between the belligerents
at the close of hostilities. Moreover, the third paragraph of Article 66
specifically makes the Power of Origin responsible for settling the
credit balances due to prisoners of war on their personal accounts
upon the termination of captivity. As advances of pay are one of the
numerous different types of items included in those accounts, it is
unlikely that any of the "arrangements" contemplated by Article 67
will actually eventuate.
There is one other aspect of the "pay" of prisoners of war which
must be mentioned, one which had no precedent in prior conventions
-"supplementary pay." During World War II it had been necessary
to take some action to provide financial assistance to enlisted men
(other ranks) who, as we have seen, did not receive "advances of pay"
under the 1929 Convention.43G The 1949 Conference of Government
Experts proposed that a provision be included in the new convention
then under consideration which would require the Detaining Power
434 Unfortunately, no indications are contained in the Article as to the standards to be followed in determining what is "reasonable"-a determination which
will be made unilaterally by the Detaining Power. See p. 288 infra.
435 Although the wording here is somewhat murky, it was obviously intended to
prohibit the Detaining Power from reducing advances of pay to prisoners of war
in Category I below the pay of persons of equivalent status in its own armed
forces.
436 Franklin, Protection, Appendix XI, Circular Instruction, para. 15.

2~1

to accept from the Power of Origin lump sums to be credited to the
accounts of the prisoners of war depending on that country, the same
amount to be allocated therefrom to all prisoners of the same class.437
This proposal was incorporated into the draft convention and, with
considerable editing, was eventually approved by the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference as Article 61 of the Convention (despite the fact that the
new Article 60 now provided for advances of pay for all prisoners of
war, enlisted as well as commissioned). That Article provides that
the Detaining Power shall accept sums forwarded by the Power of
Origin for distribution to prisoners of war as "supplementary pay"
on the condition that all prisoners of war of the same category shall
receive the same amount, and on the further condition that all prisoners of war of that category shall share in the distribution. The supplementary pay is to be credited to the individual prisoner-of-war
accounts as quickly as possible and is not to relieve the Detaining
Power from any obligation to make advances of pay. While the necessity for such a provision has been greatly reduced by the fact that
under the first paragraph of Article 60 all prisoners of war are now
entitled to advances of pay, the provision may prove of value when
a Detaining Power avails itself of the privilege contained in the third
paragraph of Article 60, discussed immediately above, and limits the
amount of advances of pay made available for prisoner-of-war use.
(3). Working Pay
In the section of the 1949 Convention which is concerned with the
labor of prisoners of war, the first paragraph of Article 54 states
merely that the working pay shall be fixed in accordance with the
provisions of Article 62.438 This latter Article makes several major
changes in the prior practice with respect to the matter of "working
paY,"439 that is, the amount which the prisoner of war is entitled to
have credited to his personal account by reason of services actually
rendered by him.
The labor of prisoners of war may be utilized by the Detaining
Power in four different ways: (1) for the administration and operation of the prisoner-of-war camp itself; (2) working for the armed
forces of the Detaining Power; (3) working for other branches of
the government of the Detaining Power; and (4) working for private
persons who contract with the Detaining Power for prisoner-of-war
437

1947 GE Report 158.

438 This is unlike the manner in which the matter of currency in the possession
of a prisoner of war at the time of capture was dealt with. See note 416 supra.
439 Actually, Article 62 refers to "working rate of pay" twice and to "working
pay" four times, while Articles 54 and 64 refer only to "working pay." The term
"indemnite de travail" is used in the French version of all three of these articles
and the difference in English appears to be loose draftsmanship, rather than any
intent to convey two different meanings.
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labor.440 Under Article 34 of the 1929 Convention it was possible that
the first category mentioned would receive nothing in the way of
compensation for services performed441 and that the other three categories would receive varying rates of compensation. The first paragraph of Article 62 of the 1949 Convention clearly contemplates a
single basic rate of working pay for all prisoners of war; and the
second paragraph of Article 62 specifically provides that working pay
shall be paid to those prisoners of war engaged in the administration
and operation of the camp.
Article 34 of the 1929 Convention provided that prisoners of war
would be "entitled to wages to be fixed by agreements between the
belligerents." During World War II no such agreements were concluded.442 The first paragraph of Article 62, the cognate provision of
the 1949 Convention, provides for "working pay"443 in an amount to
be fixed by the Detaining Power, but which may not be less than onefourth of one Swiss franc for a full working day.444 The amount so
fixed must be "fair" and the prisoners of war must be informed of it,
as must the Power of Origin, through the Protecting Power.
With respect to the establishment by the Detaining Power of a
"fair working rate of pay," several matters should be noted. First,
440 For a complete discussion of the various problems involved with respect to
prisoner-of-war labor, see Chapter III infra.
441 The first paragraph of Article 34 of the 1929 Convention specifically so provided and few Detaining Powers elected to be more generous than legally required. McKnight, POW Employment 61-62; Lewis & Mewha 159. The United
States did eventually establish certain prisoner-of-war camp jobs as compensable.
McKnight, POW Employment 62; Lewis & Wewha 78; POW Circular No.1, para.
88.
442 1 ICRC Report 286. Although a number of statements such as that contained
in the text may be found, and the conclusions of a number of students of the practices of the United States during World War II are to the same effect (e.g., Lewis
& Mewha 77), at least a limited agreement in this respect was reached by Italy
and the United States in 1942. [1942] 3 For. Rel. U.S., Europe, at 25 & 30.
443 The word "wages" of the 1929 Convention was intentionally discarded and
the words "working pay" substituted in order to avoid invidious comparisons between civilian wages and the compensation paid to prisoners of war. 2A Final
Record 280,539, & 557.
444 This is, of course, once again, the Swiss paper franc, not the gold franc.
2B Final Record 302. The inadequacy of the minimum thus set by the first paragraph of Article 62 which amounted to approximately 6 cents a day in money of
the United States in 1949, is illustrated by the fact that over a century ago, in
1864, during the American Civil War, the Federal Government had set the rate
of prisoner-of-war pay at 10 cents a day for skilled workers and 5 cents a day
for the unskilled! Lewis & Mewha 39. During World War II the United States
paid prisoners of war 80 cents a day as compensation for their labor. Ibid., 77.
Under the incentive of the piecework system it was possible to increase this to
$1.20 a day. Ibid., 120. In 1942 the United States proposed, unsuccessfully, that
the enemy belligerents agree to three Swiss francs a day (then approximately 80
cents in American money) as the wage to be paid prisoners of war. Rich, Brief
History 419.
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no basis can be found in the history of the evolution of this provision
for attempting to determine what is "fair" by comparing the "working
pay" of prisoners of war with the wages earned by civilian workers.
There are too many diverse and unequal factors involved ;445 and the
extremely nominal minimum set by the first paragraph of Article 62
would seem to indicate clearly that there was no intention on the part
of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference to establish any such relationship.
Second, while there appears to be nothing to preclude a Detaining
Power from establishing a fair basic "working rate of pay," and then
providing for amounts in addition thereto for work requiring greater
skill, or heavier exertion, or greater exposure to danger, or as a production incentive, no authority exists for establishing different working rates of pay for prisoners of war of different nationalities who
have the same competence and are engaged in the same types of
work.H6 And finally, the rate established as "fair" may not thereafter
be administratively reduced by having a part of it "retained" by the
camp administration. The authority for this procedure, which was
contained in Article 34 of the 1929 Convention, has been intentionally
deleted from the 1949 Convention.447
It should be noted that the 1949 Convention, unlike the second paragraph of Article 34 of the 1929 Convention, does not contain any
provision for agreements between the belligerents with respect to
working pay. As drafted at Stockholm, there was a fourth paragraph
to Article 62 which provided that belligerents could, by special agreement, "change the scale."448 This was objected to at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference because it was subject to being construed as permitting agreements lowering the working pay below the specifically
prescribed minimum ;449 and if it only meant agreeing to increase the
working pay, it was unnecessary because this could already be accomplished under the first paragraph of Article 6-or even unilaterally. As a result of these objections, the proposed fourth paragraph
was deleted. 450 There is definitely no legal basis by which belligerents
may agree to reduce the working pay below the Convention minimum
of one-quarter of a Swiss franc for one full working day.
44t; For some of these differences, see 2A Final Record at 557; Mojonny, The
Labor of Prisoners of War under the Geneva Conventions 24. For a contrary view,
see Pictet, Commentary 315.
446 During World War II the Germans habitually paid Soviet prisoners of war
as little as one-half of the amount paid to prisoners of war of other nationalities.
Dallin, German Rule 425. Article 16 of the 1949 Convention now specifically prohibits "adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political
opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria."
4471947 GE Report 160.
448 Revised Draft Conventions 73.
449 2A Final Record 280 & 541. The JCRC had previously taken the same position.
Remarks and Proposals 54.
4502A Final Record 557.
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Several changes have been embodied in the second paragraph of
Article 62 of the 1949 Convention with respect to the types of work
which entitle a prisoner of war to working pay. Of major importance
is the fact that, while Article 34 of the 1929 Convention specifically
provided that "prisoners of war shall not receive wages for work
connected with the administration, management and maintenance of
[prisoner-of-war] camps," the second paragraph of Article 62 of the
1949 Convention is equally specific that prisoners of war "permanently
detailed to duties or to a skilled or semiskilled occupation in connection
with the administration, installation or maintenance of [prisoner-ofwar] camps" shall be entitled to working pay. This new Article also
contains a specific provision under which "prisoners who are required
to carry out spiritual or medical duties on behalf of their comrades"
are likewise entitled to working pay. There is nothing in the provision
to indicate whether the term "prisoners" refers to the nonmedical
service, but medically trained, personnel of Article 32, or to the retained medical personnel of Article 33, or to both. Retained personnel
are not, of course, prisoners of war45l-and it would undoubtedly be
attributing to the 1948 Stockholm Conference which drafted this
clause452 an unwarranted refinement in the choice of words if we
assumed that it used the term "prisoners" instead of "prisoners of
war" because it was referring to retained personnel who technically
are not prisoners of war. On the other hand. Article 32 refers exclusively to medical personnel, while the first paragraph of Article 33
refers to both medical personnel and to chaplains. As the relevant
portion of the second paragraph of Article 62, quoted immediately
above, refers to "spiritual or medical duties," there is certainly justification for assuming that the "prisoners" of that Article are the
retained personnel of the first paragraph of Article 33.453 And, while
the prisoners' representative and his advisers and assistants are primarily paid out of canteen funds, if there are no such funds, these
individuals, too, are entitled to "a fair working rate of pay" from
the Detaining Power. 454 Finally, although not specifically mentioned
in Article 62, because enlisted men who are assigned as orderlies in
officers' camps are, by the second paragraph of Article 44, specifically
exempted from any other work, and because this is, therefore, a full-

See pp. 70-74 supra.
Revised Draft Conventions 73.
453 This is apparently the conclusion reached by the United States as para. 147a
of U.S. Army Regs. 633-50 provides for the payment of working retained personnel of the same daily rate of pay as is received by prisoners of war.
454 If canteen funds are available, the third paragraph of Article 62 provides
that the prisoners' representative fixes the "scale" of working pay for himself
and his assistants, subject to approval by the camp commander.
451

452
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time job, it appears that they should be entitled to working pay from
the Detaining Power:Hi5
There is ope provision of the 1949 Convention which could render
this entire subject relatively moot. Under the last paragraph of Article 34 of the 1929 Convention the pay remaining to the credit of a
prisoner of war in his personal account was to be paid to him upon
the termination of his captivity.456 Under the first paragraph of Article 66 of the 1949 Convention, upon the termination of captivity the
Detaining Power gives the individual prisoner of war a statement
showing the entire credit balance due to him.457 Thereafter, under the
third paragraph of Article 66, it will be the responsibility of the Power of Origin, and not of the Detaining Power, to settle any balance
of his account which has been certified by the Detaining Power as
being due to him. Under these circumstances there appears to be
little reason why a Detaining Power should not be extremely generous in establishing its "fair working rate of pay." It can limit the
amount that a prisoner of war can use in the canteen and it will
merely be creating a future liability on the part of its enemy! This
fact may result in the negotiation of agreements between belligerents
fixing mutually acceptable maximum "working rates of pay," despite
the lack of a specific provision for such agreements in the 1949 Convention-agreements which, as has been noted, were not reached under
the 1929 Convention where there was a specific provision for them.

(4). Amounts Derived from Other Sources
"Supplementary pay" is, of course, one of the "other sources" from
which a prisoner of war may secure credits to his personal account.458
However, whether governments will make such payments for the
benefit of prisoners of war in future international armed conflicts is
doubtful in view of the fact that all prisoners of war will be entitled
to advances of pay and those who work will, in addition, receive working pay. Under the circumstances, it is probable that a major source
of other credits will be pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 63,
which directs that prisoners of war be permitted to receive remittances
of money sent to them "individually or collectively." In other words,
families may send remittances to be credited to the account of the
individual prisoners of war; or organizations may send lump sums
4G:; This was the policy followed by the United States during World War II.
POW Circular No.1, para. 85. It is also the present approved policy. U.S. Army
Regs. 633-50, para. 227b.
4GB In the event of his death it was to be forwarded to his heirs through diplomatic channels.
457 This will, of course, include not only his working pay, but all other credits,
less all debits.
4G8 See pp. 200-201 supra.

206
to be credited, for example, to the accounts of all of the prisoners of
war from one country at a particular prisoner-of-war camp.459
One other substantial source of credits to the personal accounts of
prisoners of war will be that derived from the repair or manufacture
of items by them during their off-time. Prisoners of war with unusual
skills will frequently do repairs during off-hours; and prisoner-of-war
artists and artisans will use their unique talents to create salable
products.46o Although the commercial aspects of the transactions
could conceivably be entered into directly between prisoner of war
and buyer, the merchandising procedure usually followed is that the
canteen acts as a middleman between the prisoner of war and the
buyer, who may be another prisoner of war, or a member of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power, or even a member of the civilian population.461 The canteen then turns the funds received for the
purchase, less a commission, over to the camp administration which
makes the appropriate credit on the personal accounts of the prisoners of war concerned.
b. DEBITS
(1). Payments Made to the Prisoner of War
The second paragraph of Article 64 refers to "payments made to
the prisoner [of war] in cash." While, as has been noted, the Detaining Power will rarely permit such payments to be made, the possibility does exist. Of course, when cash, or scrip money, or a canteen coupon book is issued to the prisoner of war, a debit in the
appropriate amount will be made on his account.
There is one particular use of cash which was envisaged by the
draftsmen of the Convention-for the purchase of "services or commodities" outside of the camp. The second paragraph of Article 58
provides that where such purchases are permitted, the prisoner of
war will either make the payment himself or it will be made for him
459 The possibility of such remittances will, of course, depend largely upon the
financial condition and exchange regulations of the country of the would-be remitter.
460 See pp. 236-237 infra. The ingenuity of the prisoner of war in this regard is
well illustrated by an episode related by a former labor officer for a prisoner-ofwar camp in England, which included the theft by the prisoners of war of baling
string, cotton, etc., from the farms on which they worked during the day, the
manufacture of these items into rope-soled shoes during the evening, and their
subsequent sale on the same farms. Barker, Behind Barbed Wire 103.
461 The policy of the United States is to permit sales only through the canteen.
U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 233. A provision limiting the prisoner of war to
an hourly rate of compensation which may not exceed the daily rate for paid
work contained in para. 233f of that Regulation is, perhaps, acceptable for the
prisoner-of-war tailor or shoemaker, but will be grossly unfair to the artist or
artisan.
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by the camp administration and charged to his account.462 The Detaining Power is directed to promulgate rules establishing the procedure for such transactions. It can be anticipated that the procedure preferred by most Detaining Powers, and which will be established by their rules, will be one pursuant to which payments are
made directly to the person from outside the camp by the camp administration and the amount so advanced is charged to the prisoner
of war's account.463

(2). Payments Made on Behalf of the Prisoner of War
The second paragraph of Article 63 provides that the credit balance
of the account of each prisoner of war is at his disposal and that the
Detaining Power "shall make such payments as are requested." However, this seemingly unlimited provision is in fact limited by a clause
which keeps the use of the credit balance "within the limits fixed by
the Detaining Power."464
As we have just seen, the Detaining Power may make payments
on behalf of a prisoner of war pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 58 for the purchase of services or commodities outside of the
camp, debiting his account by the amount so paid out. Also, if a prisoner of war is without news from home for a lengthy period of time,
or has an emergency, the second paragraph of Article 71 permits
him to send a telegram, the charge for which will be debited on
his account.465
(8). Sums Transferred at the Request of the Prisoner of War
The third paragraph of Article 24 of the 1929 Convention required
the Detaining Power to grant facilities for the transfer of any cash
("ready money") taken from a prisoner of war at the time of capture
and credited to his account or deposited by him in his account "to
banks or private persons in [his] country of origin." Article 38 of
that same Convention referred to "consignments of money or valu462 During W orld War II the British gave prisoners of war sterling cash for
this purpose, but the general practice was otherwise. 2A Final Record 278.
403 The provision concerning payments being made by the prisoners of war
themselves was really added to the text in order to permit the United Kingdom
to follow its World War II practice if it so desired. Ibid., 278, 53!.
404 This is why the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 66 could make
many of the rules relating to financial resources meaningless. See p. 205
supra. The Detaining Power is not concerned with respect to the ultimate size
of the credit balance as long as its use within the territory of the Detaining Power can be restricted; and it need not concern itself that the Power of Origin may
do the same thing with respect to the accounts of the members of its own armed
forces who are prisoners of war, inasmuch as the action to be taken by it with
respect to the credit balances upon their repatriation is a purely domestic matter.
46G See pp. 151-152 supra.
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abIes" which the prisoner of war might send in the mail.406 However,
because of the exchange regulations o,f the various belligerents, very
few transmittals of money from the territory of a Detaining Power to
the territory of a Power of Origin actually occurred.467
The current provisions relating to this subject are to be found in the
second and third paragraphs of Article 63 and in Annex V. The second
paragraph of Article 63 provides that, subject to the Detaining Power's financial and monetary restrictions, prisoners of war may have
payments made abroad, with remittances to dependents given priority.
Of course, the prisoner of war in any future major international
armed conflict will once again find his privileges in this regard severely limited, if not completely nullified, by the Detaining Power's ex, change regulations-which now have the added legitimacy of specific
mention in the Convention.
The third paragraph of Article 63 and Annex V (which is incorporated by reference in the fourth paragraph of Article 63) set forth
the procedure by which the prisoner of war, with the consent of the
Power of Origin, may send remittance to his home country: (1) the
authorities in tne Detaining Power prepare a notification containing
(a) the identification of each prisoner-of-war payer, (b) the name
and address of each payee, and (c) the amount to be transmitted,
stated in the currency of the Detaining Power; (2) the notification
is signed by each prisoner-of-war payer and countersigned by the
prisoners'representative; (3) the camp commander certifies that each
prisoner-of-war payer has a credit balance adequate to cover the remittance; (4) each sum to be remitted is deducted from the account
of the appropriate prisoner of war. the sums so deducted being placed
by the Detaining Power to the credit of the Power of Origin; and (5)
the notification is sent by the Detaining Power through the Protecting
Power to the Power of Origin. The Power of Origin then has the
internal responsibility of actually making payment to the payee.468

466 The Germans did not permit British prisoners of war to mail the currency
of their country back home during World War II. German Regulations No. 36,
para..,672. However, American currency taken from American prisoners of war
at the' time of capture could be sent to the United States through the Deutsche
Bank in Berlin. Ibid., No. 37, para. 697.
467 1 ICRC Report 290. In May 1944 the United States authorized Italian prisoners of war to transmit up to $100 in any quarter to their families in Italy.
German prisoners of war never received this authorization. Rich, Brief History 440.
468 If the number of prisoners of war held by both sides is substantially equal,
the transmittal of funds by prisoners of war could be entirely a paper transaction,
the debits and credits of the Detaining Power and of the Power of Origin balancing
each other out. Of course, this type of situation rarely occurs.
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c. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
In addition to the third paragraph of Article 63 and Annex V setting forth the detailed procedure for the transmittal of prisoner-ofwar funds, the Convention contains a number of other administrative
instructions with respect to the maintenance of the prisoner-of-war
accounts.
The basic provision is, of course, Article 64, which establishes the
accounts themselves and enumerates the several general categories of
credits and debits. 4G9 Article 65 provides some of the routine accounting procedures to be followed, all of which are obviously intended to
protect the prisoner of war by ensuring that he receives all of the
credits to which he is entitled and that no debit is made without his
consent. Thus, the first paragraph of Article 65 requires that every
entry in a prisoner-of-war account must be certified by the signature
or the initials of the prisoner of war or of the prisoners' representative acting on his behalf. The second paragraph of Article 65 requires
that the Detaining Power afford the prisoner of war the opportunity
to check his account and to obtain a copy of it.470 When a prisoner of
war is transferred from one camp to another, the third paragraph of
Article 65 provides that his account will likewise be transferred. When
he is transferred from one Detaining Power to another, he is to be
given a certificate showing his credit balance; and unconverted currency (money taken from him at the time of capture which was not
in the currency of the first Detaining Power and which he had elected
not to have converted) is likewise to be transferred. 471 The last paragraph of Article 65 contains the rather strange provision that the
belligerents "may agree to notify each other at specific intervals
through the Protecting Power, the amount of the accounts of the pris-

461l

See pp. 194-195 supra.

470 The second paragraph of Article 65 also authorizes the representatives of
the Protecting Power to inspect the accounts when they visit a prisoner-of-war
camp. Except that they might find generalities (i.e., no credits for advances of
payor working pay, no signatures or initials to certify debits, etc.) the inspection
by the representatives of the Protecting Power will be of value only when it is
concerned with the complaint of a specific prisoner of war with reference to his
personal account.
471 The Detaining Power to which he is transferred will probably allow the prisoner of war to retain the certificate for use under the third paragraph of Article
66, not allowing him to use the credit balance while in its custody. If the unconverted money includes any currency of the new Detaining Power, this will now be
credited to his account in accordance with the provisions of the fourth paragraph
of Article 18, and the first paragraphs of Articles 58 and 59. This was the procedule followed during World War II. Rich, Brief History 439.
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oners of war."472 As far as appears, such a notification would merely
inform the Power of Origin of the amount that its indebtedness
(under the third paragraph of Article 66) to the members of its armed
forces who are prisoners of war would have been if the armed con
flict had ended on the date to which the amounts of the prisoner-of
war accounts were computed.473
Finally, the rules for the ultimate closing of the prisoner-of-war
accounts upon the termination of captivity by release or repatriation
are set forth in Article 66. The first paragraph of Article 66 requires
that at such time the Detaining Power give to the prisoner of war a
certified statement of his account showing the credit balance due
him ;474 while the third paragraph of Article 66 places upon the Power
of Origin the responsibility for actually settling the account.4n· And
M

M

472 It is obvious that this provision is ambiguous. Does it mean the total amount
due on all prisoner-of-war accounts-or does it mean the amounts due on each
separate prisoner-of-war account? The original proposal, made by the Canadian
delegate at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, used the word "amount." 2A Final
Record 282. The Sub-Committee of Financial Experts approved this proposal, the
meaning of which was not explained. Ibid., 546-47. On 29 June 1949 the Sub-Committee decided to coordinate the French and English texts to read: "les montants
figurant aux comptes des prisonniers de guerre [the amounts of accounts of prisoners of war.]" Ibid., 552. Nevertheless, its Report, submitted two days later, on
1 July 1949 used the words, "the amount of accounts of the prisoners of war"
(Ibid., 555), and this remained the form in which it was finally adopted. The
French version continued in the plural, although the word "les montants" did
somehow become "les releves" in the final version. Presumably, it is the amount
of each individual account which was intended, but the final English version does
not specifically so indicate. Of course, inasmuch as this provision requires an
agreement between the belligerents in order to become effective, the ambiguity
can be resolved in such an agreement.
473 The ICRC says that the value of the provision is that it allows the Power
of Origin to see how the Detaining Power is fulfilling its obligations. Pictet, Commentary 325-26. As only totals will be given, this appears doubtful.
474 The second paragraph of Article 119 provides that "on repatriation" impounded articles of value and unconverted currency wiII be restored to each prisoner of war and that if this is not done these items will be sent to the Detaining
Power's Information Bureau. That Bureau, under the last paragraph of Article
122, has the obligation to send to the Power of Origin "all personal valuables, including sums in currencies other than that of the Detaining Power." Although
Article 119 refers only to "on repatriation," the last paragraph of Article 122
refers to prisoners of war who have been "repatriated or released, or who have
escaped or died."
475 The 1949 Diplomatic Conference intentionally departed from the prior system under which each prisoner of war was to be given his credit balance in cash
prior to repatriation. 2A Final Record 568. What the Power of Origin actually
does in this regard will, of course, be solely a matter of domestic concern. See
note 464 supra. (At the time of signing the Convention on 12 August 1949, Italy
made a general reservation to this provision. 1 Final Record, 348. This reservation was not maintained on ratification. 120 U.N.T.S. 299.) Soviet International
Law 432 erroneously states that the balance due each prisoner of war "is handed
to him when captivity is terminated."
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the second paragraph of Article 66 states that the provisions of the
article may be varied by agreement "between any two of the Parties
to the conflict."476
In the cases referred to above, of release and repatriation, as well
as in cases of the termination of the captivity by "escape, death or
any other means," the Detaining Power is required by the first paragraph of Article 66 to send to the Power of Origin, through the Protecting Power, lists identifying the prisoners of war concerned and
certifying the amount of the credit balance of each one. 477
There remains to be mentioned only one last facet of the financial
aspects of the life of the prisoner of war--claims. This subject is
dealt with in Article 68.478 The second paragraph of Article 68 provides that claims for compensation for personal effects, money, or
valuables taken from the prisoner of war upon capture and "not forthcoming on his repatriation"479 shall be referred to the Power of Origin. 480 This same rule applies to items alleged to have been lost due
to the negligence of the Detaining Power, with the proviso that if it
is the type of item required for use by the prisoner of war while in
custody, the Detaining Power must, at its own expense, replace it.
Finally, once again the Detaining Power must provide the prisoner
of war with a certified statement containing full information as to
why the missing items have not been restored to the prisoner of war,

476 The agreed variations would certainly apply only to the two belligerents
concerned. This provision clearly removes Article 66 from the purview of the first
paragraph of Article 6 of the Convention.
477 It will be noted that the first paragraph of Article 66, the second paragraphs of Article 68 and 119, and the last paragraph of Article 122 vary widely as
to the types of termination of captivity to which reference is made. It is believed
that this is merely another instance of poor internal coordination and that the
intent in each instance was to include all relevant cases of the termination of
captivity, whether by release, repatriation, escape, death, or any other means.
478 The first paragraph of Article 68 is concerned with claims arising out of
accidents at work. This subject is discussed in connection with civil rights (see
p. 183 supra) and with the overall subject of the employment of prisoners of war
(see pp. 249-252 infra).
-170 See the comment in note 477 supra.
4S0 It must be borne in mind that even though "not forthcoming on his repatriation," the missing items may eventually reach the prisoner of war. See, e.g., note
474 supra. For a large-scale analogous program to brinOg together ex-prisoners of
war and the items which were left behind at the time of repatriation, see 3 ICRC
Report 115-16.
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with a copy being forwarded to the Power of Origin through the
Central Prisoners of War Agency.481
481 There is no logic whatsoever to the sudden naming of the Central Prisoners
of War Agency as the intermediary in this matter, and it is incomprehensible that
the ICRC representative in Committee II did not point this out. The copy of the
certificate showing the credit balance, given to the prisoner of war at the same
time that he receives this certificate, is, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article
66, sent by the Detaining Power to the Protecting Power for transmission to the
Power of Origin, as are others (e.g., the first paragraph of Article 62 and the
third paragraph of Article 63). This entire Article derived from a United Kingdom proposal (3 Final Record Annex 128, at 75) which contained the reference
to the Central Agency and, although a number of other changes were made, apparently no one noted the incongruity of naming the Central Agency to perform
the function here allocated to it.
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